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ABSTRACT 
 
In the first chapter, we use a laboratory experiment to investigate 
empirically the influence of various organizational designs on producing welfare-
enhancing outcomes for a firm. We find organizational design significantly 
influences group outcomes without changes to incentive structures, which can be 
explained by a theory that assumes individuals care not only about their own self-
interest but receive disutility when the group outcome deviates from a social 
norm. We hypothesize that organizational design changes affect individuals 
through a combination of changing the amount of moral wiggle room available 
and cognitive energy required to self-deceive, and allowing for individuals to 
update their beliefs about assumed group preferences through communication.  
In chapter two, we consider recent research utilizing Health and 
Retirement Survey data, which identifies a growing wealth gap between veterans 
and non-veterans entering retirement age. We survey the literature by exploring 
institutional factors such as income challenges associated with military service. 
We conclude that while servicemembers may earn income near parity with their 
non-veteran peers, they face significant challenges in maintaining dual income 
households. Similarly, homeownership is much lower among active duty 
servicemembers and below the American average. A decline in veteran wealth 
places strains on intergenerational transfers, which may be especially 
challenging for legacy servicemembers. The literature suggests servicemembers, 
like most Americans, struggle with financial literacy but seek professional 
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guidance at higher rates than the national average. Recent retirement changes 
within the Department of Defense (DOD) present opportunities for behaviorally 
informed savings programs. Finally, we consider how locus of control influences 
veteran wealth outcomes. 
Finally, our third chapter examines the impact of changing DOD presence 
on median wages by gender and on occupational crowding. We focus on the 
implementation of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). We use the 
American Communities Survey data linking BRAC actions to county economic 
outcomes of interest. Our findings indicate heterogeneous impacts on wages by 
gender resulting from BRAC shocks, primarily associated with military personnel 
shocks. We find military personnel shocks also significantly affects the wage gap 
between men and women. However, we find little support for changes in DOD 
presence materially impacting occupational crowding. 
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CHAPTER 1  
THE ECONOMICS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN: AN 
EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH 
1.1 Introduction 
What impact does organizational design have on firm outcomes? Apple Inc. and 
Valve Corporation are both arguably successful in their respective fields. Innovative 
products produced by Apple have resulted in the company skyrocketing to the most 
valuable company in the world (by market capitalization). Since Valve’s founding in 
1996, Valve has been a disruptor in the video game development and digital distribution 
space. While each organization has been successful, these organizations have very 
different approaches to organizational design.  
These two organizations tell a compelling story about finding success without a 
single “optimal” organizational design strategy. Sir Richard Branson describes the late 
Apple CEO Steve Jobs’ leadership style as “autocratic” with a desire to control every 
detail himself (Branson, 2011). In stark contrast, Valve Corporation describes 
themselves as a “flat” company (Valve, 2012). In the new employee handbook, Valve 
even goes so far as to say “…we don’t have any management, and nobody ‘reports to’ 
anybody else. We do have a founder/president, but even he isn’t your manager.”  
In our study, we use theory and laboratory experiments to study the interplay 
between organizational design and firm outcomes such as profit maximization. In 
particular, we investigate a spectrum of organizational structures, ranging from a flat 
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hierarchy (majority vote) to an autocracy and demonstrate that, without changing 
monetary incentives, changes in design can significantly influence whether welfare-
enhancing outcomes are achieved.  
The economics literature on organizational design provides relatively little 
discussion of strategic group behavior, or ways in which organizational design 
influences group decision making. Traditionally, this literature falls into three common 
theoretical approaches: transaction cost economics (see Williamson, 2000), information 
processing (see Galbraith, 1974; Tushman and Nadler, 1978; Keren and Levhari, 1989; 
Radner, 1992) and the decentralization of incentives (see Radner, 1992; Colombo and 
Delmastro, 2008).  
Researchers have begun placing increased attention on the interactions of the 
more traditional monetary incentives and social concerns of workers within firms. For 
example, Kandel and Lazear (1992) formalize a theory incorporating peer pressure and 
how it operates within partnerships with profit sharing. Additionally, Rotemberg (1994) 
provides a framework to rationalize altruistic behavior of supervisors because of 
strategic complementarity in the workplace. Still others have studied contract 
implications of other social preferences such as fairness, inequality aversion, and social 
esteem (Fehr et al., 2007; Englmaier and Wambach, 2010; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 
2007). This study is part of a growing body of empirical literature that utilizes 
experimental methods to gain a better understanding of both within and between-firm 
behaviors (see Levitt and Neckermann, 2014). 
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While prior experiments have not focused on organizational design, there are 
several economics experiments on group decision-making. In a recent survey of the 
group decision-making literature, Charness and Sutter (2012) document several 
situations where groups are more likely to fall in line with standard game-theoretic 
predictions, and by doing so decrease welfare. For example, in the trust game, groups 
send and return smaller amounts than individuals send and return (Kugler, Bornstein, 
Kocher, and Sutter, 2007; Song, 2008); in the centipede game, teams defect earlier 
(Bornstein, Kugler, and Ziegelmeyer, 2004); and in the prisoner’s dilemma, groups 
cooperate at significantly lower levels (Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini, 2007). These 
studies rely on three-player groups where subjects equally share the group payoff, and 
make decisions facing an outgroup.1  
There are many interesting circumstances in which groups make decisions 
among alternatives without directly considering an outgroup. These decisions can also 
result in benefits that are heterogeneous among group members. A department hiring 
decision, choosing a business strategy, a family deciding where to eat on a special 
occasion are all examples of cases when it is possible for a group to make a decision 
without considering an outgroup, and benefits may accrue unevenly to group members. 
In these cases, the choice of organizational design may promote welfare-maximizing 
                                            
 
 
 
1 Charness et al (2007) finds that payoff commonality significantly lowers social efficiency for groups in 
the prisoner’s dilemma when playing against an outgroup player but increases cooperation and social 
efficiency with ingroup players. In the payoff commonality treatment, subjects received one-third of the 
payoff sum from other groups members’ outcome. 
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outcomes. We feel this class of problem is understudied in the literature but has 
meaningful implications for the economics of the firm.  
Using three-player groups, we examine four organizational structures inspired by 
Baron et al. (1996), and Baron and Kreps (1999): engineering model, flat bureaucracy, 
tall bureaucracy, and autocratic model. In the engineering model, we consider a firm 
using a majority vote to make decisions thus representing a completely flat organization. 
A flat bureaucracy represents a firm where two subordinates make independent 
recommendations to a decision authority. This is similar to our tall bureaucracy, where a 
subordinate makes a recommendation to a superior but the superior makes his own 
recommendation to the decision authority. Finally, we consider an autocratic model 
where the decision authority makes a binding decision without feedback from the group 
he represents. In the experiment, we frame each of these settings neutrally to avoid 
priming effects. 
Our experiment builds on the work of Engelmann and Strobel (2004, henceforth 
E&S) who investigate the relative importance of efficiency concerns, maximin 
preferences, and inequality aversion in distribution experiments. While our paper is not 
directly about testing these preferences, we find the E&S framework helpful in 
discussing the impacts of organizational design on group decision making. For example, 
the E&S framework allows us to cleanly identify efficiency concerns without confounding 
our results with other motives such as maximin preferences, or inequality aversion. 
Unlike E&S, we do not rely on role uncertainty and instead randomly assign roles to 
subjects, which we maintain throughout the experiment. 
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In each decision round, and depending on what organizational design has been 
assigned, groups must choose among three payoff allocations. Groups must choose 
between allocations that increase total group payoffs and/or increase the payoff 
assigned to the lowest paid player. Additionally, in some cases, a decision authority 
must also consider allocations that increase his own payoff.  We can think of the payoffs 
in each allocation in many ways. These payoffs can reflect direct monetary payoffs (e.g. 
bonuses) to employees within a firm for different production or service outcomes. In the 
case where group payoffs are tied to firm-level profits, allocations that maximize group 
member payoffs reflect firm profit-maximizing allocations. Payoffs may also represent 
utility from non-pecuniary drivers. This may be in the form of relative standing within the 
firm or satisfaction from the recognition of supervisees. For ease of exposition, and to 
coincide with the related literature, we refer to the “efficient” outcome as one that 
maximizes group payoffs. 
To understand better the links between organizational design and individual 
preferences, we propose a theoretical framework loosely inspired by Rabin (1994), Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999), and Konow (2000). We model players as facing tradeoffs between 
self-interested gains and adherence to a social norm, such as efficiency. Players are 
potentially influenced by the recommendations provided by others. This internal struggle 
and the resulting disutility is what social psychology refers to as, “cognitive dissonance.” 
In introducing the concept of cognitive dissonance, Leon Festinger (1957) also 
proposed subjects can reduce cognitive dissonance by decreasing the self-interested 
behavior or by self-deceiving. We make no concerted efforts to create or reinforce group 
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identity which itself might lead to increased social welfare maximizing behavior (Chen 
and Li, 2009). However, our results point to the complimentary nature of group identity 
and the choice of organizational design itself in promoting efficiency within the firm.  
Turning briefly to the results, we find that organizational design significantly 
influences group outcomes. We see variation across treatments in the proportion of 
outcomes aligned with motives such as efficiency concerns, maximin motives, and self-
interest. Consistent with expectations, as we move from the engineering model to the 
autocracy, decision makers become less willing to tradeoff own payoffs and payoffs to 
others. In the flat bureaucracy and tall bureaucracy treatments, we find that 
recommendations from subordinates significantly influence the importance of group 
norms. We find statistical evidence that suggests both adherence to social norms of 
efficiency and maximizing the payoff of the lowest-paid player are important. The latter 
motive is associated with a higher marginal utility. Moreover, when both maximin and 
efficiency norms are controlled for, adhering to efficiency norms is no longer statistically 
significant for the tall bureaucracy and autocratic treatments.   
1.2 Experimental Design 
In the following subsections, we detail our experimental design by first 
addressing common elements across treatments. We then provide details specific to 
each of our four treatments: Engineering model firm, Flat Bureaucracy, Tall 
Bureaucracy, and Autocratic model. We provide the 23 allocations we use across 
treatments in the Appendix A and the instructions for each treatment in Appendix B. 
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1.2.1 Common Elements Across Treatments 
Each session consists of 23 decision rounds (11 from E&S, 12 of our own design; 
see Appendix A). Players are randomly assigned to a group of three subjects and a role 
of Player 1, Player 2, or Player 3. Subjects maintain their group and role assignment 
throughout the experiment. Each round represents one of 23 choice sets of three 
different allocations between three persons. We randomize the order of the 23 sets 
across groups and between sessions. Additionally, we randomize the order the three 
allocations are presented in each round between sessions. Subjects are told they will 
not know how many decision rounds there are until the experiment is complete. All 
decisions are made and recorded via networked computers using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007). One of the authors read the instructions aloud and addressed any questions. No 
practice rounds are provided consistent with E&S. 
We make it clear to the subjects that two of the 23 decision rounds are selected at 
random to be the paid rounds and that each round is equally likely to be selected. There 
is no feedback at the end of each round. Only the outcomes from the two paid rounds 
are announced at the conclusion of the experiment.  
While each treatment represents a different organizational design, we provide a 
neutral framing. Our objective is to identify distributional preference changes due to the 
organizational design. Framing one player as having a formal title with responsibility or 
authority over the others would potentially introduce unintended experimental demands. 
Additionally, each session consists of one treatment.  
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1.2.1.1 E&S Decision Task Themes 
Below, we present Figure 1.1 to illustrate the typical E&S task and then provide 
descriptions of themes captured in the E&S tasks. We see from this example that 
Players can choose between allocations “A”, “B”, or “C.” The motives are labeled from 
Player 3’s perspective. We see that Player 3 has no opportunities to choose selfishly 
because all allocations provide the same payoff to Player 3. However, we see differing 
levels of efficiency across the choice set. Efficiency is defined as the total payoff of all 
players in an allocation. In the example below, the sum total of payoffs to each player in 
allocation “A” is 18. Since allocation “A” results in the highest group payoff, allocation 
“A” is the efficient allocation. The allocation which maximizes the minimum payoff 
across the choice set is defined as the “maximin allocation.” In the example below, 
allocation “C” maximizes the minimum payoff for all players and is therefore the 
maximin allocation. We now distinguish sets of tasks based on their payoff structure. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 – Example E&S Decision Task 
 
Taxation Games (Decision Tasks 1-4) – This setting is characterized by a 
“middle income” individual choosing payoffs for a “high income” individual and a “low 
income” individual.  The “middle income” individual is provided with the same payoff 
A B C
Player 3 6 6 6
Player 2 10.5 8.5 6.5
Player 1 1.5 2 2.5
Predictions
Selfish A B C
Efficiency A
Maximin C
Ex (E&S1.4)
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across the three allocations to remove selfish motives. We have arranged the 
allocations so that Player 3, in our design, is the “middle income” individual.  
Envy Games (Decision Tasks 5-8) – The envy games are characterized by the 
ability of the “middle income” individual to reduce the payoff available to the “high 
income” individuals by simultaneously reducing the payoff available to “low income” 
individuals. In decision task 5, the payoff to the “middle income” individual, Player 3, is 
kept constant across the three available options. However, in decision tasks 6, 7, and 8, 
E&S introduce a selfish motive by providing different payoffs to Player 3 across the 
three available options. This variation provides insight to the tradeoff individuals are 
willing to make between selfish concerns or efficiency concerns and maximin 
preferences. 
Rich and Poor Games (Decision Tasks 9-11) – In contrast to the prior decision 
tasks, the rich and poor games are characterized by Player 3 receiving the highest 
payoff or the lowest payoff respectively. Player 3’s payoff is constant across the three 
choices for each of the decision tasks. The final decision task provided by E&S, 
decision task 11, reintroduces the taxation game structure but separates efficiency from 
all other fairness motives considered by E&S. These structures were chosen by E&S to 
analyze efficiency, maximin preferences, and inequality aversion. Again, we focus our 
analysis on efficiency and maximin preferences. 
1.2.1.2 HCP Decision Task Themes 
The E&S tasks primarily focus on an environment where Player 3 faces a 
constant payoff across the choice set. In the Hierarchy Consistent Payoff (HCP) tasks, 
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we provide variations to Player 3’s payoffs to increase the opportunities for selfish 
behavior. Below, we present Figure 1.2 to illustrate a typical HCP task.  
 
 
Figure 1.2 – Example HCP Task 
 
 We now see Player 3 has an opportunity to choose selfishly. That is make a 
choice that will result in a higher payoff for himself. In Figure 1.2, allocation “B” leads to 
the highest payoff for Player 3 and is therefore the “selfish allocation.” Using the same 
definitions from above, we see here allocation “A” is the efficient allocation and 
allocation “C” is the maximin allocation. Below we provide a brief description for each of 
the themes we capture in the HCP tasks. 
HCP1 Series (Decision Tasks 12-14) – In the HCP1 series of decision tasks we 
disentangle self-interest from efficiency and maximin preferences. To choose the 
efficient allocation in T2, T3, and T4, Player 3 must give up some amount of their own 
payoff. To select the maximin allocation, Player 3 must give up double the amount 
relative to the amount required to choose the efficient allocation. The cost to achieve an 
efficient or maximin allocation increases from decision task 12 to decision task 13 and 
again from decision task 13 to decision task 14. 
A B C
Player 3 9 9.25 8.75
Player 2 7.5 5 6.25
Player 1 4.5 4 5
Predictions
Selfish B
Efficiency A
Maximin C
HCP1.1
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HCP2 Series (Decision Tasks 15-17) – The HCP1 series decision tasks focused 
on isolating self-interest, efficiency concerns, and maximin preferences. Here we 
instead focus on self-interest while allowing the efficient and maximin allocation to 
coincide. This design provides a clear contrast for self-interest against efficiency and 
maximin preferences. 
HCP3 Series (Decision Tasks 18-20) – We carry forward elements from the 
HCP2 series of decision tasks but now hold constant the payoff for Player 2. This 
adjustment makes Player 2 indifferent between the three allocations in each of the 
decision tasks with respect to their own payoff. Having Player 2 indifferent between 
allocations concerning their own payoff reduces the cognitive energy required to self-
deceive oneself into choosing the selfish choice. In the HCP2 series of decision tasks, if 
Player 3 chooses selfishly it is at the expense of both Player 1 and Player 2. This 
dynamic is no longer present in the HCP3 series since the payoff to Player 2 is constant 
across allocations. We maintain the alignment of efficiency and maximin predictions to 
isolate self-interest motives. 
HCP4 Series (Decision Tasks 20-23) – Finally, we present the HCP4 series of 
decision task. In the HCP3 series of decision tasks, we focused on the alignment of the 
maximin preferences and efficiency concerns while isolating selfish motives. In the 
HCP4 series of decision tasks, we relax the constant payoff across allocations for 
Player 2 and now align selfish motives with maximin. By doing so, we isolate efficiency 
concerns and show the influence the efficiency motive when a decision maker is faced 
with clearly aligned selfish and maximin allocations. 
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1.2.2 Experimental Treatments 
1.2.2.1 Engineering Model (T1) 
In each period, subjects are asked to vote for one of the three available allocations 
for implementation. The option with a majority is selected for implementation and the 
decision round ends. As part of the instructions, subjects are informed that if a majority 
is not reached, which means that each player chose a different allocation, one of the 
allocations is randomly selected. This ensures no learning occurs within periods through 
an unanimity rule that may require several iterations to resolve and maintains 
comparability between treatments.  
This setting is characterized by a lack of responsibility accruing to a single decision 
maker but places pressures on group members to vote for the assumed group norm in 
order to achieve a majority. 
1.2.2.2 Flat Bureaucracy (T2) 
Player 1 and Player 2 provide a recommendation to Player 3. Player 1, Player 2 and 
Player 3 simultaneously consider the three allocations for the period. Player 1 and 
Player 2 make a selection to serve as their recommendation to Player 3. 
Recommendations made by Player 1 and Player 2 are then provided to Player 3. Player 
3 then makes a final selection to end the decision round.  
While the responsibility for the group payoff now falls solely on the group decision 
maker, having several sources of information provides potentially strong guidance to the 
decision maker on which allocation to choose reducing or even eliminating moral wiggle 
room. 
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1.2.2.3 Tall Bureaucracy (T3) 
While similar to the Flat Bureaucracy treatment, the Tall Bureaucracy treatment 
differs in that Player 1 now makes a recommendation to Player 2. Next, Player 2 
considers the three allocations for the period and Player 1’s recommendation. Player 2 
can either confirm Player 1’s recommendation by making the same recommendation or 
deny Player 1’s recommendation by making a new recommendation. Only Player 2’s 
recommendation proceeds to Player 3 for consideration. Finally, we provide Player 3 
with Player 2’s recommendation and the three allocations to consider. Player 3 will 
make a final selection for implementation for the group and end the decision round.  
In this treatment, responsibility for the group payoff still falls solely on the group 
decision maker. However, the partial nature of the information passed between other 
group members and the decision maker increases the amount of moral wiggle room 
available to the decision maker.  
1.2.2.4 Autocratic Model (T4) 
In this treatment, Player 1, Player 2, and Player 3 simultaneously consider the three 
different allocations for the period. As part of the instructions, we make it clear that 
recommendations from Player 1 and Player 2 will not go forward to Player 3 for 
consideration. We ask Player 1 and Player 2 to select which allocation they would 
recommend to Player 3, if they could. Player 3 considers the three different allocations 
without recommendations and makes a selection to end the decision round.  
This setting is characterized by a decision authority that bears the full responsibility 
for the group payoff and no information is exchanged with the autocrat. The autocrat 
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can deviate from the assumed group norm but must expend costly cognitive effort to do 
so. 
1.2.3 Participants 
A total of 162 University of Tennessee undergraduate students participated in an 
experiment conducted at the UT experimental Economics Laboratory. These individuals 
were recruited from a pool of roughly 1,400 students representing a diverse assortment 
of majors who had previously registered as potential economics experiment 
participants. Roughly 58% of participants were male with an average age of 21 years. 
21% of participants had taken one or no economics courses and 88% had taken fewer 
than 3. Roughly 53% of participants have participated in a previous (unrelated) 
experiment. Earnings for this experiment were denominated in US dollars. Each session 
lasted approximately one hour and subjects earned an average of $16.04. Each subject 
was paid in private using sealed envelopes at the conclusion of each session. When 
asked how well subjects understood the instructions in a post-experiment questionnaire, 
subjects responded with an average 4.80 out of 5. With 5 representing the instructions 
were understood “very well.” 
1.3 Theoretical Framework and Testable Hypotheses 
Here we provide a theoretical framework, which we will use to inform the data 
analysis. We consider a model of group decision making shaped by organizational 
design. In this setting, a group of three players must choose between three allocations. 
Each individual is motivated to maximize his own self-interest. However, he is also 
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motivated by social concerns with a changing sensitivity to these social concerns based 
on his setting. All decision makers are assumed to have a utility function of the form 
𝑈(𝒛𝑗) = 𝛽𝑧𝑗𝑖 + 𝐶[?̂? − 𝑆(𝒛𝑗)].     (1) 
Here, 𝑧𝑗𝑖 is the monetary payoff to player 𝑖 from allocation 𝑗, and 𝛽 is the marginal utility 
from receiving another dollar (i.e. it is the marginal utility of income). Let 𝑆(𝒛𝑗) represent 
some measure of group welfare, the statistic 𝑆 can represent total group payoff, 
average group payoff, the lowest individual payoff in the group, or some measure of 
equality. Let ?̂? represent the highest feasible value achievable for all choices of 𝒛𝑗.  
 The coefficient 𝐶 denotes the individual’s sensitivity to changes in the group 
welfare measure 𝑆, and it is also the parameter affected by the experimental treatments. 
The coefficient 𝐶 is negative if an individual dislikes deviations from ?̂? and positive 
otherwise. This sensitivity changes as a result of a “choice-shift” effect proposed by 
Levinger and Schneider (1969). The choice shift effect occurs when (a) a group 
member has a preference that might differ from what he believes is the norm, (b) he 
makes a decision somewhere between his own ideal choice and the assumed norm, (c) 
some information from other group members reveals the group norm is much closer to 
(or further away from) his own preference. This information is used to update the 
decision maker’s actual choice. We assume individuals care about adhering to the 
social norm, and view deviations as a “bad.” Thus, 𝐶 is most likely negative. 
Our model bears resemblances to the one proposed by Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999). In their model, as in ours, utility has two components. They hypothesize that 
individuals gain utility from their own payoffs, but they lose utility whenever their payoffs 
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differ from those of others. Thus, their “norm” is based on perfectly equitable payoffs, 
and any deviations from that reduce utility. In our model the norm could take other forms 
besides reflecting inequity, and could be based on efficiency or the payoff to the lowest-
paid individual in the group.  In this way our model has greater flexibility than the Fehr-
Schmidt model, while retaining its basic, two-component structure. The flexibility of our 
model also allows us to add multiple social norms for consideration similar to that 
proposed by Charness and Rabin (2002). In their model, an individuals payoff is defined 
by weighted sum of the individual’s own-payoff, concern for the worst-off person 
(maximin), and maximizing the social surplus (efficiency). 
We hypothesize that 𝐶 depends on factors such as responsibility, availability of 
moral wiggle room, and cognitive effort, and thus we expect that the relative importance 
of norms will depend on organizational structure. We suspect that, under the 
Engineering Model, group members will rely most heavily on the assumed group norm 
when casting votes in an effort to reach a consensus. At the other extreme, in the 
Autocratic Model treatment, the decision maker makes a choice behind a veil of 
ignorance, and thus can easily rationalize a more selfish choice. In the bureaucracy 
treatments, when subordinates recommend allocations that suggest group norms, this 
should influence the decision maker towards welfare-enhancing choices. In the Flat 
Bureaucracy, this influence should be strongest when both subordinates recommend 
the same welfare-enhancing allocation. Overall, holding the marginal utility of self-
interest (𝛽) constant, we expect 𝐶 to be largest (in absolute value) with the Engineering 
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Model, the smallest with the Autocratic Model, with the bureaucracy treatments in-
between.  We provide our expectations in the form of three hypotheses: 
 Hypothesis 1. The relative importance of motives (selfish, efficiency, and 
maximin) will differ across treatments. 
 
 Hypothesis 2. The relative importance of adhering to the efficiency or maximin 
norms will be highest in the Engineering model, followed by the two bureaucracy 
treatments, and then the Autocratic Setting.   
 
 Hypothesis 3. In the Flat Bureaucracy and Tall Bureaucracy treatments, the 
decision maker places more importance on adhering to the efficiency (maximin) norm 
when subordinates recommend the efficient (maximin) outcome. 
  Ultimately, however, the influence of social norms in the context of organizational 
designs is an empirical question, and one can make contrasting arguments. For 
instance, under the Engineering Model, people have equal say and thus if someone 
else prefers a different allocation then they have the chance to say so. This may lead to 
selfish choices. In contrast, in the autocratic setting, the decision maker may empathize 
with those who have no say in the outcome and thus seek out what they perceive to be 
desirable outcome from the group. In the bureaucracy treatments, providing information 
to a decision maker introduces the possibility of moral wiggle room. If a decision maker 
is provided with information from some group members that is closer to her own 
preferred allocation, but further away from the assumed group norm, the decision maker 
can now wiggle away from the assumed norm. 
1.4 Experimental Results 
 Throughout this section, we provide several different approaches to provide 
insight on the above hypotheses. We begin by visually analyzing the data to show at a 
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high level that organizational design clearly influences group outcomes. Additionally, we 
include a comparison to a random decision-making process. With our experimental 
design, random decision-making results in the allocation associated with self-interest, 
efficiency or maximin preferences being chosen one-third of the time. These results are 
presented in Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4.  
 Next, we analyze the distribution of group decisions by treatment in each 
decision tasks. We conduct a two-tailed t-test with unequal variance for equal mean 
outcome of motives across treatments. We make a pairwise comparison of observed 
outcomes in each treatment and statistically test whether they come from the same data 
generating process. We present these results in Table 1.1 through Table 1.10.  
Finally, we consider how organizational design influences group decision making 
at the individual level. We utilize McFadden’s Random Utility Maximization framework to 
analyze individual choices to determine the influence of organizational design on 
individual decision making. We present these results in Table 1.11 through Table 1.16. 
1.4.1 Visual Inspection of the Data 
 We begin by summarizing results suggesting organizational design influences 
group decision making. In particular, for each treatment, we display in Figure 1.3 the 
proportion of realized allocations that coincide with pure self-interest, efficiency or 
maximin preferences. We include a dotted line to represent the random choice  
outcome. For T2, T3 and T4, these percentages coincide with choices from Player 3, 
the decision maker. For T1, percentages for the efficiency and maximin choices 
coincide with the group preference (which may be randomly determined). For an 
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apples-to-apples comparison, the self-interest percentage is based on the choice of 
Player 3.  
We note that for some tasks the three motives are not mutually exclusive in our 
design. For example, it might be the case Option A in a particular task may align with 
both efficiency concerns and selfish motives. For this reason, the three percentages for 
a particular treatment sum to over 100%. We include all decision tasks in calculating the 
proportion of available efficiency outcomes achieved. However, in calculating the 
proportion of available maximin outcomes achieved, we exclude E&S decision task 10 
due to all three allocations maximizing the minimum payoff. Finally, we only include the 
15 decision tasks where Player 3 has the opportunity to choose selfishly in the sense 
that there is variation in own payoff across allocations.  
 
 
Figure 1.3 – Average Proportion of Motive Achieved by Group by Treatment. 
 
 If organizational design had no influence on group decision making, we should 
see a lack of variation across treatments in each motive. However, instead there 
 
 20 
 
appears to be meaningful differences. Further, choices are not simply “random”. The 
starkest differences are between T1 and the other treatments. The highest percentage 
of either efficiency (61%) or maximin (74%) choices occur in T1, and the lowest 
percentage of selfish choices (22%). For the other treatments, the percentage 
associated with self-interest climbs as high as 61% in the case of T4, and social welfare 
outcomes are lowest in T3 (34% and 49% for efficiency and maximum, respectively). 
There is only moderate variation across T2, T3 and T4, with the exception of the selfish 
motive.   
By design, the 11 decision tasks provided by E&S are predominantly defined by 
indifference with respect to own payoff for Player 3 across allocations. In our 12 
Hierarchy Consistent Payoff (HCP) allocations, we provide an opportunity for Player 3 to 
trade off self-interest, efficiency, and/or maximin allocations. In Figure 1.4 we separate 
the outcomes across the two sets of tasks.  
 
 
Figure 1.4 – Average Proportion of Motive Achieved by Treatment and Decision Task Series 
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 In Figure 1.4, it becomes clear the availability of self-interested allocations 
influences group decision making but to differing degrees by organizational design. For 
example, we see T4 is essentially equal to T2 in generating efficiency maximizing 
outcomes in the E&S tasks but underperforms T2 in the HCP tasks. Similarly, T2 leads 
to more Maximin outcomes in E&S tasks than T4, but reaches near parity in HCP tasks.  
We now turn to a statistical analysis. 
1.4.2 Testing the Importance of Motives across Treatments  
 In Table 1.1, we present results from various pairwise treatment comparisons, 
using t-tests (allowing for unequal variances). In each entry in Table 1.1, we provide the 
p-value corresponding with the null hypothesis that the proportion of choices associated 
with a particular motive are equal across two treatments. For instance, the p-value 0.08 
for the cell corresponding to T2 (row), T3 (column) and the efficiency motive suggests 
that the proportion of choices corresponding this motive are (weakly) statistically 
different between the two bureaucracy treatments.  
Table 1.1 – Test for Equal Motives, All Tasks 
Two sample t-Test (p-values) T1 T2  T3 T4 
T1 - Engineering Model 
(N=13) 
Selfish     
Efficiency     
Maximin     
T2 - Flat Bureaucracy 
(N=13) 
Selfish 0.00    
Efficiency 0.01    
Maximin 0.00    
T3 - Tall Bureaucracy 
(N=14) 
Selfish 0.00 0.08   
Efficiency 0.00 0.04   
Maximin 0.00 0.13   
T4 – Autocracy 
(N=14) 
Selfish 0.00 0.17 0.87  
Efficiency 0.01 0.62 0.21  
Maximin 0.00 0.80 0.21  
Number of Group Decisions 299 299 322 322 
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At a basic level, these tests suggest that organizational design matters. This 
provides evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1. Interestingly, the most prominent 
differences occur when comparing T1 to any of the treatments. This is consistent with 
our earlier visual inspection. We summarize results of the statistical tests as Result 1.  
Result 1. (1) For each of the three motives, the Engineering Model leads to statistically 
different outcomes from every other treatment; in particular, there are higher proportions 
of efficiency and maximin outcomes but fewer selfish outcomes. (2) The Tall 
Bureaucracy leads to greater selfish outcomes, lower efficiency outcomes, but no 
difference in maximin outcomes when compared to the Flat Bureaucracy. (3) The 
Autocratic Model leads to outcomes that fall between those for the Tall and Flat 
Bureaucracy treatments, but are statistically indistinguishable from either.  
 
 To explore further, we present t-test results of our data broken down by both E&S 
tasks and our own HCP tasks. Below we present Table 1.2, which presents the results 
from our t-test analysis specific to the 11 E&S tasks. Table 1.3, Table 1.4, and Table 1.5 
present the results of our t-test analysis broken down by the three types of decision 
tasks developed by E&S. Following the E&S tasks, we transition to the HCP tasks. 
Table 1.6 presents the results from the 12 HCP tasks of our own design. Table 1.7 
through Table 1.10 present the results of the t-test analysis broken down by the four 
themes we designed for this experiment. Each table is interpreted the in the same way 
as Table 1.1 
Table 1.1 provided strong statistical support for differences in outcomes between 
T1 and all other treatments. However, when we focus only on E&S tasks, in many cases 
these differences are no longer statistically significant. For example, in Table 1.1, the 
observed group decisions in T1 (column) compared to observed group decisions in T2 
(row) show strong statistical support for differences in outcomes. In Table 1.2, for the 
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same cell, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that any of the mean outcomes by 
motive are the same. 
Table 1.2 – Test for Equal Motives, E&S Tasks 
Two sample t-Test (p-values) T1 T2  T3 T4 
T1 - Engineering Model 
(N=13) 
Selfish     
Efficiency     
Maximin     
T2 - Flat Bureaucracy 
(N=13) 
Selfish 0.34        
Efficiency 0.14        
Maximin 0.23        
T3 - Tall Bureaucracy 
(N=14) 
Selfish 0.00  0.01      
Efficiency 0.00  0.19      
Maximin 0.00  0.06      
T4 - Autocracy 
(N=14) 
Selfish 0.00  0.01  0.68    
Efficiency 0.17  0.94  0.30    
Maximin 0.09  0.61  0.18    
Number of Group Decisions 299 299 322 322 
 
In other areas, we now find that there are statistical differences within particular 
sets of tasks, although there were no differences in the aggregate. For example, In 
Table 1.1, the observed group decisions in T2 (column) compared to observed group 
decisions in T4 (row) showed statistically insignificant differences in mean outcomes for 
the Selfish motive. When the analysis is restricted to E&S tasks, for the same cell, we 
can now reject the null hypothesis the mean outcomes are the same at the 0.01 
significance level.  
Taxation Games (Decision Tasks 1-4) – Table 1.3 presents the results of our t-
test for equal mean outcomes by motive and by treatment for Taxation Games. We find 
that in this subset of decision tasks, we find no statistical differences between 
treatments. 
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Table 1.3 – Test for Equal Motives, Taxation Games 
Two sample t-Test (p-values) T1 T2  T3 T4 
T1 - Engineering Model 
(N=13) 
Selfish         
Efficiency         
Maximin         
T2 - Flat Bureaucracy 
(N=13) 
Selfish  -        
Efficiency 0.56        
Maximin 0.85        
T3 - Tall Bureaucracy 
(N=14) 
Selfish  -   -      
Efficiency 0.47  0.96      
Maximin 0.55  0.43      
T4 - Autocracy 
(N=14) 
Selfish  -   -   -    
Efficiency 0.70  0.39  0.33    
Maximin 0.69  0.55  0.84    
Number of Group Decisions 52 52 56 56 
 
Envy Games (Decision Tasks 5-8) – Table 1.4 presents the results of our t-test 
for equal mean outcomes by motive and by treatment for Envy Games. We find that in 
this subset of decision tasks, T1 is statistically different from the other treatments a 
majority of the time across motives. In a setting described by the Envy Games, the t-test 
results point to statistically insignificant differences between T3 and T4. 
Rich and Poor Games (Decision Tasks 9-11) – Table 1.5 presents the results of 
our t-test for equal mean outcomes by motive and by treatment for Rich and Poor 
Games. We find that in this subset of decision tasks, in any pairwise comparison cross 
treatments, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the observed mean outcomes are 
equal. In other words, we cannot statistically say that on average these treatments 
achieve different motive outcomes.  
The prior 11 decision tasks focused primarily on cases where Player 3 maintains 
a fixed payoff across the three allocations for each decision task. Only decision tasks 7- 
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Table 1.4 – Test for Equal Motives, Envy Games 
Two sample t-Test (p-values) T1 T2  T3 T4 
T1 - Engineering Model 
(N=13) 
Selfish     
Efficiency     
Maximin     
T2 - Flat Bureaucracy 
(N=13) 
Selfish 0.34    
Efficiency 0.03    
Maximin 0.03    
T3 - Tall Bureaucracy 
(N=14) 
Selfish 0.01 0.02   
Efficiency 0.00 0.01   
Maximin 0.00 0.00   
T4 - Autocracy 
(N=14) 
Selfish 0.01 0.02 0.71  
Efficiency 0.00 0.09 0.52  
Maximin 0.00 0.19 0.22  
Number of Group Decisions 52 52 56 56 
 
Table 1.5 – Test for Equal Motives, Rich and Poor Games 
Two sample t-Test (p-values) T1 T2  T3 T4 
T1 - Engineering Model 
(N=13) 
Selfish     
Efficiency     
Maximin     
T2 - Flat Bureaucracy 
(N=13) 
Selfish -    
Efficiency 0.47    
Maximin 0.63    
T3 - Tall Bureaucracy 
(N=14) 
Selfish - -   
Efficiency 0.36 0.90   
Maximin 0.66 0.98   
T4 - Autocracy 
(N=14) 
Selfish - - -  
Efficiency 0.99 0.52 0.43  
Maximin 0.32 0.19 0.21  
Number of Group Decisions 39 39 42 42 
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9 provide an opportunity for self-interest. In the following 12 decision tasks, the 
Hierarchy Consistent Payoff (HCP) tasks, we expand on this and provide variation 
across player 3’s payoff in the three allocations for each decision task introducing larger 
incentives for selfish behavior. Table 1.6 reports results for our t-test analysis subject to 
isolating our data to the 12 HCP decision tasks. 
From Table 1.6, we see again that when comparing T1 (column) to any treatment 
(row), we can reject the null hypothesis of equality of the mean outcome by motive. This 
is not as clear cut in other treatments. We find we can only reject the null hypothesis of 
the t-test for the equal mean Efficiency outcomes between T2 (column) and T3 (row) at 
any reasonable significance level. 
Hierarchy Consistent Payoff Task Series1 (Decision Tasks 12-14) – Table 1.7 
presents the results of our t-test for equal mean outcomes by motive and by treatment 
for HCP Series 1. We find that in this subset of decision tasks, T1 (column) results in 
statistically insignificant differences in Efficiency outcomes across treatments. However, 
T1 (column) does result in statistically different mean outcomes of both Selfish and 
Maximin motives across treatments. We find few statistically different outcomes across 
treatments T2 through T4. 
HCP2 Series (Decision Tasks 15-17) – Table 1.8 presents the results of our t-test 
for equal mean outcomes by motive and by treatment for HCP Series 2. We find that in 
this subset of decision tasks, T1 (column) results in statistically significant differences in 
outcomes across all treatments. However, the remaining treatments result in statistically 
insignificant differences in outcomes across treatments. 
 27 
 
Table 1.6 – Test for Equal Motives, HCP Tasks 
Two sample t-Test (p-values) T1 T2  T3 T4 
T1 - Engineering Model 
(N=13) 
Selfish     
Efficiency     
Maximin     
T2 - Flat Bureaucracy 
(N=13) 
Selfish 0.00    
Efficiency 0.00    
Maximin 0.00    
T3 - Tall Bureaucracy 
(N=14) 
Selfish 0.00 0.15   
Efficiency 0.00 0.04   
Maximin 0.00 0.39   
T4 - Autocracy 
(N=14) 
Selfish 0.00 0.32 0.78  
Efficiency 0.00 0.46 0.33  
Maximin 0.00 1.00 0.45  
Number of Group Decisions 299 299 322 322 
 
Table 1.7 – Test for Equal Motives, HCP1 Tasks 
Two sample t-Test (p-values) T1 T2  T3 T4 
T1 - Engineering Model 
(N=13) 
Selfish     
Efficiency     
Maximin     
T2 - Flat Bureaucracy 
(N=13) 
Selfish 0.00    
Efficiency 1.00    
Maximin 0.00    
T3 - Tall Bureaucracy 
(N=14) 
Selfish 0.00 0.22   
Efficiency 0.18 0.16   
Maximin 0.02 0.52   
T4 - Autocracy 
(N=14) 
Selfish 0.00 0.27 1.00  
Efficiency 0.10 0.09 0.68  
Maximin 0.11 0.29 0.62  
Number of Group Decisions 39 39 42 42 
 
Table 1.8 – Test for Equal Motives, HCP2 Tasks 
Two sample t-Test (p-values) T1 T2 T3 T4 
T1 - Engineering Model 
(N=13) 
Selfish     
Efficiency     
Maximin     
T2 - Flat Bureaucracy 
(N=13) 
Selfish 0.10    
Efficiency 0.02    
Maximin 0.02    
T3 - Tall Bureaucracy 
(N=14) 
Selfish 0.02 0.23   
Efficiency 0.00 0.22   
Maximin 0.00 0.14   
T4 - Autocracy 
(N=14) 
Selfish 0.01 0.12 0.69  
Efficiency 0.00 0.36 0.74  
Maximin 0.01 0.60 0.44  
Number of Group Decisions 39 39 42 42 
 
 28 
 
HCP3 Series (Decision Tasks 18-20) – Table 1.9 presents the results of our t-test 
for equal mean outcomes by motive and by treatment for HCP Series 3. We find here 
again T1 (column) results in statistically significant differences in outcomes across all 
treatments. However, the remaining treatments result in statistically insignificant 
differences in outcomes across treatments. 
HCP4 Series (Decision Tasks 20-23) – Table 1.10 presents the results of our t-test 
for equal mean outcomes by motive and by treatment for HCP Series 4. We find in this 
setting T1 (column) results in statistically significant differences in the Maximin outcome 
when compared to T3 (row). The remaining treatments result in statistically insignificant 
differences in outcomes across treatments. 
Result 2. (1) We find no statistical differences across treatments within the following 
sets of decision tasks: Taxation games (tasks: 1-4), Rich and Poor games (tasks: 9-11), 
and Hierarchy Consistent Payoffs Series 4 (tasks: 20-23).2 (2) We find statistical 
differences across treatments in Envy Games (tasks:5-8) and Hierarchy Consistent 
Payoffs (Series 1, 2, and 3 (tasks 12-19) with the Engineering Model generally leading 
to more efficiency and maximin outcomes, and fewer selfish outcomes. 
1.4.3 Importance of Self-Interest and Social Welfare Motives 
Having shown both visually and statistically that organizational design matters, 
we now use the data to estimate parameters of the theoretical model. We do so using a 
conditional logit model, following McFadden’s random utility maximization (RUM) model 
framework (see e.g. Wooldridge, 2002). This framework allows us to quantify the 
relative importance of motives. It is important to note that in the conditional logit analysis  
                                            
 
 
 
2 We can only reject the test for equal maximin motive outcomes between T1 and T3 in Hierarchy 
Consistent Payoffs Series 4 (tasks: 20-23). 
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Table 1.9 – Test for Equal Motives, HCP3 Tasks 
Two sample t-Test (p-values) T1 T2 T3 T4 
T1 - Engineering Model 
(N=13) 
Selfish     
Efficiency     
Maximin     
T2 - Flat Bureaucracy 
(N=13) 
Selfish 0.00    
Efficiency 0.00    
Maximin 0.00    
T3 - Tall Bureaucracy 
(N=14) 
Selfish 0.00 0.30   
Efficiency 0.00 0.50   
Maximin 0.00 0.37   
T4 - Autocracy 
(N=14) 
Selfish 0.00 0.70 0.58  
Efficiency 0.00 1.00 0.51  
Maximin 0.00 0.77 0.28  
Number of Group Decisions 39 39 42 42 
 
Table 1.10 – Test for Equal Motives, HCP4 Tasks 
Two sample t-Test (p-values) T1 T2 T3 T4 
T1 - Engineering Model 
(N=13) 
Selfish     
Efficiency     
Maximin     
T2 - Flat Bureaucracy 
(N=13) 
Selfish 0.21    
Efficiency 0.42    
Maximin 0.21    
T3 - Tall Bureaucracy 
(N=14) 
Selfish 0.20 0.89   
Efficiency 0.71 0.83   
Maximin 0.07 0.50   
T4 - Autocracy 
(N=14) 
Selfish 0.49 0.65 0.59  
Efficiency 0.49 0.20 0.38  
Maximin 0.16 0.74 0.83  
Number of Group Decisions 39 39 42 42 
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we focus solely on the selections made by Player 3 in each of the treatments. This 
ensures that we make a consistent comparison across the treatments when we 
consider the impact organizational design has on individual decision making.   
1.4.3 Importance of Self-Interest and Social Welfare Motives 
Having shown both visually and statistically that organizational design matters, 
we now use the data to estimate parameters of the theoretical model. We do so using a 
conditional logit model, following McFadden’s random utility maximization (RUM) model 
framework (see e.g. Wooldridge, 2002). This framework allows us to quantify the 
relative importance of motives. It is important to note that in the conditional logit analysis 
we focus solely on the selections made by Player 3 in each of the treatments. This 
ensures that we make a consistent comparison across the treatments when we 
consider the impact organizational design has on individual decision making.   
Here we present a model of self-interest and efficiency concerns.3 For each 
allocation 𝑗 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶} that individual 𝑖 can choose we provide the following explanatory 
variables where 𝑥𝑗𝑘 is the payoff to person 𝑘 for allocation 𝑗: 
𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 = 𝑥𝑗𝑖 , 
 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 = ∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑘
3
𝑘=1
, 
 
𝐸𝑓?̂? = max {∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑘
3
𝑘=1
, 𝑗 = 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶} , 
 
                                            
 
 
 
3 Later we consider the maximin outcome as an alternative group norm.   
 31 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 = 𝐸𝑓?̂? − 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 , 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗,1𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 = (𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗) ∗ 1𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟, 
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 
1𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟
= {
1, 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 1 𝑂𝑅 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 2 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑓?̂? 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑇2 𝑜𝑟 𝑇3) 
0, 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗,2𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 = (𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗) ∗ 2𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟,  
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 
2𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟
= {
1, 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 1 𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 2 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑓?̂? 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑇2)
0, 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
 
In order to isolate the influence of organizational design on decision making we interact 
our explanatory variable with indicator variables for the respective treatments. This 
allows us to pool the data from all treatments – which helps facilitate hypothesis tests - 
without placing any restrictions on the estimated utility function parameters. Below we 
provide an example for the Engineering model treatment, T1, but treatment indicators 
for T2, T3, and T4 follow the same convention: 
𝑇1 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑇1 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
0, 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
We now have a pooled utility specification function of the form: 
𝑉𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽1( 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇1𝑖) + 𝛽2( 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇2𝑖) + 𝛽3( 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3𝑖) + 𝛽4( 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇4𝑖)
+ 𝐶𝑇1(𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇1𝑖) + 𝐶𝑇2(𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇2𝑖)
+ 𝐶𝑇2∗(𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗,1𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝑇2𝑖) + 𝐶𝑇2∗∗(𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗,2𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝑇2𝑖)
+ 𝐶𝑇3(𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3𝑖) + 𝐶𝑇3∗(𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗,1𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝑇3𝑖)
+ 𝐶𝑇4(𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇4𝑖) + 𝑢𝑖𝑗 
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With the assumption that the error, 𝑢𝑖𝑗, follows a Type 1 extreme value distribution, and 
that individuals pick the allocation that maximizes utility, the probability that person 𝑖 
chooses allocation 𝑗 is: 
𝑃𝑖𝑗 =
exp(𝑉𝑖𝑗)
∑ exp(𝑉𝑖𝑔)𝑔∈{𝐴,𝐵,𝐶}
 
Estimation proceeds using maximum likelihood estimation.  
In Table 1.11, we present the results from a restricted version of the above 
model, where we do not allow heterogeneous effects due to messaging, i.e. 𝐶𝑇2∗ =
𝐶𝑇2∗∗ =  𝐶𝑇3∗ = 0. Coefficients are directly interpretable as marginal utilities. In most 
cases, as expected, the marginal utility of own payoff is positive, and the marginal utility 
of deviating from the efficiency norm is negative.  
The Wald test results presented in Table 1.11 for equality of the coefficients 
across all four treatments (for self-interest and for treatment coefficients separately) 
beyond the 1% significance level. This is consistent with our prior results.   
In Section 1.3 we hypothesized that the relative importance of the group norm 
will be highest in T1 and lowest in T4 (Hypothesis 2). To examine this, note that the 
ratio 𝛽/𝐶𝑇 can be interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between self-
interest and efficiency. If the marginal rate of substitution is positive, Player 3 is willing 
to take less for himself in exchange for increasing the deviation from the efficient 
allocation. Conversely, a negative marginal rate of substitution is interpreted as Player 
3’s willingness to forgo money to himself in exchange for decreasing the deviation from 
the efficient allocation.  
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Table 1.11 – Estimated Coefficients for the Conditional Logit Model with Self-interest and 
Efficiency (N=3,726) 
Log likelihood = -1243.7521 
 Variable Coefficient 
Significance 
(p-value) 
𝛽1       𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇1 -0.083 0.202 
𝛽2     𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇2  0.400
 <0.001 
𝛽3       𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3  0.667 <0.001 
𝛽4      𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇4  0.399 <0.001 
𝐶𝑇1     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇1 -0.349 <0.001 
𝐶𝑇2     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇2 -0.352 <0.001 
𝐶𝑇3     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3 -0.189 <0.001 
𝐶𝑇4  𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇4 -0.135 0.008 
Wald 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4  <0.001 
Wald 𝐶𝑇1 = 𝐶𝑇2 = 𝐶𝑇3 = 𝐶𝑇4  0.006 
Wald 𝐶𝑇1 = 𝐶𝑇2  0.971 
Wald 𝐶𝑇3 = 𝐶𝑇4  0.466 
 
In T4, the MRS is 𝛽4/𝐶𝑇4 = −2.96, suggesting that Player 3 is willing to forego $1 
to himself in exchange for decreasing the deviation from the efficient allocation by 
$2.96. The ratio is statistically zero for T1, is near 1:1 in T2 and approximately 3:1 for T3 
and T4. Overall, the relative importance of self-interest increases as we move from T1 
to T4. All pairwise comparisons of the MRS produce statistical differences, except when 
comparing T3 and T4. These results largely lend support to Hypothesis 2. We 
summarize these findings as Result 3. 
Result 3. Organizational design alters preferences for both self-interest and efficiency 
concerns. The relative preference for efficient outcomes is strongest under the 
Engineering Model, and weakest for the Tall Bureaucracy and Autocratic Model 
treatments. 
To explore the effects of messaging in the two bureaucracy treatments, in Table 
1.12, we present the results of the full model specification. With this model, the 
coefficient 𝐶𝑇2 is the marginal disutility from deviating from efficiency norm in the case  
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Table 1.12 – Estimated Coefficients for the Conditional Logit Model with Self-interest and 
Efficiency, Includes Recommendation Coefficients (N=3,726) 
 
  
Log likelihood = -1211.7572 
 Variable Coefficient 
Significance 
(p-value) 
𝛽1       𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇1 -0.083 0.202 
𝛽2     𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇2 0.386
 <0.001 
𝛽3       𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3 0.638 <0.001 
𝛽4      𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇4 0.399 <0.001 
𝐶𝑇1     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇1 -0.349 <0.001 
𝐶𝑇2     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇2 0.134 0.254 
𝐶𝑇2∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗,1𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝑇2 -0.369 0.009 
𝐶𝑇2∗∗  𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗,2𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝑇2 -1.331 <0.001 
𝐶𝑇3     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3 0.025 0.796 
𝐶𝑇3∗   𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗,1𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝑇3 -0.292 0.009 
𝐶𝑇4  𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇4 -0.135 0.008 
Wald 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4  <0.001 
Wald 𝐶𝑇1 = 𝐶𝑇2 = 𝐶𝑇3 = 𝐶𝑇4  <0.001 
Wald 𝐶𝑇2∗ = 𝐶𝑇2∗∗   <0.001 
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where neither Player 1 nor Player 2 recommends the efficient outcome. Interestingly, 
this coefficient is insignificant, suggesting no preference for the social norm. The 
coefficients  𝐶𝑇2∗ and 𝐶𝑇2∗∗ measure the disutility (relative to the above case), when one 
or both players, respectively, recommend the efficient allocation. Both these coefficients 
are negative and significant, emphasizing the role of messaging. Further, we reject the 
null hypothesis that these coefficients are equal at the 95% confidence level. In terms of 
magnitudes, if only one subordinate recommends the efficient allocation, at the margin 
Player 3 is willing to forego $1 to himself if it decreases the deviation from the efficiency 
norm by $1.64. However, if there is agreement among subordinates to choose the 
efficient allocation, we see Player 3 is willing to forgo $1 to himself if it decreases the 
deviation from the efficient choice by $0.32. Overall, when neither player recommends 
the efficient outcome, Player 3 choices look more like those from T4, whereas when 
both players recommend the efficient outcome choices are similar to those in T1.  
Similar results arise for T3: when Player 2 does not recommend the efficient 
allocation, Player 3 receives no disutility from deviating from the efficient choice; on the 
other hand, when Player 2 recommends the efficient allocation, Player 3 experiences 
significant disutility from deviating from this. Overall, the results are consistent with 
Hypothesis 3. We summarize the results from the bureaucracy treatments as Result 4.  
Result 4. Decision makers are much more sensitive to deviations from efficiency 
maximizing allocations when subordinates recommend this allocation. In the Flat 
Bureaucracy treatment, greater disutility arises when both subordinates recommend the 
efficient allocation, as compared to when only one subordinate does. 
Our hypotheses focus on the influence of organizational design on decision 
makers but does so across all decision tasks. In Figure 1.4, we presented the average 
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proportion of motives achieved by group decisions broken down by decision task series 
and treatment. In Table 1.13, we estimate utility parameters for each treatment, 
separately by E&S and HCP tasks.   
From Table 1.13, we find that the decision makers in T3 and T4 are the least 
sensitive to deviations from the efficiency maximizing allocations in both the E&S and 
HCP.  In fact, the disutility parameter is statistically zero in both cases for the HCP 
tasks. For T1 and T2, in the E&S tasks, Player 3 places little weight on own payoffs. 
This is perhaps not surprising as there is no variation in Player 3 payoffs in most tasks. 
For both treatments, deviations from the efficiency norm do matter. For HCP tasks, 
surprisingly, the model suggests that Player 3 in T1 experiences disutility from own 
payoffs while not caring about the efficiency norm on average. This is counterintuitive, 
and may suggest that for HCP tasks the theoretical model is poorly equipped to 
describe behavior in this treatment.  
In Table 1.14, we allow for the effects of messaging in the bureaucracy 
treatments. For the Flat Bureaucracy treatment, in both sets of tasks we find decision 
makers are most sensitive to deviations from the efficiency maximizing allocation when 
there is agreement between subordinates. For example, in the E&S setting, when there 
is agreement among subordinates we see the MRS equals -0.21. In other words, Player 
3 is willing to forgo $1 to himself in order to decrease the deviation from the efficient 
allocation by $0.21. In comparison, the MRS equals -0.87 when there is only one 
subordinate recommending the efficient allocation. We see a similar pattern in the HCP 
decision tasks setting. Interestingly, in the Tall Bureaucracy treatment, 
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Table 1.13 – Estimated Coefficients for the Conditional Logit Model with Self-interest and 
Efficiency Concerns by E&S (N=1,782) and HCP Tasks (N=1,944) 
E&S Tasks HCP Task  
Log likelihood = -569.93009 Log likelihood = -647.44446   
 Variable Coefficient 
Significance 
(p-value) 
 Variable Coefficient 
Significance 
(p-value) 
𝛽1       𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇1 0.197 0.761 𝛽1       𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇1 -0.175 0.009 
𝛽2       𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇2 0.360 0.059 𝛽2       𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇2  0.356 <0.001 
𝛽3       𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3 2.730 <0.001 𝛽3       𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3  0.541 <0.001 
𝛽4       𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3 2.330 <0.001 𝛽4       𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3  0.262 <0.001 
𝐶𝑇1     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇1 -0.521 <0.001 𝐶𝑇1     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇1 -0.069 0.452 
𝐶𝑇2     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇2 -0.411 <0.001 𝐶𝑇2     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇2 -0.244 0.012 
𝐶𝑇3     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3 -0.299 <0.001 𝐶𝑇3     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3 -0.031 0.770 
𝐶𝑇4     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇4 -0.282 <0.001 𝐶𝑇4     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇4  0.121 0.205 
Wald 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4 <0.001 Wald 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4 <0.001 
Wald 𝐶𝑇1 = 𝐶𝑇2 = 𝐶𝑇3 = 𝐶𝑇4 0.102 Wald 𝐶𝑇1 = 𝐶𝑇2 = 𝐶𝑇3 = 𝐶𝑇4 0.065 
Wald 𝐶𝑇1 = 𝐶𝑇2 = 𝐶𝑇3 = 𝐶𝑇4 = 0 <0.001 Wald 𝐶𝑇1 = 𝐶𝑇2 = 𝐶𝑇3 = 𝐶𝑇4 = 0 0.075 
 
Table 1.14 – Estimated Coefficients for the Conditional Logit Model with Self-interest and 
Efficiency Concerns by E&S (N=1,782) and HCP Tasks, with recommendation coefficients 
(N=1,944) 
E&S Tasks HCP Task  
Log likelihood = -553.79482 Log likelihood = -631.25633 
 Variable Coefficient 
Significance 
(p-value) 
 Variable Coefficient 
Significance 
(p-value) 
𝛽1       𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇1 0.197 0.761 𝛽1       𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇1 -0.175 0.009 
𝛽2        𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇2  0.231  0.206 𝛽2        𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇2  0.411 <0.001 
𝛽3        𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3  2.791 <0.001 𝛽3        𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3  0.536 <0.001 
𝛽4        𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3  2.330 <0.001 𝛽4        𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3  0.262 <0.001 
𝐶𝑇1     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇1 -0.521 <0.001 𝐶𝑇1     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇1 0.069 0.452 
𝐶𝑇2     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇2  0.065  0.669 𝐶𝑇2     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇2  0.256 0.185 
𝐶𝑇2∗   𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗,1𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝑇2 -0.331  0.080 𝐶𝑇2∗   𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗,1𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝑇2 -0.465 0.034 
𝐶𝑇2∗∗  𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗,2𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝑇2 -1.142 <0.001 𝐶𝑇2∗∗  𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗,2𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝑇2 -1.631 <0.001 
𝐶𝑇3     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3 -0.006  0.963 𝐶𝑇3     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3  0.047 0.763 
𝐶𝑇3∗   𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗,1𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝑇3 -0.406  0.011 𝐶𝑇3∗   𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗,1𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝑇3 -0.124 0.486 
𝐶𝑇4     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇4 -0.282 <0.001 𝐶𝑇4     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇4  0.121 0.205 
Wald   𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4 <0.001 Wald   𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4 <0.001 
Wald  𝐶𝑇2∗ = 𝐶𝑇2∗∗  0.002 Wald  𝐶𝑇2∗ = 𝐶𝑇2∗∗ <0.001 
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 recommendations only influence Player 3 choices within E&S tasks. As before, when 
no efficiency allocations are recommended, Player 3 experiences no disutility from 
deviating from the efficient allocation. 
1.4.4 Maximin, an Alternative Group Norm 
We now analyze the data using instead the maximin allocation as the group 
norm.  Table 1.15 presents the efficiency and maximin-based specifications in adjacent 
panels. As evident from the value of the log-likelihood functions at solution, the maximin 
specification provides a better fit for the data. Moreover, all coefficients are statistically 
significant and have the expected sign. Similar to the efficiency-based model, we find 
that relative preferences for minimizing deviations from the social norm are strongest in 
T1. For this treatment, Player 3 is willing to give up $1 to decrease the deviation from 
the group norm by $0.39. In the other treatments, Player 3 is only willing to give up $1 if 
it results in a bigger reduction. The MRS is -1.20 for T2, -1.81 for T3 and -1.48 for T4.  
 Finding support for a maximin group norm is not altogether surprising. In their 
own analysis, E&S show maximin preferences greatly influence allocation decisions. 
However, finding a maximin motive is not simply an artifact of our shared experimental 
design or unique to our setting. Kamada et al. (2016) provide a neuroeconomics 
approach to distributive justice and risky decision making to find “…the ‘maximin’ 
concern (maximizing the minimum possible payoff) operates as a strong cognitive 
anchor in both distributive decisions for others and economics decisions for self” and is 
associated with specific regions of the brain. Our paper suggests that organizational 
design can help to overcome this “cognitive anchor” by encouraging decision makers to 
choose welfare enhancing allocations.  
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Table 1.15 – Estimated Coefficients for the Conditional Logit Model Efficiency and Separately 
Maximin for the Social Welfare Statistic (N=3,726) 
Efficiency Maximin 
Log likelihood = -1243.7521 Log likelihood = -1119.9524 
 Variable Coefficient 
Significance 
(p-value) 
 Variable Coefficient 
Significance 
(p-value) 
𝛽1       𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇1 -0.083 0.202 𝛽1       𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇1 0.315 0.001 
𝛽2     𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇2  0.400 <0.001 𝛽2     𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇2 0.969 <0.001 
𝛽3       𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3  0.667 <0.001 𝛽3       𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3 1.167 <0.001 
𝛽4      𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇4  0.399 <0.001 𝛽4      𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇4 0.823 <0.001 
𝐶𝑇1     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇1 -0.349 <0.001 𝐶𝑇1     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇1 -0.799 <0.001 
𝐶𝑇2     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇2 -0.352 <0.001 𝐶𝑇2     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇2 -0.808 <0.001 
𝐶𝑇3     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3 -0.189 <0.001 𝐶𝑇3     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3 -0.646 <0.001 
𝐶𝑇4  𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇4 -0.135 0.008 𝐶𝑇4  𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇4 -0.557 <0.001 
Wald 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4  <0.001 Wald 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4 <0.001 
Wald 𝐶𝑇1 = 𝐶𝑇2 = 𝐶𝑇3 = 𝐶𝑇4  0.006 Wald 𝐶𝑇1 = 𝐶𝑇2 = 𝐶𝑇3 = 𝐶𝑇4 0.104 
Wald 𝐶𝑇1 = 𝐶𝑇2 0.971 Wald 𝐶𝑇1 = 𝐶𝑇2 0.939 
Wald 𝐶𝑇3 = 𝐶𝑇4 0.466 Wald 𝐶𝑇3 = 𝐶𝑇4 0.464 
 
Last, similar to the theory model of Charness and Rabin (2002), we allow the 
possibility that players are influenced by both efficiency and maximin norms. In doing 
so, we must be careful about interpreting utility parameters as interpretation differs from 
the prior models. Here, 𝛽 is the marginal utility associated with own payoff, holding 
constant deviations from both the efficiency and maximin norms. As a result, the 
coefficient on self-interest must be interpreted as a transfer from a player who is not 
receiving the minimum payoff. Similarly, a one-dollar increase in the deviation from the 
efficiency maximizing allocation cannot reduce own payoff or the maximin payoff. This 
suggests that we must interpret the deviation from the efficient allocation as a reduction 
of another player’s payoff who is not oneself nor the player receiving the minimum 
payoff. Finally, the coefficient on deviations from the maximin motive must be 
interpreted as decreasing the minimum players payoff without changes to own payoff or 
the Efficiency. This suggests that we must interpret the deviation from the maximin 
allocation as a transfer from the player with the lowest payoff to another player (not 
oneself). presents the results from our conditional logit analysis jointly estimating the 
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effect of self-interest, deviations from the efficient allocation, and deviations from the 
maximin allocation.  
Estimation results are presented in Table 1.16. Similar to the model that only 
considers maximin preferences, we find that players care about self-interest and the 
maximin norm in all treatments. In fact, the coefficients are nearly identical across the 
two models, suggesting similar tradeoffs. Once maximin preferences are controlled for, 
deviations from the efficiency norm no longer matter statistically for T3 and T4. While 
significant and negative for T1 and T2, the coefficients are small in magnitude. This 
lends qualified support of efficiency norms, while providing additional evidence that 
deviations from maximin norms are more important.  
Result 5. Experimental evidence suggests that allocation choices are better explained 
by a theory where individuals experience disutility from deviating from the maximin 
outcome.     
1.5 Conclusions 
 This study utilizes a laboratory experiment to test the influence of various 
organizational designs on group decision making. We show that organizational design 
has a significant influence on the ability of groups to achieve welfare-maximizing 
outcomes without changes to the incentive structure. Our analysis considers the 
possible influence of efficiency and/or maximin motives. In either case, our findings 
suggest that if a firm can establish a norm around the firm’s preferred objective, 
organizational design can be used to help achieve this goal. In particular, when the 
objective is to either maximize surplus (which may coincide with firm profits) or 
maximize the payoff of the lowest-paid group member, our results suggest that an  
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Table 1.16 – Jointly Estimated Coefficients for the Conditional Logit Model using Efficiency and 
Maximin for the Social Welfare Statistic (N=3,726) 
 
  
Combined Efficiency & Maximin 
Log likelihood = -1106.717 
 Variable Coefficient 
Significance 
(p-value) 
𝛽1       𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇1 0.345 <0.001 
𝛽2     𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇2 0.969 <0.001 
𝛽3       𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3 1.167 <0.001 
𝛽4      𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇4 0.827 <0.001 
𝐶𝑇1     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇1 -0.249 <0.001 
𝐶𝑇2     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇2 -0.225 0.001 
𝐶𝑇3     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3 -0.007 0.907 
𝐶𝑇4  𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇4 0.027 0.658 
𝐶𝑇1𝑀𝑀     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇1 -0.738 <0.001 
𝐶𝑇2𝑀𝑀     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇2 -0.721 <0.001 
𝐶𝑇3𝑀𝑀     𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇3 -0.641 <0.001 
𝐶𝑇4𝑀𝑀  𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇4 -0.573 <0.001 
Wald 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4  <0.001 
Wald 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4  <0.001 
Wald 𝛽2 = 𝛽3  0.266 
Wald 𝛽2 = 𝛽4  0.379 
Wald 𝛽3 = 𝛽4  0.042 
Wald 𝐶𝑇1 = 𝐶𝑇1𝑀𝑀  <0.001 
Wald 𝐶𝑇2 = 𝐶𝑇2𝑀𝑀  <0.001 
Wald 𝐶𝑇3 = 𝐶𝑇3𝑀𝑀  <0.001 
Wald 𝐶𝑇4 = 𝐶𝑇4𝑀𝑀  <0.001 
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Engineering Model, where people have equal say, is most likely to lead to the desired 
outcome. An Autocratic Model, which characterizes a decision maker who does not 
consult others, is much less likely to be desirable. The same holds true for a Tall 
Hierarchy, especially when the direct advisor to the boss makes a recommendation 
inconsistent with the firm’s objective.  
Within a hierarchical structure, the results emphasize that advisors play an 
important role. In our Tall Bureaucracy treatment, if the advisor does not provide the 
recommendation to adhere to the welfare-enhancing norm, the decision maker now has 
moral wiggle room and is more likely to make choices that conflict with the norm.  
However, when the advisor suggests the welfare-enhancing allocation, the decision 
maker finds it much harder to deviate from this recommendation. This effect is even 
greater when there is agreement between two subordinates in recommending the 
welfare-enhancing allocation, as we found in the Flat Bureaucracy treatment.  
We find real world examples of firms making concerted efforts to address these 
tendencies either by accident or by design. For example, a passage from U.S. Air Force 
Officer training materials states, “Service Before Self – …A leader unwilling to sacrifice 
individual goals for the good of the unit cannot convince other members to do so” (U.S. 
Air Force ROTC, 2014). This type of statement serves to influence directly both a self-
interest motive as well as efficiency concerns. Additionally, it influences how receptive 
individuals are to recommendations from others and which recommendations are put 
forth. 
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This study provides initial insights to the influence organizational design itself has 
on encouraging surplus maximizing concerns. However, there are many possible 
extensions of this research that may help provide a richer understanding of how 
organizational design influences firm outcomes. A growing body of research is 
concerned with how groups make decisions over risky prospects and how individuals 
choose risky prospects for others (see Vieider et al., 2015; Andersson et al., 2016). We 
think studying the influence of organizational design in a setting characterized by risk 
may enhance the discussion. Another issue worth exploring is how organizational 
design and social hierarchy together influence group outcomes. Last, we implemented 
the choice tasks as a static game, without feedback. Employees within a firm instead 
play a repeated game, and factors such as reputation are likely to influence outcomes in 
a dynamic setting.        
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CHAPTER 2  
INSTITUTIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL FACTORS INFLUENCING 
LIFETIME WEALTH ACCUMULATION OF U.S. SERVICEMEMBERS 
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or 
position of the US Air Force, Department of Defense, or the US Government. 
2.1 Introduction 
The mission of the Department of Defense (DOD) is to “provide the military 
forces necessary to deter war and protect the security of our country” (Department of 
Defense, 2017a). In order to accomplish this mission, the DOD must recruit, train, and 
retain quality individuals. Pay and benefits directly impact the DOD’s ability to attract 
and retain quality recruits. For example, a 1 percent gain in military pay relative to 
civilian pay results in a 1 percent gain in recruitment (National Research Council, 2003, 
and the references therein). Unlike civilian organizations, which have total control over 
wage and benefit setting, the DOD must rely on Congress to set wages and determine 
benefits offered to U.S. servicemembers. Through this process of Congressional 
debate, the question of the right amount of pay and benefits becomes a matter of public 
concern.  
Few would argue that veterans should be financially worse-off for their service 
relative to non-veterans with similar qualifications. However, recent research has shown 
that veterans have fallen behind in terms of lifetime wealth accumulation (Gustman, 
Steinmeier, & Tabatabai, 2016). Figure 2.1 presents results of the Gustman et al. (2016) 
analysis of Health and Retirement Study (hereafter, HRS) data comparing veteran and 
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non-veteran cohorts entering ages 51 to 56 in 1992, 1998, 2004, and 2010. We see a 
relatively close grouping of veterans and nonveterans prior to 2004 but a growing 
disparity from 2004 on. According to their research, as of 2010, veterans accumulated 
25% less wealth than nonveteran households.4 That is a difference of roughly $217,000 
per household. 
 
Figure 2.1 – Total Wealth Accumulation by Cohort (in 2010 dollars) 
 
 Figure 2.1 simply considers the difference in total wealth accumulation by 
veteran and nonveteran status. A richer discussion includes the influence that length of 
service has on wealth accumulation. In a separate analysis of the HRS data, Fitzgerald 
(2006) finds that additional years of military service negatively impacts lifetime wealth 
accumulation for each year of service, up to 20 years of service (the vesting period for 
the current military retirement system). Veterans from the all-volunteer military struggle 
                                            
 
 
 
4 Gustman, Steinmeier, & Tabatabai (2016) define total wealth as the sum of total household social 
security benefits, total value of all household pensions, net house value (home equity), real estate, 
business assets, net value of vehicles, financial assets, and IRA assets. 
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to keep pace with nonveterans in accumulating wealth over their lifetimes and this leads 
us to question why this is so, and what can be done to close the gap if necessary. 
The life-cycle model of consumption and savings is a workhorse within the 
economics discipline used to describe savings behavior (Browning & Crossley, 2001). 
The model assumes that individuals plan consumption and savings choices over their 
life span, striving to even out consumption. The result of this planning is a pattern of 
consumption that includes borrowing before entering the workforce, accumulating 
wealth during working years (e.g. saving), and divesting accumulated wealth in 
retirement (e.g. dissaving). An unresolved issue is why similar households reach 
retirement with very different levels of wealth, if any at all. In this study, we consider 
factors which influence veterans’ ability to accumulate wealth during their working years 
(institutional concerns) and potential departures from the standard life-cycle model 
which may also influence wealth accumulation (behavioral concerns). 
 This study first explores drivers for wealth accumulation by considering 
institutional factors related to veteran income, home ownership, and intergenerational 
transfers. We then explore the underlying behavioral components contributing to lifetime 
wealth accumulation such as financial literacy, self-control, and locus of control.  
2.2 Income 
 Income has a significant impact on an individual’s ability to save during their 
working years and accumulate wealth over their lifetime. In this section, we begin by 
considering the existence of a wage gap between military pay and civilian pay. Next, we 
consider the impact veteran status itself has on wages in the civilian sector relative to 
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nonveterans. Finally, we consider the influence military service has on attaining and 
maintaining a dual income household by examining the tied migrant problem. 
2.2.1 Pay Gap Between Military and Civilian Pay 
 Measuring a pay gap between military and civilian pay is extremely difficult due 
to a lack of consistent definitions and inconsistent reference points (Kapp & Torreon, 
2017). In one report, using a starting point of 1982, the pay gap between military and 
civilians steadily increased, reaching a highpoint of nearly 14% in the early 2000s, then 
experienced a sharp decline falling to roughly 2% by 2012 (Military Officer's Association, 
2013). Using a broader measure of income for military pay, the Congressional Budget 
Office (2010) reports military compensation “exceeded the cumulative increase in 
private-sector wages and salaries by 11 percent since 1982.” These seemingly 
contradictory reports show how difficult it is to measure precisely the military and civilian 
pay gap, if there is one.  
The DOD’s position, as stated in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, is that 
military pay is appropriate at this time and that, within a constrained fiscal environment, 
the DOD cannot afford the same rate of growth for military pay and benefits as in the 
previous decade. The aforementioned military pay and benefit increases have “more 
than closed compensation gaps.” To maintain competitive compensation packages, the 
DOD proposed modest annual military pay raises, a leveling off in the growth rate of 
housing allowances, and updates to the military healthcare system (TRICARE).  
Others echo this finding, suggesting military servicemembers are compensated 
appropriately relative to those not currently serving (Skimmyhorn, 2016; Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority, 2013b; Hosek and Wadsworth, 2013). Of course, 
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constant monitoring is required to ensure military pay and benefits remain competitive 
with civilian wages, both for recruiting new talent and retention of those currently 
serving. 
2.2.2 Veteran Status and Income 
 The majority of those who join the military do not stay for a 20-year career, which 
is the minimum number of years required to earn the defined benefits portion of military 
retirement compensation. Under the current Uniformed Services retirement system, 
roughly 51 percent of officers and 83 percent of enlisted personnel will leave the military 
prior to 20 years of service (Department of Defense, 2012). This leads us to ask how 
veteran status influences earnings in civilian careers where individuals derive their 
income the remainder of their working years. 
2.2.2.1 Influence of Draft Era Veteran Status on Civilian Wages 
 Draft era veteran status has shown a mixed influence on a servicemember’s 
subsequent civilian earnings (Gabriel, 2016; and the references therein). World War I 
(WWI) veterans enjoyed a 3.6% wage premium relative to non-veterans. The wage 
premium for WWII veterans was nearly five times larger at 17%. The veteran premium 
for WWII is, at least partially, a natural extension of the newfound human capital gains 
in greater college education attainment, and completion attributed to the G.I. Bill signed 
into law in 1944 (Bound & Turner, 2002). However, these wage premiums essentially 
disappeared for Korean War veterans and turned negative for Vietnam War veterans 
(Schwartz, 1986).  
 In the early 1980s, at least a decade after their service in Vietnam for many, 
veterans were earning nearly 15% less per year than a comparable nonveteran 
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(Angrist, 1990).5 While the Vietnam war was unpopular, the explanation for the loss of 
earnings is not necessarily bias against Vietnam veterans reintegrating into the civilian 
workforce. Instead, the loss of earnings can be attributed to the partial transferability of 
military experience to the civilian labor market. Using Social Security data, Angrist 
(1990) estimates that military service resulted in the equivalent loss of two years of 
civilian labor market experience and thus lower relative wages. 
 The wage gap between Vietnam veterans and nonveterans mostly subsided by 
1999 (Angrist, Chen, & Song, 2011). These findings are still consistent with the loss-of-
experience interpretation for the earnings loss for Vietnam veterans. Specific to this 
study, if we consider lifetime wealth accumulation impacts, it is clear the initial negative 
shocks to income were never recovered, leading to lower wealth accumulation for 
Vietnam era veterans. 
2.2.2.2 The All-Volunteer Force (AVF) 
While registering for the Selective Service System is still required for all males 
between the ages of 18 and 25, the last authority to induct draftees to military service 
expired on 30 Jun 1973. This begins an era of military service commonly referred to as 
the “All-Volunteer Force” or AVF. Bryant et. al (1993) provide an initial insight to the 
impact of veteran status on post-Vietnam veterans by considering full time workers in 
1985 both with and without military experience. The reduced transferability of military 
                                            
 
 
 
5  This is specific to white Vietnam veterans. The difference between nonwhite veteran and nonveterans 
was not statistically different. 
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skills to the civilian work force and loss of experience still weigh on post-Vietnam 
veteran wages. While not as pronounced as the wage gap associated with Vietnam 
veterans, post-Vietnam veterans still received an estimated 1.7% less than non-veteran 
peers did. 
More recent analysis has pointed to a persistent veteran to nonveteran wage gap 
that is also influenced by the nations attitudes towards veterans (Davila & Mora, 2012). 
In the years leading up to September 11, 2001 (hereafter, 9/11), male veterans earned 
roughly 5% less on average than their nonveteran peers. Shortly after 9/11 and 
between 2001 and 2005, a surge of patriotism helped to reduce the wage gap between 
veterans and nonveterans to roughly 3.5% less on average. Over time this improvement 
in the veteran and nonveteran wage gap dissipated and by 2006 the wage gap returned 
to pre-9/11 levels. 
The AVF introduces new concerns for research in the lifetime wealth 
accumulation gap. In terms of economic research, this makes a comparison of veterans 
and non-veterans more challenging. The AVF is influenced by selection bias. This 
makes clearly identifying or attributing the influence military service on lifetime wealth 
accumulation more challenging. If there is a growing gap, is it because something about 
the military attracts individuals that are systematically different from those who do not 
choose military service? While selection bias complicates casual identification for 
researchers, we can still examine structural issues that directly influencing military 
veterans and their opportunities for wealth accumulation.  
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2.2.3 Dual Income Families and the Tied Migrant Problem 
 It has been said that the military recruits the soldier but retains the family. That is 
to say that the DOD makes significant investments to attract and train talented 
individuals into service but must convince the families to stay in the military. In 2015, 
roughly 51% of enlisted members and roughly 70% of officers were married 
(Department of Defense, 2015a).6 In Figure 2.2, we present a comparison of marriage 
rates for active component (AC) military enlisted personnel to civilians by gender and 
age. In Figure 2.3 we present the same comparison but for military officer personnel. 
 
 From Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3, we see military males married at higher rates 
across all age groups regardless of officer or enlisted status. A similar pattern exists for 
enlisted women but the results are mixed for women who are commissioned officers. 
 It is generally accepted that marital status influences wealth accumulation. For 
example, utilizing data from the HRS and Panel Study of Income Dynamics (hereafter, 
PSID), Lupton and Smith (1999) show married households achieve a median net worth 
nearly 4 times never married households achieve. However, marital status as a static 
measure does not tell a complete story. Duration of marriage also influences household 
net worth as seen below in Figure 2.4. 
  
                                            
 
 
 
6 Here we focus on the Active Component as it relates to the tied migrant problem. For the same period of 
time, nearly 40% of Selected Reserve enlisted personnel and 69% of Selected Reserve officers reported 
married. 
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Figure 2.2 – FY15 Married Rates of AC Enlisted Personnel and Civilian Comparison Groups, by 
Gender and Age (Department of Defense, 2015b) 
 
 
Figure 2.3 – FY15 Married Rates of AC Commissioned Officers and Civilian Comparison Groups, 
by Gender and Age (Department of Defense, 2015) 
 
 
Figure 2.4 – HRS Household Net Worth by Duration of Marriage (Lupton & Smith, 1999) 
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From Figure 2.4, we see household net worth increases at an increasing rate as 
marriage duration increases. When this is combined with PSID data showing median 
married households wages more than double never married household median wages, 
we should expect at least some advantage to accrue to military families given they 
marry so early. This advantage should help to close the wealth accumulation gap unless 
military families are encumbered in some way and unable to keep pace with nonveteran 
peers. 
Military service requires a permanent change of stations roughly every 3-4 years, 
with some as few as 2 years. This has the potential to create a tied migrant problem for 
military families. The tied migrant problem describes a scenario when a spouse “moves 
even when their private calculus dictates they stay” (Mincer, 1978). In a military family 
context, if a servicemember receives orders to move to a new location, a spouse might 
give up a well-paid job with little to no prospects in the new location.  
Cooke and Speirs (2005) published a paper that studied the impacts of being a 
tied migrant on civilian husbands and wives of military personnel. Cooke and Speirs 
used the Public Use Microdata Sample from the 1990 U.S. Census, which allowed them 
to identify military families in 1985 and 1990. Without access to military permanent 
change of station orders, Cooke and Speirs had to infer who in the sample was directed 
to move. A family was considered to have moved if they reported a residence in 1990 
that was more than 50 miles away from the residence they reported in 1985. Over this 
five-year period, 77% of civilian wives and 62% of civilian husbands were considered 
migrants with over one-third of the sample moving more than 1000 miles.  
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Cooke and Speirs (2005) find that military migration has negative impacts on the 
economic status of both civilian husbands and the civilian wives of military personnel. 
Specifically, for civilian wives, military migration is associated with a 10% drop in 
employment and a four-hour decrease in hours worked per week for those who remain 
employed. For civilian husbands, military moves are associated with a five-hour 
decrease in hours worked and a similar 10% drop in employment.  
More recent analysis of the 2000 U.S. Census, Sample Edited Detail File show 
consistently lower age-earning profiles for all military spouses, both for civilian 
husbands and wives (Hisnanick & Little, 2015). Figure 2.5 shows tied migrant military 
spouses, both husbands and wives, earn less across all age groups by as much as 
30%. Additionally, analysis of military records on personnel and their dependents, and 
social security earnings records between 2001 and 2012, show the immediate negative 
impact of relocation on spousal earnings (Burke & Miller, 2017). Military moves reduce 
spousal wages by 14% of average spousal earnings in the year of the move and 
increases the likelihood the spouse has no earnings in the year of the move. These 
negative impacts of relocation on spouses persist for at least 2 years.  
Finally, in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, we present results from our analysis of 
the gender specific wage impact of changing DOD presence through the 2005 Base 
Realignment and Closure. We find that increasing the presence of military personnel 
decreases median wages for both men and women in affected counties. However, we 
find suggestive evidence that decreasing military personnel increases median wages for 
women while wages for men remain relatively unchanged. This highlights another  
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Figure 2.5 – Average Annual Earnings by Age Group of Military Husbands & Wives Compared to 
Civilian Counterparts (Hisnanick & Little, 2015) 
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challenge for military families as they work towards maintaining dual-income 
households. That is, the effect of military presence on the local labor markets may 
further negatively impact wages for tied migrants. At this time, the literature is silent on 
the cumulative net effect servicemembers’ relatively early marriages may have on 
lifetime wealth accumulation when placed in the context of the tied migrant problem 
inherent with military families. 
The tied migrant problem is one that is well known to the DOD, which estimates 
77% of military spouses are unable to find or maintain work due to frequent moves 
(Military Spouse Employment Partnership, 2014). Furthermore, the DOD estimates a 
26% unemployment rate among military spouses, and a 25% wage gap between civilian 
spouses and military spouses who do find work. A separate DOD estimate suggests 
that of the more than 1,000,000 military spouses, roughly 250,000 military spouses are 
unemployed and at least an additional 250,000 military spouses are underemployed 
(Lyle, 2014). In June 2011, the DOD launched the Military Spouse Employment 
Partnership (MSEP) redoubling its efforts to provide more opportunities for military 
spouses to find private sector careers. The MSEP partners with Fortune 500 Plus 
companies and seeks to prepare military spouses to secure and maintain private sector 
careers.  
Related to military pay and wealth accumulation, future researchers must 
carefully disentangle the effects of repeated and prolonged deployments to combat 
zones for servicemembers in the post-9/11 era from compensation provided to 
servicemembers in peacetime.  Servicemembers deployed to combat zones receive 
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additional pay such as hardship duty pay, hostile fire or imminent danger pay, family 
separation allowance, and combat zone tax exclusions. These benefits can easily 
surpass $1,000 in additional compensation per month. Since 2002, and as recently as 
2010, the DOD has identified between 200,000 and 250,000 personnel that qualify for 
combat zone tax exclusion each year (Gould & Horowitz, 2011). Each military service 
manages their own deployment strategy. The Army for example has traditionally 
deployed servicemembers for 12-month rotations, whereas the Air Force has more 
recently deployed servicemembers for 6 month or longer rotations. If researchers fail to 
properly account for the “war-time” compensation in the AVF, they may provide policy 
recommendations that negatively impact compensation for servicemembers in peace 
time.  
2.3 Home Ownership 
 While Income certainly correlates with greater wealth accumulation, it is the 
existence and duration of homeownership that results in greater future household net 
wealth accumulation (Di, Belsky, & Liu, 2007). Utilizing data from PSID between 1989 
and 2001, Di et. al find that after controlling for location, income, education, and other 
characteristics, families who owned homes and owned them for longer periods had 
significantly greater wealth accumulation by 2001. Differences in net wealth between 
renters and homeowners can be quite large as presented in Figure 2.6. 
From Figure 2.6, we see as home ownership duration increases, wealth 
differences between homeowners and renters increase as well, peaking at roughly 8 
years. The decline beyond 8 years is not suggesting that homeowners should sell their 
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house after eight years of ownership but is instead an artifact of the dataset used in the 
analysis. Homeowners with more than eight years in duration purchased their homes in 
the early 1990s, which coincided with a peak in the housing market, followed by a drop 
in housing prices and a few years of relatively slow price appreciation. In Figure 2.7, we 
present the Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index showing the annual 
percentage change over the period in question.  
 
 
Figure 2.6 – Estimated net wealth difference between owners and renters (in 2001 dollars) (Di, 
Belsky, & Liu, 2007) 
 
We urge caution in interpreting Figure 2.6. It appears that even short durations of 
home ownership can lead to large wealth differences between homeowners and 
renters. However, two factors must be considered. First, the timing of the decision to 
purchase a home will have significant impacts on wealth accumulation. We point to the 
relatively small downturn in the early 1990s and the significant downturn in housing 
prices during the financial crisis of 2007 (see Figure 2.7). This type of price volatility 
suggests short duration homeownership does not guarantee increases in wealth.  
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Figure 2.7 – Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index 1990 – 2016 (S&P Dow Jones Indices 
LLC, 2017) 
 
The second point of caution in interpreting Figure 2.6 is that in order to access 
the accumulated wealth, without borrowing against equity, homeowners would need to 
sell their homes. In 2002, Donald Haurin (a professor at Ohio State University) uses 
data from the 1992 Survey of the Married Military Officers and Enlisted Personnel report 
to estimate the impact of transaction costs and expected length of stay on 
homeownership. In his analysis, he finds the length of stay and transaction cost of 
selling a home have a significant impact on homeownership. Specifically, he estimates 
the transaction costs of selling a home (not the total cost of owning) are the sum of 3% 
of the house value and 4% of household earnings.  
For illustrative purposes, a breakeven analysis might assume a median home 
value of $170,000, and a married couple with a median income of $60,000 in 2001. 
Using Haurin’s (2002) estimates for transaction costs, a homeowner would need $7,500 
in home equity to break even. This type of analysis is especially pertinent to military 
families who often move due to military orders after 3 years in one location.  
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Shelton (1968) considered the cost of renting versus owning a home to estimate 
a minimum duration to break even. He first estimates a homeowner will accrue an 
annual net savings of 2% of the home value relative to renting. This is based on 
avoiding the cost associated with operating as a landlord, such as higher annual 
maintenance costs, vacancy allowances, and management costs. He then estimates a 
non-recurring cost of transferring the home (transaction costs associated with selling the 
home) of 7% of the home value.  From this we can calculate the minimum required 
tenure for homeownership to have a lower cost than renting to be 3.5 years or longer 
(7% ÷ 2%). For tenures less than 3.5 years, it is less expensive to rent.  
Given the regular intervals at which servicemembers are required to make 
military directed moves, 3.5 years is a difficult threshold to meet. Haurin (2002) points to 
data on expected stays for military members from the 1992 Survey of the Married 
Military Officers and Enlisted Personnel. He finds only 35% of his sample had an 
expected duration for their current assignment of 3-4 years. Additionally, 26% of 
respondents expected to stay in their current assignment for 1-2 years and 39% 
expected to stay between 2-3 years. 
2.3.1 Military Families and Housing 
“There are few human needs in life more basic or important than a 
decent place to live. Housing is certainly on our people’s minds. Every 
time I visit an installation and sit down with enlisted folks to hear their 
concerns, they bring up housing. We have a special duty to ensure 
quality housing.” – Secretary of Defense William J. Perry (Department 
of Defense, 1995) 
When a military family moves to a new location within the U.S. there are three 
broad categories of housing available. First, families can apply to live in a limited 
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number of government owned military housing units or, more recently, privatized military 
housing. Second, families can rent housing off base. Finally, families can choose to 
purchase a home.  
In 1995, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Quality of Life found military 
family housing in a state of disrepair, obsolescence, and substandard relative to civilian 
living arrangements (Department of Defense, 1995). In addition to strongly 
recommending a liberalization of financial policy on the DOD to support privatization by 
Congress, the Task Force also strongly recommended home ownership by military 
families.7  Specifically, the Task Force found that homeownership was consistent with 
DOD policy in utilizing private sector housing solutions as a primary solution to housing 
military families and in line with the goals of many Americans to own homes. The Task 
force went so far as to suggest that the DOD “actively seek to eliminate hurdles to home 
ownership” and “strongly encourage, evaluate and implement imaginative programs to 
encourage home ownership by Servicemembers” (Department of Defense, 1995). 
When choosing a home, military families place a significant weight on economic 
considerations (Buddin et. al, 1999). Nearly 60% of military families choosing to live in 
military housing stated “good economic decision” as the first or second most important 
consideration. Roughly 40% of military families choosing to rent a home on the 
                                            
 
 
 
7 In response, Congress established the 1996 Military Housing Privatization Initiative which allowed for 
the privatization of the first 2,663 military family housing units in 2000 (U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, 2015). The project culminated in the privatization of 219,000 military family housing 
units or roughly 98% of military family housing units by 2012. 
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economy states “military housing unavailable” as the first or second most important 
factor leading to their home decision presumably preferring military housing for similar 
reasons. Finally, military families who choose to buy a home state “Investment” and 
“good economic decision” as first or second most important drivers roughly 40% and 
30% respectively. Nearly 70% of military families prefer military housing to civilian 
alternatives due to cost-effectiveness and about 27% of military families owned homes. 
Increases in servicemembers’ basic allowance for housing in the early 2000s, 
and decreases in mortgage interest rates, led to increases in military family 
homeownership rates from roughly 27% in 1997 to 38% in 2007 (Bissell, Crosslin, & 
Hathaway, 2010). While military families experienced greater gains in homeownership, 
overall American homeownership rates grew over the same period, increasing from 
65.7% in the first quarter of 1997 to 68.9% in the fourth quarter of 2006 (U.S. Bureau of 
the Census, 2017).  
As previously mentioned, military personnel are often required to make frequent 
relocations, and short-term home ownership does not guarantee wealth accumulation. 
Following the financial crisis of 2007-2008, Congress moved to protect servicemembers 
and their families from significant financial loss due to military directed relocations 
during the Financial Crisis through an expansion of the Homeowners Assistance 
Program (Office of the Inspector General - Department of Defense, 2011).8 Specifically, 
                                            
 
 
 
8 The Homeowners Assistance Program was established as part of the Demonstration Cities and 
Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 and originally provided assistance to assist eligible 
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Congress appropriated $555 million under the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009 with an additional $300 million under the National Defense Authorization Act 
of 2010. As of 23 February 2011, the Housing Assistance program had paid $725.5 
million to 4,825 applicants with an additional 4,897 pending cases. These payments are 
used to offset financial losses to homeowners who needed to sell their house because 
of military directed relocation during the financial crisis.  
Considering the recent financial crisis, the 1995 Defense Science Board Task 
Force on Quality of Life’s recommendations may have reflected the housing euphoria of 
the time. However, an important question remains: does the lower homeownership rate 
of military families disadvantage veterans in accumulating wealth over their lifetimes? If 
this is an undesirable side effect of military service, how do we close the gap without 
creating excessive burdens on taxpayers if another financial crisis were to occur? 
Data from HRS points to significant gaps in home equity between veterans and 
nonveterans (Gustman, Steinmeier, & Tabatabai, 2016). In Figure 2.8, we present 
Gustman et. al HRS data comparing net house value (home equity) for veteran and 
non-veteran cohorts entering ages 51 to 56 in 1992, 1998, 2004, and 2010. There are 
striking similarities between Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.8. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
difference in net house values represents 32% and 35% of the wealth gap in the 2004 
and 2010 cohorts, respectively.  
                                            
 
 
 
servicemembers and civilian Federal employee homeowners negatively impacted by Base Realignment 
and Closure. 
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Figure 2.8 – Net House Value by Cohort (in 2010 dollars) 
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The increasing gap between veterans and nonveterans coincides with a sharp 
decrease in the proportion of respondents serving in the military. The proportion fell 
from roughly 50% in the 1992 and 1998 cohorts to 29% and 16% in the 2004 and 2010 
cohorts, respectively. At the same time, we see increases in the duration of military 
service. In the 1998 cohort, 7% of male veterans served more than 10 years while 8% 
and 13% of the 2004 and 2010 cohorts served for more than 10 years. The trend of 
increasing duration of military service has continued since the 1970s increasing to 
roughly 11 years for officers and 7 years for enlisted servicemembers (see Figure 2.9). 
As a draft era reference point, the average duration of service for WWII was 2.75 years 
(The National WWII Museum, 2017). If military families postpone home purchases while 
on active duty, longer durations for military service result in longer delays in home 
purchases. This subsequently reduces the amount of time to build equity through home 
ownership before the ages of 51-56 (the ages the HRS observations are made). 
We are unaware of any data showing historical homeownership rates for military 
families prior to the 1995 Defense Science Board Task Force on Quality of Life report. 
However, it seems reasonable to assume that growth of the basic housing allowance in  
the early 2000s and relatively low mortgage interest rates culminated in a 
historically high military family ownership rate of 38% in 2007, roughly half the 
homeownership rates of the American average for the same year (Bissell, Crosslin, & 
Hathaway, 2010). This suggests that as active duty servicemembers continue to serve 
for longer durations, a large proportion are postponing purchasing homes for longer 
periods of time. 
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Figure 2.9 – Average Years in the Military 1973-2011 (Department of Defense, 2011a) 
 
After leaving military service, veterans show a higher likelihood of purchasing 
homes than their nonveteran peers (Department of Veterans Affairs, 2004).9 While 
active duty servicemembers lag behind the American average for homeownership rates, 
the veteran population achieves a roughly 12% higher home ownership rate. Even after 
controlling for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, veterans achieve a 5% 
higher likelihood of homeownership relative to the comparable American. Much of the 
credit for this goes to the Veterans Administration (henceforth VA) Home Loan Guaranty 
program, which provides eligible servicemembers and veterans home loans that require 
neither a down payment nor private mortgage insurance. Traditionally, borrowers with 
                                            
 
 
 
9 This may not apply uniformly to subsets of the veteran population and is sensitive to how the estimating 
model is specified. Utilizing data from the 2000 Decennial Census Long Form and the 2005 American 
Community Survey, Conely and Heerwig (2011) estimate Vietnam veterans show no difference or lower 
probability of homeownership compared to nonservice peers. 
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less than 20% down require private mortgage insurance, generally at a cost of 0.5% of 
the loan amount per year. Roughly 60% of veterans who borrowed money to buy, 
improve, or refinance a home have obtained a VA home loan.  
To provide a rough estimate of potential equity appreciation veterans may have 
enjoyed from buying a home sooner, we estimate a home price appreciation profile. 
Specifically, we utilize Case-Shiller monthly percent change in U.S. National Home 
Price index data from 1 Jan 1990 – 1 Aug 2017. We conduct a 500-iteration simulation 
to randomly sample, with replacement, 79 continuous month periods from the data.10  
We use our 79-month Case-Shiller price index simulation to establish an 80-
month monthly price appreciation profile (includes the first month of ownership) and 
corresponding 95% confidence interval.  We also calculate a 30-year mortgage 
schedule, again assuming a $170,000 home price, a 10% down payment, and a 4% 
interest rate. We present the results of this simulation in Figure 2.10. 
From Figure 2.10, we see that if veterans purchased a home 5 years earlier, they 
may have enjoyed a $68,542 increase in their equity position. Interestingly, the home 
equity gap identified by Gustman et al. (2016) is roughly $73,000 and $77,000 in the 
2004 and 2010 cohorts, respectively.  
The VA home loan is also popular among the active duty servicemembers who 
choose to purchase homes (FINRA Investor Education Foundation, 2013b). In 2012,  
  
                                            
 
 
 
10 79 continuous months is an arbitrary cutoff. Including the first month of ownership this provides a price 
appreciation profile of 80 months. 
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Figure 2.10  – Estimated Equity Appreciation to Veterans of Purchasing a Home Sooner by Year 
  
 69 
 
roughly 30% of military families stated they had placed 0% towards down payments 
when purchasing homes since 2000. This presents significant risk towards losses in the 
event of even minor downturns in housing prices. Roughly 46% of active duty 
homeowners responded they are “underwater” or owe more than their home is worth, 
significantly higher than the 31.4% of Americans underwater in the first quarter of 2012 
(Humphries, 2014). Additionally, 12% of active duty homeowners in the FINRA study 
stated they were involved in a foreclosure between 2010 and 2012.  
When taken together, the postponement of homeownership by active duty 
servicemembers, the increasing duration of military service, and the significant 
utilization of 0% down financing provides a plausible explanation for the increasing gap 
in home equity observed by Gustman et. al. It also paints a picture of the vulnerability of 
active duty homeowners and the potential for future risks to American taxpayers if 
another housing downturn were to occur. 
2.4 Intergenerational Transfers 
Wealth is generated from two sources, income and transfers from others. Here, 
we define intergenerational transfers as simply transfers from oneself to one’s 
descendants. These transfers can be as simple as a parent providing money to their 
children to help pay rent after they move out or a grandparent providing funds to help 
with a down payment for a first home. There are two types of transfers. The first type of 
transfer, inter vivos transfers, are transfers made between living people. The second 
type of transfer, bequests, are transfers that are made after the death of the donor.  
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 Gale (1994) utilized data from the 1983 and 1986 Survey of Consumer Finances 
to study the impact of both inter vivos transfers and bequests on U.S. wealth 
accumulation. The 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances contains extensive financial 
interviews from 3,824 randomly selected U.S. households. Of these households, 2,822 
households were re-interviewed in the 1986 Survey of Consumer Finances. In addition 
to detailed data on wealth, income, and demographics, households were asked about 
transfers of more than $3,000 from one household to another between 1983 and 1986. 
Of these transfers, 75.4% consisted of transfers sent to support children and averaged 
$16,430. Another 11.8% or these transfers went to support grandchildren with an 
average transfer of $16,272. For individuals reporting that they had received a transfer 
of $3,000 or more, 84.2% reported receiving an average transfer of $14,966 from their 
parents.  
These transfers make up a large portion of aggregate U.S. wealth. Specifically, 
Gale and Scholz find inter vivos transfers account for at least 20% of wealth. Bequests 
account for an additional 31% of wealth. These transfers together account for at least 
51% of total wealth accumulation. These figures exclude transfers for college expenses, 
which one in eight families reported contributing towards in the mid-80s.11   
 Having wealth to transfer is especially important for postsecondary schooling. 
Conley (2001) highlighted the influence wealth may have on enrolling in and completing 
                                            
 
 
 
11 Gale & Scholz (1994) report that among families with positive contributions towards college expenses 
for their children, the average was $9,373 between 1983-85. That amount in 2017 dollars is $22,516. 
(https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=9373&year1=198401&year2=201707) 
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college. By analyzing data from the annual Panel Study of Income Dynamics interviews, 
Conley was able to analyze multigenerational family level data on a large number of 
financial and demographic dimensions from 1984 to 1995. He finds that even after 
controlling for income and other socioeconomic factors parental net worth has a strong 
effect on postsecondary schooling of children. Specifically, higher levels of net worth 
allow parents to finance higher levels of educational and professional credientials for 
their children. Resulting in increases to the total number of years of schooling and the 
chances that a child will graduate. That is to say, “nonhuman capital (property) and 
human capital are linked across generations.” These linkages allow parents with greater 
wealth to secure higher socioeconomic status for their children. 
2.4.1 The Warrior Caste 
If the wealth gap between veterans and nonveterans persists, intergenerational 
transfers will grow in importance for veterans and their families. In the context of the 
contributions intergenerational transfers make to wealth, lower levels of wealth 
accumulated by veterans will lead to lower total transfers to their children. Below, we 
discuss particular challenges faced by veterans regarding intergenerational transfers 
and recent policies aiding veterans and their families.  
In the AVF era, military service has become a family business. In a six-month 
census of new recruits in 2012-13, the DOD found roughly 28% of new recruits joining 
the military had parents who served in the military (Department of Defense, 2013). 
Roughly 81% of new recruits reported having at least one family member (parent, 
sibling, grandparent, aunt/uncle, or cousin) who served in the military.  
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At the same time the general American public has reduced its familial association 
with those in the Military. The Pew Research Center (2011) finds 79% of respondents 
between 50-64 reported having an immediate family member (spouse, parent, sibling, 
or child) who served in the military. Only 33% of respondents between 18-29 reported 
having any immediate family members who served. Furthermore, the report confirms 
the intergenerational nature of military service. Veterans are roughly 22% more likely to 
have a parent who has also served, 59% more likely to have a sibling who has also 
served, and 133% more likely to have a child who has or is serving than the general 
American public.  
  If military families are less able to accumulate wealth throughout their lifetimes, 
the logical conclusion must be that there is less wealth to transfer between generations. 
This negative trend for intergenerational transfers has the potential to compound over 
time due to successive generations of military families. This compounding has the 
potential to lead to large deviations in total wealth accumulation for legacy 
servicemembers and their families.  
2.4.2 Post-9/11 GI Bill  
Recent policy has provided new avenues for military families to provide 
intergenerational transfers. Dating back to the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, 
the GI Bill has provided a viable path to college for millions of veterans (U.S. 
Department of Veterans Affairs, 2013). In 2008, the GI Bill was updated again. The 
updated version of the GI Bill, commonly referred to as the Post-9/11 GI Bill, provides 
expanded benefits over the 1984 “Montgomery” GI Bill covering more education 
expenses, provides a living allowance, and money for books. One of the key new 
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benefits of the Post-9/11 GI Bill is that it allows transferability of the unused portion of 
the 36 months of educational benefits to spouses or children, a direct intergenerational 
transfer.12 As a reference point, the estimated value of 36 months of benefits utilized by 
an eligible servicemember’s child in 2017 at the University of Tennessee totals $73,900.  
2.4.3 Blended Retirement System  
Under the current Uniformed Services retirement system, eligible 
servicemembers with at least 20 years of service receive an inflation-protected annuity. 
If the retiree dies, military retired pay stops unless the servicemember elected to 
participate in the Survivor Benefit Plan, which provides an annuity of up to 55% of the 
member’s retired pay to a surviving spouse and/or eligible children (Department of 
Defense, 2017b). Under this retirement system, bequests must come from other 
sources outside of these retirement funds. In a gloomy example, if a servicemember 
retires after 20 years of service but passes away the next day and is only survived by a 
22-year-old child, there are no bequests available from the value of the annuity the 
government would have paid the member.13   
With the Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress created 
a new Blended Retirement System (henceforth BRS), effective 1 January 2018. Under 
the new BRS the DOD provides a 1% automatic contribution and up to an additional 4% 
                                            
 
 
 
12 Eligible servicemembers must have at least six years of service and agree to serve four additional 
years. Children of eligible servicemembers can only begin using the transferred benefits after the 
servicemember has completed 10 years of service. 
(https://www.benefits.va.gov/GIBILL/docs/factsheets/Transferability_Factsheet.pdf) 
13 Under the Survivor Benefit Plan, children under the age of 18 are eligible to receive a portion of the 
military retired paid, if elected. If the child is a full-time student, the age of eligibility is increased to 22. 
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in matching contributions to a tax preferred Thrift Savings Plan account, the DOD’s 
version of a 401(k). After completing two years of service, these funds are fully vested.  
The new BRS also provides an annuity for eligible servicemembers after 20 years of 
service. However, the defined benefit portion of the BRS is slightly reduced relative to 
the current system.  
Related to intergenerational transfers, this new retirement system provides an 
integrated path for savings that can be transferred as a bequest. Compared to our prior 
gloomy example, if the same servicemember joined the military after 1 Jan 2018,  
served 20 years, and died the next day, military retired pay will still stop. However, the 
automatic 1% government contribution and any additional savings with government 
match in the TSP account are available to transfer as a bequest.  
Several areas ripe for future research include the effect of transferring education 
benefits through the post-9/11 GI bill on recruiting, retention, and wealth accumulation 
of dependents of veterans. The new BRS will also provide new opportunities for future 
research, perhaps the most significant of these opportunities is how BRS impacts 
intergenerational transfers.   
Underlying the previously discussed institutional dimensions, we find behavioral 
influences can move us closer or further away from desired savings. In what follows, we 
consider these behavioral factors for servicemembers. We begin by exploring the 
influence of financial education on financial behavior. Next, we consider issues at the 
intersection of financial education, self-control, and loss aversion by highlighting a 
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unique savings program called the Save More Tomorrow™ (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004). 
Finally, we dive into how locus of control shapes individual savings behaviors. 
2.5 Financial Literacy 
 Underlying the act of retirement planning is a strong implicit assumption that 
individuals understand basic financial concepts such as compound returns, the 
differences between stocks and bonds, tax implications associated with investment 
decisions, and much more. These concepts are generally gathered under the heading 
of financial literacy. Here we consider the influence financial literacy has on financial 
behavior and lifetime wealth outcomes. 
 Over the last few decades, the financial landscape has become increasingly 
complex and difficult to navigate for consumers (Boshara, Gannon, Mandell, & Sass, 
2010). Since the mid-1970s, financial firms have seen the deregulation of brokerage 
commissions and standardized bank interest rates, as well as the elimination of usury 
laws which drove increased profitability of credit cards and consumer debt. Additionally, 
financial innovation, combined with relaxation of interest rate ceilings on consumer debt, 
led to increased access for consumers to subprime consumer debt such as credit cards, 
car loans, and home mortgages. Simultaneously, employers have shifted away from 
defined benefit pensions in favor of defined contribution plans that place the burden of 
making costly and risky retirement decisions on individuals. While these innovations and 
deregulations have increased the availability of choices to consumers, it has also 
increased the need for more financially competent consumers.  
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 Unfortunately, America has a financial literacy problem. Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2014) considered the state of economic research on financial literacy. In this paper, 
they present a simple three question survey used to gauge an individual’s basic 
understanding of (i) numeracy (ability to understand and work with numbers) and 
interest rates; (ii) inflation; and (iii) risk diversification. These three questions are 
(answers provided in footnote): 
1. Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2 
percent per year. After 5 Years, how much do you think you would have in the 
account if you left the money to grow: [more than $102; exactly $102; less 
than $102; do not know; refuse to answer.] 
2. Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1 percent per year 
and inflation was 2 percent per year. After 1 year, would you be able to buy: 
[more than; exactly the same as; or less than today with the money in this 
account; do not know; refuse to answer.] 
3. Do you think that the following statement is true or false? “Buying a single 
company stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund.” 
[true; false; do not know; refuse to answer.]14 
If an individual can answer all three questions correctly, it seems reasonable to believe 
the individual understands fundamental financial concepts. These fundamental 
concepts form the foundations necessary for making quality savings, investment, and 
retirement planning decisions.  
Since the first administration of the three questions above in the 2004 Health and 
Retirement Study, researchers have incorporated them into several other studies in the 
US and internationally. For example, the 2007-2008 National Longitudinal Survey of 
                                            
 
 
 
14 Answers: 1.) More than $102, 2.) Less than today, 3.) False 
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Youth surveyed individuals ages 23-28 (Lusardi, Mitchell, & Curto, 2010), and the 
RAND American Life Panel surveyed individuals of all ages (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2009). 
These questions have also been translated and used in more than a dozen international 
studies cited by Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) including the Netherlands, Japan, Australia 
and many more.  
So how does the US compare with other countries? Not well. Regardless of age, 
gender, or education level, the US tends to lag behind comparable countries in financial 
literacy when measured by the above questions. Below we present Figures 11, 12, and 
13. In each of these figures, we present the percentage of individuals providing correct 
responses for all three financial literacy questions. In Figure 2.11, we see fewer than 
20% of Americans below the age of 36 answer the three financial literacy questions 
correctly. Compared to 55% of Germans the same age or roughly 45% of Dutch and 
Swiss the same age. In Figure 2.12, we see large differences between Americans by 
gender but also see Americans lag behind the Germans, Dutch, and Swiss across the 
board. Finally, in Figure 2.13 we see Americans again lagging behind the German, 
Dutch, and Swiss in financial literacy across all comparable education levels.  
These statistics are concerning due to the substantial influence financial literacy 
has on decision making. Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) point to several studies that find 
those with greater financial literacy are also more likely to participate in financial 
markets, invest in stocks, and hold emergency funds. Furthermore, individuals with 
greater financial literacy are more likely to plan for retirement, and those who make 
financial plans accumulate more wealth.  
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Figure 2.11 – Percent Providing Correct Answers to All Three Financial Literacy Questions by Age 
Group (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2014)  
 
 
Figure 2.12 - Percent Providing Correct Answers to All Three Financial Literacy Questions by 
Gender (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2014) 
 
 
Figure 2.13 – Percent Providing Correct Answer to All Three Financial Literacy Questions by 
Education (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2014) 
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Conversely, Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) also point to studies that find individuals 
with lower financial literacy are more likely to engage in costly behavior. For example, 
lower financial literacy is associated with costly mortgages through higher transaction 
costs, paying higher fees, and high-cost borrowing. Additionally, lower financial literacy 
is associated with costly credit card behavior, excessive debt loads, and engaging in 
alternative financial services (such as payday loans, pawn shops, auto title loans, or 
rent-to-own services). 
Taking a slightly different approach, Allgood and Walstad (2016) explore the 
linkage between financial literacy and financial behaviors associated with credit cards, 
investments, loans, insurance, and financial advice. More specifically, Allgood and 
Walstad consider the difference between perceived financial literacy (subjective and 
self-assessed) and “actual” financial literacy (test based on financial concepts). The 
authors accomplish this by conducting a national survey of over 28,000 U.S. adults and 
households. Not surprisingly, individuals with both high perceived and actual financial 
literacy are more likely to show positive financial behaviors with credit cards, 
investments, loans, insurance, and financial advice than those with low perceived and 
actual financial literacy.15 However, a counterintuitive result is that increasing perceived 
financial literacy relative to actual financial literacy may have greater impacts on positive 
                                            
 
 
 
15 Positive financial behaviors are those that might be recommended by financial management experts 
such as: avoiding costly credit card usage and debt, participating in financial investments like stocks, 
bonds, and mutual funds, seeking financial advice, and so on. 
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financial behaviors. Allgood and Walstad relate perceived financial literacy to 
confidence in financial knowledge, which may be required to take actions associated 
with positive financial behaviors.16  
The evidence pointing to positive economic outcomes associated with greater 
financial literacy raises the question of how to improve financial literacy. An obvious 
answer might be training and education programs. However, the next questions policy 
makers should ask are who should get the training, how much training is required (both 
intensity and duration), and how often?  
Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) highlight the popularity of financial literacy programs 
by drawing on dozens of studies both in the US and internationally. These studies 
consider a wide spectrum of training programs such as those targeting young 
individuals (e.g. high school students), or professionals in large US firms. Still others 
look to provide training to those already in financial distress. However, few studies have 
carefully evaluated the effectiveness of these programs in the context of financial 
literacy as a human capital investment. Under this analytical lens, some individuals may 
find it optimal to invest in financial literacy while others will not (similar to an investment 
in higher education). Furthermore, many employers provide training programs to 
increase participation rates in retirement savings programs. Given people have 
                                            
 
 
 
16 Allgood and Walstad note their study may be limited due to the shortness of the test measure. 
Additionally, the authors note an inability to identify a causal relationship between financial literacy and 
behavior. Instead the authors point to the relationship between the combination of actual financial literacy 
and perceived financial literacy and financial outcomes. 
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heterogeneous preferences and economic conditions, it is unreasonable to expect every 
person to respond equally to these training opportunities. Finally, Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2014) point to best practices when considering the development of effective financial 
education programs such as avoiding short indiscriminate one-size-fits-all training 
regimes.  
Fernandes, Lynch, and Netemeyer (2014) considers financial literacy, financial 
education, and associated economic behavior. This study was a meta-analysis that 
reviewed 168 papers covering 201 prior studies to understand the effectiveness of 
financial literacy programs on economic behavior. They find very small effects for 
financial literacy interventions (see our discussion from Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) 
above). However, Fernandes et al. (2014) point to the perishable nature of financial 
education showing even extensive interventions have negligible effects 20 months later. 
Similar to recommendations from Lusardi and Mitchell (2014), Fernandes et al. (2014) 
suggest eliminating one-size-fits-all training. More specifically, addressing the 
perishable nature of financial training by providing focused topical “just-in-time” financial 
training related to specific decisions being made.   
2.5.1 The DOD and Financial Literacy 
 Financial literacy concerns are nothing new to the DOD (Military Compensation 
and Retirement Modernization Commission, 2015). The Military Compensation and 
Retirement Modernization Commission report, and sources therein, point to the ways 
that financial illiteracy have degraded mission effectiveness and distracted 
servicemembers from their mission focus. For example, in Fiscal Year 2013, nearly 
1,130 servicemembers lost their security clearance due to financial issues. Additionally, 
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it has been estimated that the DOD must involuntarily separate between 4,703 and 
7,957 military personnel each year due to financial distress. With each separation 
costing as much as $57,333, these separations divert hundreds of millions of dollars 
away from other uses.  
According to the 2013 Blue Star Families Annual Lifestyle Survey, 12% of military 
family households indicate servicemembers were provided financial education while 
90% were interested in preventative financial education. Effective 19 Sept 2017, Title 10 
U.S.C. § 992 requires the DOD to provide comprehensive financial literacy training, 
consistent with many recommendations outlined in the Military Compensation and 
Retirement Modernization Commission report. Specifically, the new law falls in line with 
just-in-time requirements suggested by Fernandes et al. (2014) for events such as 
promotion, vesting under the new Blended Retirement System, major life events (e.g. 
marriage, divorce, birth of first child), and many more circumstances.  
While the new law is consistent with much of the current literature, the 
effectiveness of this new requirement remains unclear. As we previously mentioned, 
many families are interested in preventative financial education. Recent surveys 
conducted by the FINRA Investor Education Foundation (2013a and 2013b) show a 
strong interest among servicemembers for financial planning and financial advice 
services. In Table 2.1, we present the percent of respondents who have consulted a 
financial professional between 2007-2012 from a national survey and a survey 
specifically for servicemembers.  
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Table 2.1 – Percent of respondents who have consulted a financial advisor between 2007-2012 
Have consulted a financial professional about: 
National 
Total 
Service 
Member 
Total 
Insurance of any type 30% 45% 
Savings or investments 29% 42% 
Taking out a mortgage or a loan 20% 40% 
Tax planning 18% 26% 
Debt counseling 9% 18% 
Have consulted a financial professional about any of the above 50% 66% 
 
 
Table 2.1 suggests the military servicemembers who find it optimal to increase 
their financial literacy may search out opportunities to do so on their own. If this is true, 
the effects from the new training requirements may be negligible due to existing 
tendencies towards searching out opportunities to invest in their own financial literacy. 
2.6 A “SMarT”-er Way to Save 
Thaler and Benartzi (2004) outlines an innovative program designed to increase 
employee savings informed by principles from behavioral economics. They called this 
program the Save More Tomorrow™ (SMarT) program. In this section, we explore 
behavioral economic foundations underlying the SMarT program (financial literacy, self-
control, procrastination, and loss aversion), discuss the mechanics of the SMarT 
program, and highlight the implications of implementing such a program within the DOD.  
2.6.1 Financial Literacy 
As we have discussed in prior sections, there are many hurdles individuals (both 
veterans and nonveterans) face to saving adequately for the future. One such hurdle 
may be that individuals lack the information they require to adequately estimate their 
post retirement needs. For example, adequate retirement savings requires information 
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on expected lifetime income, estimated working years, anticipated risk adjusted 
investment returns, life expectancy, and consumption levels.  
Goda, Manchester, and Sojourner (2014) presents a field experiment designed to 
study the effects that providing retirement income projections have on employer-
sponsored retirement savings behavior. Their experiment was conducted at the 
University of Minnesota, involved nearly 17,000 employees, and provided three different 
randomized information treatments: general information on savings for retirement; 
individualized information on impacts of hypothetical additional contributions on balance 
at retirement; and individualized information on impacts of hypothetical additional 
contributions on income in retirement. In addition to the information brochure, 
individuals outside the control group were provided with a contribution change form that 
would allow individuals to make changes to their retirement contributions after reviewing 
the provided material.  
All three information treatments made it more likely that individuals changed their 
retirement savings contributions when compared to the control group. However, the 
general information on savings treatment was not statistically different from the control 
group. The treatment including both retirement balance and income in retirement 
increased the average contribution to retirement savings. This experiment resulted in an 
average annual increase in retirement contributions by $2,504. Roughly 24% of the 
changes in retirement contributions are associated with those who went from 
contributing nothing to contributing something, the extensive margin. Among those who 
chose to contribute, the average annual increase in contributions was $7,612.  
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This experiment provided the first direct evidence that people will adjust their 
retirement contributions based on lifetime savings projections. Furthermore, this study 
confirms that targeted financial education, followed by an opportunity to take action and 
to commit oneself, is an effective strategy for increasing savings (see Lusardi and 
Mitchell, 2014; Fernandes, Lynch, and Netemeyer, 2014). These are important 
implications for an effective savings program, and we will revisit this as we discuss the 
mechanics of the SMarT program. 
2.6.2 Self-Control  
 The idea of self-control in an economic context was formally introduced by Strotz 
(1956). Consider a young person who has an idea of how they would like to retire. 
Perhaps they want to travel the world during their retirement years, or own a lakefront 
home and spend their retirement fishing. In any case, each day that passes presents an 
opportunity to stay on the path to achieving that goal or move further away from it. 
Splurging on the most current smartphone, newest model car, or a cutting edge ultra-
high-definition TV are all possible examples of temptations that might move this person 
away from their intended goal. If this person fails to recognize the inconsistency, he will 
engage in undesirable, wasteful spending. Alternatively, if he is aware he may be 
tempted in the future, he may “precommit” his future behaviors by automatically setting 
aside money each month into the Thrift Savings Plan (hereafter TSP), 401(k) style 
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retirement account, or some other investment account.17 By investing in a retirement 
account, this person increases the cost of deviating from his intended goal through the 
specter of heavy early withdrawal penalties or increased debt. Finally, he could account 
for his future temptations and decide to lower his retirement goals. For example, instead 
of traveling the world, he may resign himself to traveling the US or not traveling at all.  
Strotz presents a theoretical model that suggests the way people discount their 
future consumption relative to the present drives this inconsistency. He conjectures that 
self-control problems arise because people “over-value” or “under-discount” 
consumption closer to the present relative to consumption that occurs much later. This 
can lead, for example, to individuals putting off saving for things like retirement or 
education and instead purchasing things that can be consumed right away, like clothes 
or electronics. Thaler and Benartzi (2004) point to a situation where an individual is 
offered a choice between two rewards, a small one at time t and a big one at time 𝑡 + 1. 
When t is far off in the future, people would prefer the big prize because the value of the 
reward is larger than the perceived cost of waiting. However, as t approaches zero (or 
right now), the small prize looks more attractive now than waiting for a bigger prize later, 
and people switch their preference.  
Coller and Williams (1999) conducted an experiment to better understand how 
people make choices between two prizes over time. In one of the sessions, individuals 
                                            
 
 
 
17 Strotz points to Odysseus tying himself to the mast to avoid the sirens in The Odyssey as a famous 
precommitment example. 
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were asked to choose between receiving $500 one month from now or some larger 
amount 3 months from now (a two month wait).18 The median respondent in their 
experiment stated they would require more than $516.94 to wait 2 months. However, in 
a separate session, individuals were asked to choose between receiving $500 today or 
some larger amount 2 months later (still waiting two months). The median respondent 
now stated they would require less than $516.94 to wait the same 2 months and would 
instead take $500 today. This present-bias preference has direct implications for lifetime 
wealth accumulation.  
2.6.3 Procrastination 
Mark Twain once quipped, “Never put off till tomorrow what may be done the day 
after tomorrow just as well.” Unfortunately, these words ring true in practice for many 
tasks that we view as unpleasant, including retirement savings decisions.  
Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2002) considered the effect different 401(k) 
plan features have on savings behavior. Part of their study included a randomized 
savings adequacy survey of employees at a large US food corporation. Individuals were 
asked how much they should ideally save towards retirement. The average response is 
13.9% of income. These individuals were then asked to evaluate their actual savings 
rate. Roughly two-thirds of respondents said their actual 401(k) saving rate was too low 
when compared to their ideal saving rate. Next, individuals were asked about their 
                                            
 
 
 
18 One subject was selected at random at the end of the experiment and received a notarized payment 
certificate that was redeemable for a university check on or after the appropriate date based on the 
selections made by the subject during the experiment. 
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future plans for their saving rate. Of the individuals that reported their saving rate was 
too low, 35% of the respondents expressed an intent to increase their contribution rate 
over the next few months. Nearly 75% of these respondents who intended to increase 
their saving rate said they planned to do so within two months. Roughly half intended to 
make increases within the next month. However, when crosschecked against individual 
401(k) records, 86% of individuals that reported they would increase their savings over 
the next few months had taken no action four months after the survey. Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser (1988) would consider this procrastination a status quo bias. That is, the 
individual has made no change to the status quo (their current savings rate) out of 
convenience, habit, or inertia. In this example, the status quo bias results in a 
presumably undesirable outcome (an individual realizes they save less than they would 
ideally like to but intends to make changes…tomorrow). 
Procrastination and status quo bias is not necessarily bad and the effective 
assignment of default options may help those who are prone to these behaviors. In fact, 
if it is desirable to increase participation in employer sponsored 401(k) plans, a status 
quo (or default option) bias can lead to significantly greater participation rates.19 In 
2001, Madrian and Dennis Shea (from UnitedHealth Group) published a paper that 
analyzed the impact of automatic enrollment on 401(k) savings behavior.  
                                            
 
 
 
19 The new Blended Retirement System servicemembers are automatically enrolled in a default “lifecycle” 
fund at a rate of 3% of basic pay. If a servicemember opts out, the member will be automatically re-
enrolled each calendar year (Department of Defense, 2017d).  
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In their paper, Madrian and Shea analyzed the 401(k) savings patterns of 
employees at a large US corporation before and after a policy change. The old policy 
required employees to opt-in to the 401(k) savings plan. The new policy automatically 
enrolled employees unless they opt-out of the 401(k) saving plan. These policies have 
become popular for reasons we will discuss here but require an employer to choose a 
default savings rate (usually modest, 3% or less) and a default savings plan (usually a 
conservative mix of stocks or bonds, or a money market fund). While classical economic 
predictions would say this policy change should have no effect, the policy significantly 
impacted participation rates. 
There are two significant findings from the Madrian and Shea study. First, 
automatic enrollment plans significantly increase participation in employer sponsored 
401(k) programs. Before the policy change, 49% of eligible employees participated in 
the 401(k) program. After the company moved to an automatic enrolment policy, 
participation increased to 86%. Other studies have found even higher participation rates 
after a similar policy change. For example, Choi et al. (2002) find participation rates in 
the 95-98% range for some companies 36 months after the policy change. 
The second significant finding from Madrian and Shea is that a large portion of 
the 401(k) participants hired under the automatic enrollment plan kept both the default 
contribution rate and default fund allocation. Conversely, few employees hired before 
the automatic enrollment plan (those that had to opt-in and subsequently make their 
own contribution rate and fund allocation decisions) chose the specific combination of 
savings rate and fund allocation associated with the new program. Madrian and Shea 
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suggest this status quo bias is a result of both participant inertia and an employee 
perception that the default recommended by the employer represents sound investment 
advice.  
On one hand, increased participation in retirement savings programs is arguably 
a positive outcome. On the other hand, the high number of individuals passively 
accepting the default savings rate and default fund allocation may lead to lower lifetime 
wealth accumulation compared to individuals who participate in a 401(k) plan at a firm 
without automatic enrollment (Choi, Laibson, & Madrian, 2004). Over time, few 
individuals change their contribution rate and fund selections. Even after 2 years, 40-
54% keep the default choices. The increased participation rates in the 401(k) savings 
program raises average wealth accumulation, but the low default savings rate and 
conservative default funds may reduce total accumulation. Below, we will discuss how 
the SMarT program attempts to capture the advantages associated with the automatic 
enrollment plans while attempting to sidestep some disadvantages. 
2.6.4 Loss Aversion 
 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) published a revolutionary paper that changed the 
way many economists think about decision making.20 The theory proposed by 
Kahneman and Tversky is called prospect theory, and they introduced the idea that 
individuals significantly weigh losses more heavily than gains (loss aversion). Empirical 
                                            
 
 
 
20 The 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to Kahneman for joint work with Tversky. 
Unfortunately, Tversky passed away in 1996 and the award is not awarded posthumously. 
(https://news.stanford.edu/news/2002/october16/tversky-1016.html) 
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work has estimated loss aversion typically close to 2.0 both for risky choices and for 
riskless choices (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 
1990). That is, losses hurt twice as much as a comparable gain gives us enjoyment. 
Another way to think of this is that a loss and foregone gains are both “bads,” however 
people regard losses as twice as bad as an equal-size foregone gain. 
 Kahneman, Jack Knetsch (a professor at Simon Fraser University, Canada), 
and Thaler published a paper in 1986 that looked at fairness considerations in customer 
and labor markets. One of the interesting findings from this paper centers on individuals’ 
perception of wage gains and losses in nominal terms. When asked if a wage cut of 7% 
during a recession with high unemployment and no inflation is acceptable or unfair, 62% 
respondents see this as unfair. However, when asked if a wage increase of 5% during a 
recession with high unemployment and inflation of 12% is acceptable or unfair, 22% of 
respondents state this is unfair. In both scenarios, an individual is losing 5% in real 
purchasing power but because people look at gains and losses in nominal terms we see 
a very different response. When people think of money only in nominal terms, 
economist call this money illusion. The combination of loss aversion and money illusion 
has powerful implications for savings behavior, as we will discuss below. 
2.6.5 Save More Tomorrow™  
 Providing employees with a voluntary and regimented savings program 
substantially increases savings rates (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004). Thaler and Benartzi (a 
professor at the University of California, Los Angeles) present a prescriptive savings 
program called Save More Tomorrow ™ (hereafter, the SMarT program). Under the 
SMarT program, employees voluntarily precommit a portion of their future salary 
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increases towards retirement savings. From 1998-2002 a midsize manufacturing 
company utilized the SMarT program and found 78% of those offered the program 
participated, 80% who joined the program remained enrolled, and the average savings 
rates increased from 3.5% to 13.6% over 40 months.  
 In designing the SMarT program, Thaler and Benartzi first attempt to diagnose 
the underlying causes for the lack of retirement savings. First, it is difficult to figure out 
what the “right” savings amount should be. In other words, people are limited by their 
cognitive ability. Second, many households lack the self-control necessary to increase 
savings towards retirement. Third, households tend to procrastinate when it comes to 
saving for retirement (related to self-control). Procrastination can also lead to inertia in 
retirement savings. As we previously discussed, companies that automatically enroll 
employees in retirement savings accounts with default savings rates find high 
participation rates with few deviations from the default settings. Finally, when 
households adjust their standard of living to their current level of disposable income, 
they view additional savings as a loss of income and are less likely to make changes 
due to loss aversion.  
The SMarT program targets households who “…are not sure how much they 
should be saving, though they realize that it is probably more than they are doing now; 
but they procrastinate about saving more now, thinking they will get to it later.” The key 
components of the program are as follows: 
1. Ask employees if they want to participate as early as possible before a 
scheduled raise 
2. If employees join, the increase in savings contributions goes into effect with 
the first paycheck after a raise 
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3.  The contribution rate increases with each scheduled raise until a preset 
maximum is met 
4. Employees can opt-out at any time 
Each component seeks to address one of the challenges to increasing retirement 
savings outlined above. The simplicity of the program minimizes the cognitive burden 
placed on households in making retirement savings decisions. Next, by maximizing the 
time between when employees opt-in and the first contribution, we take advantage of 
the way people discount future events. By tying savings contribution increases to pay 
raises, the program reduces perceived loss aversion associated with decreasing take 
home pay. Relatedly, by committing to predetermined increases in saving contributions, 
the SMarT program leverages inertia and status quo bias in favor of increased savings. 
Finally, knowing one can opt out at any time makes employees more comfortable in 
making the decision to join. If servicemembers are attracted to the military for structure 
and discipline as suggested by Gal and Mangelsdorff (1991), offering servicemembers a 
regimented savings program such as the SMarT program may be beneficial. 
2.6.6 DOD Specific Considerations 
2.6.6.1 Servicemembers’ Discount Rates 
The military drawdowns in the early 1990s provided an opportunity to study 
directly the time preferences of servicemembers over meaningful decisions worth tens 
of thousands of dollars (Warner & Pleeter, 2001). During the 1992 U.S. military 
drawdown, mid-career servicemembers in selected occupations who elected to 
voluntarily separate from the military were offered a choice between a lump-sum 
separation benefit and an annuity. The DOD estimated that roughly half of enlisted 
personnel and a very small number of officers would select the lump sum over the 
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annuity. However, roughly half of officers and 90% of enlisted personnel made the less 
financially lucrative decision (were too impatient, or lacked self-control) when selecting a 
separation pay type. 
Why were the DOD’s estimates so off? To better understand this, we need to 
introduce the idea of personal discount rates. The personal discount rate is the measure 
of how much interest the individual must earn to be indifferent between savings and 
spending. The market interest rate is the amount the individual can actually earn. If the 
personal discount rate is below the market interest rate, an individual is better off 
saving. Conversely, if the personal discount rate is above the market interest rate, it 
does not make financial sense to save.  
When deciding between a lump sum and an annuity, we are concerned with the 
break-even discount rate (the rate of return that would equate the lump-sum payment 
and the present value of the annuity). In this case, if the personal discount rate is below 
the break-even discount rate an individual will choose the annuity because they are 
compensated enough to do so. Again, if the personal discount rate is above the break-
even discount rate, an individual will choose the lump-sum payment because they are 
not compensated enough to take the annuity and prefer to have the money today.  
In the early 90s, money market funds were paying 7% interest rates (market 
interest rate). Depending on length of service for a servicemember, and a few other 
factors, the break-even discount rate for the separation payment choices were between 
17.5% and 19.8%. The findings from Warner and Pleeter (2001) suggest that a large 
portion of servicemembers have personal discount rates in excess of 17.5%. Higher 
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personal discount rates indicate greater impatience due to the individual viewing future 
consumption as less valuable than consumption today. For example, a 100% discount 
rate suggests that an individual views future consumption (even tomorrow) as worthless 
when compared with today.  
By observing the separation payment choices of roughly 11,000 officers and 
55,000 enlisted personnel, Warner and Pleeter were able to estimate the average 
discount rates for officers and enlisted personnel for several different years of service 
(YOS). We present these results in Table 2.2. 
From Table 2.2, we see the average discount rate for officers is roughly one-third 
that of enlisted personnel. Observable demographic differences such as the number of 
dependents, sex, race, education and the difference in lump-sum payments explains 
more than half this difference. Additionally, we see individuals who choose not to 
separate (Stayers) are more patient then those who choose to separate (Leavers). This 
is supported by the relatively lower discount rate associated with Stayers compared to 
Leavers in both the officer and enlisted personnel. Finally, we see that those 
servicemembers further away from the minimum 20 years of service, which is required 
for vesting in the military retirement system, are on average more impatient. In their 
concluding remarks, Warner and Pleeter find the discount rates are relatively high 
among military personnel, especially enlisted personnel.   
While servicemembers show high levels of impatience in deciding what type of 
separation pay to choose, is there evidence of this same type of impatience (or self-
control issues) in day-to-day financial decisions? A recent study suggests this may be 
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the case. Skimmyhorn (2016) utilizes data from the 2009 and 2012 National Financial 
Capability Studies, sponsored by FINRA Investor Education Foundation, and finds 
statistical differences between servicemembers and non-servicemembers in their 
household finances. Specifically, servicemembers have more types of savings accounts 
but also have more problems with credit cards. These results suggest that 
servicemembers may have intentions to plan for the future by setting up savings 
accounts, but struggle to avoid current temptations.  
Table 2.2  – Average Nominal Discount Rate (Warner & Pleeter, 2001) 
  Officers Enlisted  
All 0.104 0.354 
Stayers 0.099 0.350 
Leavers 0.129 0.369 
All in YOS:   
7 0.205 0.410 
9 0.159 0.381 
11 0.111 0.353 
13 0.046 0.327 
15 0.000 0.294 
 
2.6.6.2 DOD Precommitment Devices 
The DOD provides two main precommitment devices that can be used by 
servicemembers to prepare for retirement and wealth accumulation. The first device is 
the TSP, which provides tax advantaged savings accounts similar to civilian 401k plan 
(Thrift Savings Plan, 2017). Servicemembers who contribute to the TSP may face a 
10% early withdrawal penalty, in addition to taxes due on any taxable withdrawal before 
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the age of 59.5.21  This early withdrawal penalty makes financial “misbehavior” more 
expensive and therefore should reduce the temptation of current consumption. 
 The discretionary allotment is the second precommitment device the DOD 
provides. The discretionary allotment allows servicemembers to partition their pay 
automatically each month (Department of Defense, 2017c). As it relates to this study, 
the servicemember can send these partitioned funds to purchase savings bonds 
through the Savings Deposit Program or financial institutions where the servicemember 
holds a savings account, mutual funds, or other investment accounts. Generally 
speaking, there are no early withdrawal penalties associated with these types of 
discretionary allotments, and so compared to the TSP represents a weaker 
precommitment device.   
2.6.7 Applying the SMarT Program Within the DOD 
 Here we will explore the impact the SMarT program would have on a hypothetical 
enlisted Air Force servicemember who enlists at age 18. We can call him Joe Smith. We 
will make a few simplifying assumptions as this example is for purely illustrative 
purposes and will serve to provide a conservative estimate. We begin with an estimated 
promotion timeline collected from the Air Force Personnel Center’s promotion statistics 
and anecdotal estimates from discussions with enlisted Airmen. For simplicity, we 
                                            
 
 
 
21 There are exceptions to this rule, for example, employees leaving federal service after the age of 55 will 
still pay regular income tax but will not face the 10% early withdrawal penalty. Anecdotally, this exception 
applies to a small number of military retirees. The structure of the military retirement system and the up-
or-out promotion system suggests only a small number of senior officer and enlisted personnel stay in the 
military long enough to reach the age of 55.  
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consider Joe entering the Air Force as an Airman Basic (E-1) and over a 20-year career 
rises to the rank of Master Sergeant (E-7). After 20 years of service, Master Sergeant 
Joe Smith retires and makes no further contributions to his thrift savings plan until age 
60, when we can begin withdrawing funds without penalty. To simulate the amount of 
savings that might accrue over Joe Smith’s career we utilized the 2017 military pay 
chart from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service and assume a conservative 2% 
annual pay raise, the average over the last 10 years.  
In Figure 2.14, we present a comparison between Joe Smith choosing to 
maintain the default 3% contribution rate and a simple SMarT program implementation 
(in nominal dollars). In the default 3% contribution rate scenario, Joe will receive a 1% 
Service Automatic Contribution after 60 days of service and a matching contribution of 
3% after 2 years of service. In our hypothetical implementation of the SMarT program, 
Joe has pre-committed to begin with the 3% default contributions and will add 1% to his 
total savings rate for each annual pay raise and 3% for any promotions he earns. Joe 
decided to opt into increasing his total savings rate until he reaches 14% (the average 
savings rate individuals self-reported as ideal in Choi et al., 2002). We also take a 
conservative approach to modeling investment returns and assume a 5% annual 
return.22 
 
                                            
 
 
 
22 The average annual returns for many of the TSP funds are in excess of 7% and one, the C fund (which 
replicates the S&P 500), has an average annual return of 10.16% since its inception date of 29 Jan 1988. 
https://www.tsp.gov/InvestmentFunds/FundPerformance/returnSummary.html. 
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Figure 2.14 – Comparison of Estimated Savings Outcomes by Savings Program (in nominal 
dollars) 
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As we might expect, the savings differences in Figure 2.14 are substantial. This 
simple implementation of the SMarT program means the difference between having 
saved $261,102 after 20 years of service, and having saved only $100,272 without the 
program. At the age of 59.5, Joe can begin to withdraw funds from his TSP without early 
withdrawal penalties. In this case, the nominal value of his savings from participating in 
the SMarT program totals $801,981. This is compared to $307,987, which is what he 
would have saved had he maintained the 3% default savings rate (with matching and 
automatic contributions made by the DOD). Of course, if Joe had been able to set aside 
14% of his income from the very start of his career, he would have saved a little more. 
However, for reasons we have already outlined, this is incredibly difficult for almost 
everyone. The SMarT program provides a powerful savings tool that can help move 
servicemembers towards retirement savings adequacy.  
This program will especially benefit the roughly 83 percent of enlisted personnel 
who will leave the military prior to 20 years of service (Department of Defense, 2012). 
These individuals will not receive the defined benefit portion of the BRS. After 4 years of 
service (a common contract length for enlistment), savings are roughly 2 times larger for 
those under the SMarT program than those who stay under the 3% default setting. After 
10 years of service, the savings are about 2.5 times larger for those under the SMarT 
program compared to the default setting. 
Servicemembers gain promotions quickly early in their careers, and then the rate 
of promotion levels off. Additionally, fairly consistent annual pay raises and the recent 
roll-out of the new BRS contribute to an environment which appears ideal for applying 
 101 
 
the SMarT program. Benartzi et al. (2017) provide a recent example of the effectiveness 
of these behavioral interventions within the DOD. In the 2015 experiment, simply 
sending an email designed to increase participation in the TSP lead to a conservative 
increase in savings of roughly $8 million in 1 year. This experiment generated $1,600 in 
additional savings per dollar spent by the government, which is an effect over 100 times 
larger than the available tax incentives produce. More research is required to 
understand the full impact of these interventions on the financial wellbeing of 
servicemembers. These interventions may substantially increase savings. However, it is 
less clear if these changes will lead to further financial problems in the short term, an 
undesirable outcome. 
2.7 Locus of Control 
 Intelligence alone, or cognitive ability, does not drive wages (Cawley, Heckman, 
& Vytlacil, 2001). For two people with the same level of education, cognitive ability has 
little impact on wages. Relatedly, recent economics research has highlighted the impact 
of noncognitive skills on wages and education. Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) find 
noncognitive skills have significant impacts on the level of education achieved and 
wages, given the level of education achieved. Some of these noncognitive factors 
include personality traits, persistence, motivation and charm. Specific to this study, we 
explore the noncognitive trait of locus (sense) of control and examine the influence it 
has on savings patterns and health. 
 Rotter (1966) presents findings that have had a wide-reaching impact, not only in 
psychology but also in the fields economics and management. Rotter (1966) finds the 
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effectiveness of rewards (or reinforcement) on behavior at least partially depended on if 
a person sees the reward as a direct result of their efforts (skill) or independent of it 
(chance). He describes these perceptions as internal or external control of 
reinforcement, respectively, but this terminology was eventually replaced with internal or 
external locus of control. Individuals fall somewhere between the two ends of the 
spectrum. Someone with an external locus of control believes that an outcome is 
unrelated to their efforts but instead a result of luck, fate, or due to someone else. 
Conversely, someone with an internal locus of control believes their efforts directly lead 
to specific outcomes.  Interestingly, this work was supported with a 4-year grant from 
the Air Force. 
 Rotter theorizes our locus of control is developed from an early age. Through our 
specific life experiences, we form expectations about how our efforts relate to 
outcomes. These specific experiences become generalized to related situations we 
have not yet experienced. Our future attitudes are shaped by our current experiences, 
and can lead to stronger tendencies towards an internal locus of control. This occurs 
when our belief that specific effort leads to specific outcomes is confirmed. Conversely, 
failure of the effort-outcome relationship leads to reduced internal locus of control or 
even an external locus of control over time. This is especially true for the young (<20 
years old) and elderly (80+); however, locus of control is especially stable for those 
between 25-60 years old (Cobb-Clark & Schurer, Two Economists' Musings on the 
Stability of Locus of Control, 2013).  
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 Locus of control is relatively easy to measure. Rotter presented a survey that 
included 23 questions to measure internal versus external locus of control and 6 filler 
questions to attempt to conceal the true intent of the questionnaire. In each question, an 
individual is asked to choose the statement they most agree with. We present a few of 
these questions here (scoring information is provided in the footnote below): 23 
1. a. Children get into trouble because their parents punish them too much. 
b. The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents are too easy with 
them. 
2.  a. Many of the unhappy things in people’s lives are partly due to bad luck. 
 b. People’s misfortunes result from the mistakes they make. 
3.  a. People are lonely because they don’t try to be friendly. 
b. There’s not much use in trying too hard to please people, if they like you, they 
like you.  
 
  Events occurring during formative years for young adults are especially 
important. For example, Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) find that people who 
experience a recession when young believe that their success in life is driven more by 
luck than effort. In other words, the uncertainty shocks driven by the macroeconomy 
moves individuals towards an external locus of control. As these individuals enter the 
workforce, their locus of control will influence not only their education outcomes but also 
their choice in jobs (Heywood, Jirjahn, & Struewing, 2017). We will return to this last 
point later as we relate locus of control back to the DOD. 
                                            
 
 
 
23  1). A filler question and has no bearing on an internal-external locus of control score. 2). Statement “a” 
aligns more closely with an external locus of control and we add 1 to an individuals I-E score. Statement 
“b” aligns more closely with an internal locus of control and we add nothing. 3). Statement “a” aligns more 
closely with an internal locus of control so we add nothing to an individuals I-E score. Statement “b” aligns 
more closely with an external locus of control and we would add 1 to an individuals I-E score. The I-E 
score ranges from 0-23. Lower scores suggest a more internal locus of control while higher scores 
suggest an external locus of control.  
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 As it relates to the main topic of our study, locus of control greatly influences 
wealth accumulation (Cobb-Clark, Kassenboehmer, & Sinning, 2016). Households with 
an internal locus of control tend to save more both in total amount and as a percentage 
of income. Cobb-Clark et al. conclude that locus of control “…may be as important as 
human capital and cognitive skills in explaining heterogeneity in wealth accumulation 
and portfolio allocations.” Cobb-Clark et al. (2016) found the median wealth gap 
between households with an internal locus of control versus an external locus of control 
stood at $125,000 in the 2010. Consistent with earlier definitions of wealth, Cobb-Clark 
et al. (2016) define wealth (total net worth) based on financial wealth, business equity, 
real estate equity, vehicles, and pensions. 
 The influence of locus of control goes beyond education attainment, occupation 
selection, or savings behavior. An internal locus of control is also associated with 
individuals who are more likely to have healthier habits such as eating healthy, 
exercising regularly, and avoiding tobacco products (Cobb-Clark, Kassenboehmer, & 
Schurer, 2014).  Presumably, these factors lead to greater life expectancy, which is also 
associated with more savings (Bloom, Canning, & Graham, 2003). 
2.7.1 The DOD and Locus of Control 
As we have outlined, the non-cognitive skill of locus of control has the potential to 
have significant and long-lasting impacts. However, the question remains how this 
relates to the DOD. Are individuals with external or internal locus of control more likely 
to join the military? Given the young age of most recruits, does basic training influence 
servicemembers’ locus of control? We explore these questions here. 
 105 
 
The military attracts many different types of people; however, a pattern of 
personalities emerges that includes a high need for achievement, job and financial 
security, a need for conformity, and finally a need for authoritarianism (Gal & 
Mangelsdorff, 1991). We view the last personality trait, the need for authoritarianisms, 
as someone who expresses an external locus of control. In other words, the military 
attracts individuals who seek to allow others to control their fate. Those with an internal 
locus of control prefer participative supervision and dislike authoritarianism (Spector, 
1982). In the context of our prior discussion on the benefits of an internal locus of 
control, this seems to suggest that the military attracts those who are predisposed to 
lower wealth accumulation. 
In his concluding remarks, Spector (1982) argues, “battlefield operations where 
precise carrying out of orders is essential, would be most appropriate for externals who 
are more suited for directive supervision.” This is supported by behaviors most closely 
associated with individuals with an external locus of control such as conforming and 
compliance. However, the battlefields of the 21st century have fundamentally shifted, 
and require entirely new skillsets to face the irregular conflicts we face now and for the 
near future (Shultz, Godson, Hanlon, & Ravich, 2011). This new skill set will require 
servicemembers to take on more qualities associated with an internal locus of control. 
That is to say, the current conflicts require individuals who, provided the necessary 
training, will look to themselves for direction to seize the initiative in a highly 
decentralized irregular conflict. Spector (1982) states, “when tasks or organizational 
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demands require initiative and independence of action, the internal would be more 
suitable…”  
Military service can influence an individual’s locus of control through the recruit 
training process. Cook et al. (1982) found early evidence of the transformative nature of 
basic military training (commonly referred to as boot camp) on young men. Training 
units with higher attrition became more internally focused while training units with 
medium and low attrition became more externally focused. Duhigg (2016) relays a story 
of a 2010 initiative driven by U.S. Marine Corps General Charles C. Krulak to revamp 
the Marine Corps recruit training. The redesign specifically sought to encourage an 
internal locus of control. The end goal is to produce Marines that “take control of their 
own choices” and possess a “bias towards action.” 
 We began this section by noting individuals with external locus of control have 
lower wealth accumulation, less healthful behaviors, and lower education attainment. If 
the military does attract individuals with an external locus of control, one would expect 
that veterans accumulate less wealth, have more health problems, and attain lower 
levels of education. As we have previously pointed out, Gustman et al. (2016) finds a 
growing wealth gap between veterans and nonveterans. In Table 2.3, we provide data 
collected by Gustman et al. from the Health and Retirement Study (hereafter, HRS) 
providing a comparison of wealth, health, and education outcomes for veteran and non-
veteran cohorts entering ages 51 to 56 in 1992, 1998, 2004, and 2010. Importantly, the 
2010 cohort is the only AVF cohort in the data set. The 1992, 1998, and 2004 cohorts 
included individuals impacted to some degree by the draft. However, Gustman et al. 
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(2016) recognize that the likelihood of draft exemptions increased overtime impacting 
those in the 1998 and 2004 cohorts the most. From Table 2.3, we see veterans in the 
2010 cohort (AVF) had significantly lower wealth accumulation, more reports of health 
problems, and lost the education advantage they had enjoyed in prior cohorts, 
consistent with outcomes associated with individuals with an external locus of control. 
 The study of locus of control and its connection to economic outcomes has 
become a burgeoning area of study for economist. There are several promising 
avenues in which researchers can contribute to our understanding of locus of control, 
the military, and economic outcomes of interest. One such avenue should consider the 
interaction between locus of control and the effectiveness of behavioral interventions. If 
we find differences in response to behavioral nudges based on locus of control, we may 
have opportunities to tailor the implementation of programs like the SMarT program and 
other behavioral interventions more effectively. 
2.8 Conclusions 
 We conclude this study with a call to action. The DOD has made significant 
strides in helping veteran families close the wealth gap identified by Gustman et al. 
(2016). Increases in military pay have brought military pay to near parity with civilian 
counterparts. Though it is too early to see the long-term impacts, the Military Spouse 
Employment Partnership program has provided increased opportunities for spouses to 
close the employment and pay gaps relative to their civilian counterparts. Expanded 
benefits such as the Post-9/11 GI bill and matching contributions to the Thrift Savings 
Plan have provided increased opportunities for intergenerational transfers, an important  
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Table 2.3 – Wealth, Health, and Education Data for Veterans & Nonveterans entering ages 51-56 in 
1992, 1998, 2004, and 2010 
  HRS Cohort 
  1992 1998 2004 2010 
Wealth         
Total Nonveteran Household Wealth  
(in Thousands of 2010 dollars) 
822 897 1066 865 
Total Veteran Household Wealth  
(in Thousands of 2010 dollars) 
883 951 835 648 
Health         
Percent Veterans in Fair or Poor 
Health 
13 17 25 27 
Percent Nonveterans in Fair or Poor 
Health 
19 21 20 21 
Percent Veterans with Health 
Problem Limiting Work 
17 16 20 33 
Percent Non-veterans with Health 
Problem Limiting Work 
17 18 17 17 
Education         
Mean Years of Education Veterans 13.2 13.7 13.6 13.4 
Mean Years of Education 
Nonveterans 
12.2 12.9 13.8 13.5 
Percent Some College Veterans 51 58 67 57 
Percent Some College Nonveterans 38 49 65 58 
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component of American wealth. However, there are still areas that require further study 
and action if the goal is to close the lifetime wealth accumulation gap between veterans 
and nonveterans.  
 Frequent Permanent Change of Stations required by the military place home 
ownership just beyond reach for the majority of military families. Home ownership is the 
primary driver of wealth accumulation for Americans and the differences in home equity 
levels are substantially smaller for veterans relative to nonveterans. Further study is 
required for new and innovative ideas to address this issue. Due to military necessity, it 
seems unlikely that duration of military assignments can increase to accommodate the 
time required to make home ownership economical for most servicemembers. Perhaps 
the study of an alternative tax preferred investment vehicle, such as a separate account 
within the Thrift Savings Plan dedicated to home purchasing, might allow for the accrual 
of pseudo equity while servicemembers continue their service. By doing so, we may 
mitigate some of the loss of home equity that veterans experience.  
 Finally, the new BRS provides an opportunity to utilize findings from behavioral 
economics to make substantial gains in savings for servicemembers. The first step 
requires targeted and actionable financial literacy training which Title 10 U.S.C. § 992 
now requires. Another key component for implementing such a program requires the 
creation of a conditional discretionary allotment within the DOD financial system. A 
feasibility study of such an instrument should be undertaken sooner rather than later to 
maintain the momentum associated with the rollout of the new retirement system. 
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Strong gains have been made by Congress and the DOD along the institutional 
and behavioral dimensions we highlight in this study. However, if the goal is to close the 
lifetime wealth accumulation gap between veterans and nonveterans, more study and 
action is required. Our hope is that this study has provided additional depth to the 
ongoing discussion of how to support veterans and a potential roadmap to address 
some of the more pressing issues facing servicemembers and their families. 
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CHAPTER 3  
MEASURING THE GENDER SPECIFIC ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF 
MILITARY BASE CLOSURE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 2005 BASE 
REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE 
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or 
position of the US Air Force, Department of Defense, or the US Government. 
3.1 Introduction 
As of September 30, 2014, the DOD managed a real property portfolio that 
consisted of more than 562,000 facilities worldwide with an estimated value of $879 
billion (Department of Defense, 2014). As recently as April 2016, the DOD presented 
analysis showing a roughly 22% excess facility capacity distributed across the military 
services (Department of Defense, 2016). Unlike civilian firms, which can act quickly to 
shed unneeded infrastructure and reduce costs, the DOD must request congressional 
authorization to make such decisions. Reducing excess infrastructure is a key 
component of the DOD strategy to deal with continuing budget pressures and realize 
savings. The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process provides affected 
communities with the added advantage of providing a “structured redevelopment 
process” (Department of Defense, 2016). Specifically, the DOD’s Office of Economic 
Adjustment provides financial assistance and technical guidance to affected 
communities. As future BRACs remain likely, it is important to understand better the 
implications of these closures and realignments on the local labor markets to support 
the previously mentioned structured redevelopment processes.   
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In this paper, we evaluate the impact of increasing or decreasing the level of 
DOD presence on the labor market. Specifically, we use the 2005 BRAC process, which 
resulted in the closure of military bases and realignment of DOD personnel, as a natural 
experiment from which to identify the impact on wages for men and women. We also 
consider the impact of the 2005 BRAC on occupational crowding. BRAC actions do not 
occur instantaneously and usually take several years to complete. We provide a novel 
dataset which captures the approximate 2005 BRAC rollout between 2006 and 2011. 
We use this dataset as an identification strategy for the effect of changes in DOD 
presence on local wages and occupational crowding. 
Our analysis makes two important contributions to the literature that relates the 
impact DOD presences to local labor markets. First, we extend the literature by 
providing the evidence of heterogeneous impacts of BRAC on the wages of men and 
women. The existing evidence on the impact of BRAC on wages suggests that there are 
little to no effects on average, but analyses have not considered gender-specific effects. 
Secondly, because BRAC actions induce a large-scale migration of tied migrants 
(mostly spouses [predominately female] of military personnel [predominantly male]), our 
results suggests changes in DOD presence have no impact on local occupational 
crowding stemming from tied-migration. 
We build on a growing body of literature related to the interaction of DOD 
presence and local labor markets. One string of this literature focuses on the impact of 
BRAC on employment and wages. Hooker & Knetter (2001; henceforth H&K) provided 
the first nationwide analysis of BRAC affected communities between 1971 and 1995. 
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Specific to our study, H&K find closures have no statistically significant impact on per-
capita income. More recent analysis by Lee (2016) provides an analysis of the 2005 
BRAC and find increases in DOD presence related to BRAC positively impacted local 
employment and income while decreases generated negligible impacts. As previously 
mentioned, this string of literature is silent on the possible heterogeneous impacts of 
BRAC on the wages of men and women.  
The small or even negligible effect of BRAC activities on earnings in H&K and 
Lee (2016) are somewhat surprising given that in areas with significant military 
presence, on average, women have lower annual earnings and higher rates of 
unemployment when compared to women in nonmilitary areas (Booth, Falk, Segal, & 
Segal, 2000; Booth, 2003). Booth et al. (2000) further argue “the military emerges as a 
source of inequality in labor market outcomes for women working on or around military 
installations.” As a result, it seems that significant changes in military presence should 
impact earnings of women unless these changes are mostly offset when aggregated. 
Booth (2013) argues that military presence affects the wages of women through 
two main channels. First, the underrepresentation of women in the military means that a 
large military presence brings with it a large number of unemployed military wives. This 
influx of military wives creates an oversupply of workers in jobs most often sought by 
women, and subsequently lowers wages. Booth et al. (2000) argued that a military base 
acts as a monopsonist in a local labor market, driving down wages. However, it may 
also be the case that military presence leads to occupational crowding. 
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The occupational crowding hypothesis is that the crowding of women into a small 
number of industries reduces wages for women and leads to a gender wage gap 
(Borjas, 2013). This crowding may stem from intentional discrimination or a result of 
rational choices made by women. For example, some jobs (such as cashier or retail 
sales associate) do not require significant investments in human capital. Other 
occupations, such as primary school teachers, may require skills that do not depreciate 
quickly during interruptions in labor force participation. However, other occupations 
(such as surgeon) require significant investments in human capital and the skills 
depreciate very quickly during interruptions in labor force participation. Women, who 
may expect to leave the work force to spend time in the household sector, choose 
occupations where skills do not depreciate quickly and that maximize the present value 
of lifetime earnings (Polacheck, 1981).  
Duncan and Duncan (1955) provide a simple measure of occupational crowding, 
or occupational segregation (for example, see Macpherson and Hirsch [1995]). The 
Duncan index of segregation, measured as 
1
2
∑|𝑚𝑗 − 𝑓𝑗|, where 𝑚𝑗 is the proportion of 
male employment in occupation 𝑗 and 𝑓𝑗 corresponds to the proportion of female 
employment in occupation 𝑗. Under conditions of perfect segregation, the Duncan index 
equals one. The measure equals zero when the occupational distribution is equal 
between males and females. 
Studying occupational crowding in labor markets surrounding military bases is 
particularly interesting due to the habitually tied migrant status of military spouses. 
Mincer (1978) first proposed the idea of tied migrants, or a spouse who chooses to 
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move to maintain family cohesion even when their “private calculus dictates they stay.” 
Military necessity requires regular relocations leading to what we term a habitually tied 
migrant status for military spouses. Under these conditions, it seems reasonable to 
assume that these habitually tied migrants optimize their career choices to maximize 
their present value of lifetime earnings as suggested above, but under the additional 
constraint that military necessity may require additional (and possibly frequent) 
interruptions and/or breaks in labor force participation.  
Lim and Schulker (2010) provide evidence consistent with this view, showing that 
between 40 and 45 percent of military wives are not in the labor force, between 5 and 
10 percent are unemployed, roughly 5 percent work part-time because full-time work is 
unavailable, and roughly 30 percent are underemployed. If we only consider the military 
wives in the labor force, roughly 60 percent are either unemployed, part-time employed 
involuntarily, underemployed by low income, or underemployed by educational 
mismatch. While dated, we provide Table 3.1, which compares military and civilian 
wives by occupational group from a special issue of Monthly Labor Review published by 
the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (Grossman, 1981). We are unaware of any more 
recent comparisons. There are noticeably fewer military wives serving in managerial 
and machine operative positions but more military wives serving in sales, clerical, and 
other services.24 
                                            
 
 
 
24 A Chi-square Test for Homogeneity of the two distributions of occupational groups of employed wives 
by military or civilian status of their husbands results in a Chi-square test statistic of 25.17 with 9 degrees 
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Table 3.1 – Occupational Group of Employed Wives by Military or Civilian Status of Their 
Husbands, March 1979 (Grossman, 1981) 
Occupational Group 
Military 
Wives 
Civilian 
Wives 
Total: Number (in thousands) 292 19,570 
percent 100 100 
Professional-technical 18.2 18.4 
Managerial 3.8 6.9 
Sales 8.9 6.5 
Clerical 41.8 36.7 
Crafts 1.4 1.8 
Operatives including transport 5.8 11.2 
Laborers 2.4 1.1 
Private household service 2.1 1.8 
Other service 16.1 14.4 
Farm 0 1.3 
 
Women have seen a substantial decrease in occupational segregation by gender 
from 1970 to 2009 (Blau, Brummund, & Liu, 2013). However, institutional constraints on 
military wives, as evidenced by Lim and Schulker (2010), still exist. These institutional 
constraints may lead to continued crowding of military wives into occupations consistent 
with military life as shown in Grossman (1981). 
Booth (2013) suggests the second channel negatively impacting wages of 
women is the types of jobs military presence creates in a labor market. The relatively 
young population of military servicemembers may result in increased demand for goods 
and services characteristic of this age group such as childcare, food services, and so 
                                            
 
 
 
of freedom which allows us to reject the null hypothesis that these two distributions are equal at the 0.01 
significance level.    
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on. These jobs tend to employ a disproportionate number of women but also offer lower 
wages.  
Turning to our analysis, we use county-level longitudinal wage data from the 
American Community Survey from 2005 to 2016 to identify the effect of BRAC shocks 
occurring between 2006 and 2011. The extent of changes in military presence varies 
considerably across counties, and further there is variation in the timing of shocks 
across counties. This provides a natural experiment from which to identify causal 
impacts on the labor market. We show decreasing DOD presence increases wages, 
specifically for women. Increasing DOD presence leads to decreases in median wages 
but we find no statistical support for either males or females bearing more of a decline in 
wages. More importantly, we find significant heterogeneity in median wage outcomes by 
gender in response to shocks associated with military personnel in particular. Increasing 
the number of military personnel leads to lower median wages for both men and 
women, for men in particular. Decreasing the number of military personnel leads to 
higher median wages, specifically for women. Similarly, we also find both increasing 
and decreasing military personnel significantly reduces the wage gap between men and 
women. However, the effect of decreasing military personnel on decreasing the wage 
gap is more than twice that of increasing military personnel and is driven by gains in 
wages by women. Finally, we find little evidence that suggests changes in DOD 
presence impacts occupational crowding. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes our data and 
empirical framework. Section 3.3 presents estimates of the effect of BRAC on median 
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wages by gender, the wage gap between men and women, and occupational crowding. 
Section 3.4 concludes. 
3.2 Data and Empirical Framework 
3.2.1 Data 
We analyze the 2005 BRAC impact on local labor markets through analysis of 
county-level panel data. We begin by compiling data from the 2005 Defense Base 
Closure and Realignment Commission report (2005 Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Commission, 2005). The DOD Closure and Realignment Recommendation 
serves as the starting point but we update these recommendations with the 
Commission’s Final Recommendations to represent the final implementation of the 
2005 BRAC.25 We utilize the Report on 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
Implementation, or simply “Section 2907” reports, mandated by Congress as amended 
by Section 2931 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. 
Specifically, the 2006-2008, 2011, and 2013 reports informed our study with the 
estimated timing of BRAC actions throughout the implementation of the 2005 BRAC 
(see Appendix C for detailed procedures).  
                                            
 
 
 
25 The DOD Closure and Realignment Recommendation provided detailed personnel impacts and can be 
found in Appendix K of the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission report. The 
Commission’s Final Recommendations provided a narrative description of amendments, sections that 
were deleted, and so on and can be found in Appendix O and Appendix Q of the 2005 Base Closure and 
Realignment Commission report. Where appropriate, these narratives were used to update the DOD 
recommendations in our data set. 
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With more than 190 recommendations and initial cost estimates of $24.6 billion, 
the 2005 BRAC was a complex effort affecting nearly every state, several installations 
overseas, and tens of thousands of military, civilian, and contractor personnel. The 2005 
BRAC Commission recommendations became official on November 9, 2005 and 
Congress required the DOD to complete the BRAC activities by September 15, 2011. 
Below, we present Figure 3.1, which illustrates the change in net direct employment in 
each state because of the 2005 BRAC. Virginia and the District of Columbia top the list 
of largest declines in positions, each losing in excess of 7,000 positions that were 
mostly driven by a reduction in leased office space. Maryland received a large portion of 
those displaced by reductions in leased office space receiving nearly 9,000 positions. 
Texas and Georgia were also strong beneficiaries, gaining 8,151 and 4,331 positions 
respectively. Roughly 23 states received a net gain of 46,000 positions while 27 states 
received a net loss of nearly 52,000 positions.26 In total, the 2005 BRAC reduced the 
number of positions in the US by roughly 6,000 positions.  
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics at the installation level reported in the 
Final Commission Recommendations. The typical installation lost on average 13.66 
total direct jobs but a median of 24 direct jobs. Fort Belvoir, VA gained the most in total 
direct jobs with 12,595, followed by Fort Bliss, TX with 11,501. Reductions in leased  
  
                                            
 
 
 
26 The BRAC Commission originally recommended the closure of Doble U.S. Army Reserve Center in 
Portmouth, New Hampshire however, the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act Section 2712 
exempted this activity making New Hampshire the only state unaffected by the 2005 BRAC. For counting 
purposes, the District of Columbia is included as both a state and county. 
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Figure 3.1 – 2005 BRAC Net Direct Employment Change by State 
 
Table 3.2 – BRAC Actions by Installation 
  Mean Minimum Median Maximum 
Total Direct Jobs -13.66 -18,965 -24 12,595 
Military 22.38 -4,833 -9 11,354 
Civilian -34.14 -10,948 0 6,375 
Contractor -1.89 -3,985 0 2,058 
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office space in Virginia represented the largest declines in total direct jobs totaling 
nearly 19,000 positions. Contractor positions represented the smallest change across 
the three employee types. 
With insights gained from the Section 2907 reports, we provide Figure 3.2, which 
presents the number of positive and negative BRAC actions taken through time. We see 
no activity in 2005 consistent with the BRAC authorization becoming law in November 
2005. Due to the complexities of the 2005 BRAC many of the actions were deferred 
until late in the timeframe Congress authorized for BRAC activity. We see the first 
significant activity in 2007, relatively little change from 2008 to 2009, and a large surge 
of activity from 2010 to the end of BRAC in 2011. On average, non-zero positive BRAC 
actions represent roughly 0.60% of the 2005 county total workforce while non-zero 
negative BRAC actions represent 0.41% of the 2005 county total workforce.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 – BRAC Actions Over Time 
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We place the 2005 BRAC actions in the context of the 2005-2016 American 
Community Survey (ACS) data from the Census Bureau. We focus on the ACS 1-year 
estimates report ID S2401 (full/part-time) which provides the median earnings in the 
past 12 months, employment, and occupation type for all employed civilians 16 years of 
age or older by gender. Our initial count of US counties directly impacted by the 2005 
BRAC totals 450. The ACS data is limited to counties with populations greater than 
65,000 people. As a result, the number of counties directly impacted by the 2005 BRAC 
in our dataset is reduced by 47 counties to 403 counties. To provide counterfactuals 
and to control for aggregate trends, we include all counties reported in the ACS 
database resulting in a universe of counties totaling 775 in 2005 but due to continued 
population growth the universe of counties totals 820 counties by 2016. In total, we 
have 9,633 county-year observations. For more detailed information on data sources 
and variable definitions, we refer the readers to the Appendix C. 
3.2.2 Method of Analysis 
In this paper, we look to understand the impact of BRAC on earnings by gender. 
Therefore, our outcome variable of interest is income by gender. As the shock, i.e. the 
change in military personnel within a county, is heterogeneous, we define the shock in 
terms of a percentage of the total year 2005 county workforce. Several counties 
experienced multiple shocks over time, and our specification accounts for both short-run 
and accumulated impacts. To control for unobserved county-specific factors (such as 
education and experience and of the workforce), and aggregate time-varying changes in 
the U.S. labor market, we include both county and year fixed effects. Formally, our 
model is: 
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 ln(𝑦𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡
+ + 𝛽2𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡
− + 𝛽3𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡−1
+  
+𝛽4𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡−1
− + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 typically represents median wages in county 𝑖 in year 𝑡;  𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡 represents 
the level of the BRAC shock as a percentage of the total workforce in 2005 in county 𝑖, 
in year 𝑡; 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 represents the sum of shocks across prior years; and 𝑐𝑖 
and 𝜃𝑡 are county and year fixed effects. A positive superscript on the 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡 and 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 variables indicates a positive shock (an increase in DOD presence) 
while a negative superscript indicates a negative shock (a decrease in DOD presence). 
However, in our analysis, we take the absolute value of the negative shocks making the 
interpretation of the 𝛽 coefficients more straightforward. Specifically, a positive 
coefficient associated with negative shocks tells us that larger negative shocks increase 
wages. Similarly, a negative coefficient tells us that negative shocks decrease wages. 
This specification allows us to estimate the effect of the contemporaneous BRAC shock 
while also accounting for a one period lag of the cumulative shocks from prior years 
(𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡−1), or the BRAC shock “history.” Other models reported later in this 
paper break the variable 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡 and 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 into its component parts of 
Military, Civilian, and Contractor employee types to estimate the effect of employee type 
on median wages. We also calculate the wage gap between men and women by 
subtracting the log median wages for women from the log median wages of men in each 
county in each year. We cluster our standard errors at the county level for all models.  
Prior analysis related to BRAC actions on local labor markets (e.g. H&K; Lee, 
2016) focuses on estimating employment and per capita income multipliers. Our 
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research question differs in that we focus on the possibility of heterogenous wage 
impacts for men and women. Additionally, our dataset includes the approximate roll-out 
schedule of the 2005 BRAC which provides more depth to the dataset than previously 
available. Given the rich dataset we have produced, we use a series of fixed effects 
regression models to isolate the effect of BRAC shocks on median wages. This 
approach allows us to consider dynamic relationships within the dataset, control for 
unobserved cross section heterogeneity, and maximize the utilization of available 
information within the dataset.  
3.2.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.3 defines our dependent and independent variables used throughout our 
analysis and provides descriptive statistics. There is a sizeable difference between the 
average median wages of men and women of roughly $12,000. However, we see some 
instances where the median wages for women exceeds that of men represented by a 
negative wage gap. On average, and across all counties, positive BRAC shocks 
represent roughly 0.008% of the 2005 total workforce while negative BRAC shocks 
represent 0.009% of the 2005 total workforce. As might be expected, Military Shocks 
make up the majority of the positive and negative shocks by employee type.  
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Table 3.3 – Descriptive Statistics Dependent and Independent variables 
 Variable Name Description      Obs Mean S.D. Min  Max 
Dependent Variables                
Overall Median 
Earnings 
Overall (both men and women) median earnings in the past 12 months for civilian employed population 
16 years and over (both full-/part-time) by county by year 
9,633 $32,035 $6,313 $15,589 $71,838 
Median Earnings for 
Men 
Median earnings in the past 12 months for male civilian employed population 16 years and over (both 
full-/part-time) by county by year 
9,633 $38,546 $7,994 $18,191 $86,285 
Median Earnings for 
Women 
Median earnings in the past 12 months for female civilian employed population 16 years and over 
(both full-/part-time) by county by year 
9,633 $26,371 $5,480 $11,729 $65,730 
Wage Gap The difference between male and female median earnings by county by year 9,633 $12,175 $4,845 -$3,862 $40,506 
Duncan Index 
Measures the degree of occupational segregation by gender by county by year. A value of 0 represent 
complete gender integration while a value of 100 is complete gender segregation. 
9,504 30.65 7.59 6.87 61.27 
  Non-Zero Sample Full Sample 
Independent Variables Obs Mean S.D Min Max Obs Mean S.D. Min  Max 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘+ 
Pos values (additions) of military, civilian, & DOD 
contractors 
121 0.6016 1.7011 0.0012 14.7427 9,280 0.0078 0.2051 0 14.7427 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘− 
Neg values (loss) of military, civilian, & DOD 
contractors 
213 0.4068 1.1787 0.0001 8.6521 9,279 0.0093 0.1883 0 8.6521 
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦+ Pos values (additions) of military personnel  96 0.5144 1.7366 0.0003 13.8241 9,280 0.0053 0.1833 0 13.8241 
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦− Neg values (loss) of military personnel 201 0.3003 1.1334 0.0004 11.9534 9,279 0.0065 0.1721 0 11.9534 
𝐶𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛+ Pos values (additions) of civilian personnel  115 0.2668 0.7445 0.0002 5.0647 9,280 0.0033 0.0876 0 5.0647 
𝐶𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛− Neg values (loss) of civilian personnel  161 0.2141 0.5815 0.0001 4.8935 9,279 0.0037 0.0813 0 4.8935 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟+ Pos values (additions) of DOD contractor personnel  24 0.3508 0.7240 0.0001 3.3690 9,280 0.0009 0.0402 0 3.3690 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟− Neg values (loss) of DOD contractor personnel  60 0.1251 0.2683 0.0001 1.3377 9,280 0.0008 0.0236 0 1.3377 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦+ 
Pos cumulative value of military, civilian &DOD 
contractors 
488 0.7866 1.8854 0.0014 14.5634 
8,506 0.0451 0.4868 0 14.5634 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦− 
Neg cumulative value of military, civilian &DOD 
contractors 
986 0.5086 1.7102 0.0001 17.5227 
8,498 0.0590 0.6047 0 17.5227 
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦_𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦+  Pos cumulative value of military personnel 358 0.7424 2.0097 0.0003 13.6478 8,506 0.0312 0.4379 0 13.6478 
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦_𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦− Neg cumulative value of military personnel 989 0.3377 1.1932 0.0005 11.9534 8,498 0.0393 0.4210 0 11.9534 
𝐶𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛_𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦+ Pos cumulative value of civilian history 462 0.3500 0.8145 0.0005 5.0647 8,506 0.0190 0.2056 0 5.0647 
𝐶𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛_𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦− Neg cumulative value of civilian history  752 0.2747 0.9681 0.0001 9.9360 8,498 0.0243 0.2982 0 9.9360 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟_𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦+ Pos cumulative value of contractor history 120 0.3548 0.7096 0.0003 3.3690 8,506 0.0050 0.0938 0 3.3690 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟_𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦− Neg cumulative value of contractor history 308 0.1532 0.4949 0.0001 3.4915 8,506 0.0055 0.0983 0 3.4915 
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3.3 Results 
3.3.1 2005 BRAC Impact on Median Wages 
Table 3.4 reports results from our simplest specification, which includes the 
instantaneous asymmetric shocks, lagged cumulative asymmetric shocks, as well as 
county and year fixed effects. The dependent variables in these three specifications are 
the log of median wages overall, median wages for men, and median wages for women. 
For the “overall” model, increasing the level of DOD presence by one percentage point 
relative to the county’s 2005 total employment (instantaneous positive shock, 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘+) 
decreases the overall median wage by 0.50%. This effect is statistically significant at the 
1% significance level. A decrease in DOD presence by one percentage point relative to 
the county’s 2005 total employment (instantaneous negative shock, 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘−) increases 
the overall median wage by a statistically insignificant 0.49%. Similarly, increasing the 
lagged cumulative shock of DOD presence increase by one percentage point relative to 
the county’s 2005 total employment (lagged cumulative positive shock, 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑡−1
+ ) decreases wages by a statistically insignificant 0.36%. Finally, 
increasing in magnitude the lagged cumulative shock of DOD presence decrease by 
one percentage point relative to the county’s 2005 total employment (lagged cumulative 
negative shock, 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑡−1
− ) increases wages by 0.80% which is statistically 
significant at the 0.10 significance level. Columns two and three are interpreted in a 
similar manner except these columns represent the effect of BRAC shocks on gender-
specific median wages.  
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Table 3.4 – BRAC Shocks in Levels with Lagged Shock History on Median Wages 
Dependent Variable: Log of Median Wages 
Regressor 
Overall 
(1) 
Male 
(2) 
Female 
(3) 
H0: Male = Female 
(4) 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘+ -0.00498*** 
(0.00192) 
-0.00705*** 
(0.0023) 
-0.00498** 
(0.00206) 
0.76 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘− 0.00486 
(0.007) 
0.0005 
(0.00598) 
0.00957 
(0.00741) 
4.53** 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘. 𝐻𝑡−1
+  -0.00364 
(0.00278) 
-0.00591** 
(0.00268) 
-0.00342 
(0.00334) 
0.86 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘. 𝐻𝑡−1
−  0.00804* 
(0.00432) 
0.00447 
(0.00406) 
0.00835** 
(0.00367) 
2.94* 
 N 8,496 8,496 8,496 8,496 
County Fixed Effects  Yes 
Time Fixed Effects  Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is measured by the log of the county’s median wage (overall, male, and female). The regressor 
variables are expressed as percentages of total county employment in 2005. Standard errors are listed in parentheses and are 
clustered at the county level. Hypothesis testing in column 4 is a test for equality of coefficients across models estimaing the effects 
of BRAC shocks on male wages and female wages respectively. *,**, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% 
levels respectively. 
 
To test for differences in coefficients across gender-specific models, we need an 
estimator for the covariance between the two models, which of course rely on the same 
covariates. To facilitate this, we use the seemingly unrelated estimation framework 
(Weesie, 1999). The BRAC shocks occur at the county level and we naturally expect 
correlation between wage observations within a county. That is, male and female labor 
markets are dependent. We therefore maintain clustering of standard errors at the 
county level when computing the covariance matrix. Robust F-statistics are provided in 
the last column of Table 3.4. 
We fail to reject the null hypothesis that positive instantaneous or positive lagged 
cumulative shocks impact men and women differently. However, we can reject the null 
hypothesis that negative instantaneous shocks impact men and women equally at the 
5% significance level. Similarly, we can reject the null hypothesis that lagged negative 
shock history impact median wages for men and women equally at the 0.10 significance 
level.  
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Result 1. Decreases in overall DOD presence, both in terms of contemporaneous and 
lagged cumulative decreases, increases median wages for women more than men. 
 
There are a few possible explanations for heterogeneous effects by gender on 
wages. Increasing DOD presence may increase the proportion of lower-paying service 
sector occupations such as food service, childcare, and cashiers, lowering earnings for 
men and women. Similarly, decreasing DOD presence may decrease the proportion of 
lower-paying service sector occupations but also potentially decreases the number of 
habitually tied migrants (predominantly women due to the proportion of men in military 
service) associated with military presence, thus increasing median wages for women 
who remain relative to men. To understand better this possibility, we now turn to our 
results of the effect of BRAC shocks by employee type. 
Table 3.5 reports the effects of the 2005 BRAC shocks by employee type and 
lagged cumulative shocks by employee type on median wages. We find fairly consistent 
patterns with Table 3.4 in that positive shocks tend to decrease wages while negative 
shocks tend to increase wages. Interpreting the magnitudes of these shocks require 
some additional care. The reported coefficients have the usual interpretation in that they 
represent a one-percentage point increase in the respective shocks relative to the 2005 
total workforce. However, from Table 3.3 we see that this level of shock may be rare. 
For example, a one percentage point increase in magnitude for the level of shock 
related to decreases in DOD contractor presence (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟−) represents nearly four 
standard deviations when we consider only non-zero BRAC action sample. Additionally,  
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Table 3.5 – BRAC Shocks in Levels by Employee Type with Lagged Shock History on Median 
Wage 
Dependent Variable: Log of Median Wages 
Regressor 
Overall 
(1) 
Male 
(2) 
Female 
(3) 
H0: Male = Female 
(4) 
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦+ -0.00464*                                     
(0.0027) 
-0.00744** 
(0.00301) 
-0.00338* 
(0.00204) 
4.14** 
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦− 0.00573 
(0.00978) 
-0.00196 
(0.00797) 
0.01577 
(0.00978) 
13.91*** 
𝐶𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛+ -0.01384 
(0.02215) 
-0.00518 
(0.01703) 
-0.01838 
(0.01981) 
1.49 
𝐶𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛− 
 
0.00374 
(0.01071) 
0.00960 
(0.01712) 
0.01105 
(0.01864) 
0.00 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟+ -0.00704 
(0.02584) 
-0.00877 
(0.02557) 
-0.02738 
(0.02150) 
1.28 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟− -0.00885 
(0.04323) 
-0.01431 
(0.07117) 
-0.08030 
(0.05571) 
0.46 
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦. 𝐻𝑡−1
+  -0.00349 
(0.00294) 
-0.00640** 
(0.00311) 
-0.00234 
(0.00378) 
1.20 
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦. 𝐻𝑡−1
−  0.01293** 
(0.00651) 
0.00877 
(0.00603) 
0.01325** 
(0.00581) 
1.14 
𝐶𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛. 𝐻𝑡−1
+  -0.02755** 
(0.01359) 
-0.02940* 
(0.01530) 
-0.02374* 
(0.01218) 
0.14 
𝐶𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛. 𝐻𝑡−1
−  0.00018 
(0.01422) 
-0.00026 
(0.01810) 
-0.00518 
(0.00732) 
0.08 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟. 𝐻𝑡−1
+  0.03458** 
(0.01719) 
0.04556** 
(0.021360) 
0.01333 
(0.01857) 
3.04* 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟. 𝐻𝑡−1
−  0.00745 
(0.03686) 
0.00244 
(0.04826) 
0.02096 
(0.02415) 
0.14 
 N 8,496 8,496 8,496 8,496 
County Fixed Effects  Yes 
Time Fixed Effects   Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is measured by the log of the county’s median wage (overall, male, and female). The regressor 
variables are expressed as percentages of total county employment in 2005.Standard errors are listed in parentheses and they are 
clustered at the county level. Hypothesis testing in column 4 is a test for equality of coefficients across models estimaing the effects 
of BRAC shocks on male wages and female wages respectively. *,**, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% 
levels respectively. 
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shocks related to increases in DOD contractor presence may suffer from data paucity 
with only 24 observations. With these limitations in mind, we focus primarily on the 
estimates related to Military and Civilian shocks.  
Turning first to the results of instantaneous shocks, we find that increases in 
military presence lead to statistically significant decreases in the overall median wage of 
0.46%. While the median wages for men and women fall, an increase in military 
personnel decreases wages doubly for men relative to women. This is confirmed by our 
hypothesis test in which we reject the null hypothesis that the effect of military increases 
equally impact men and women median wages at the 5% significance level. While the 
effect of decreasing military personnel is not statistically significant, we see the point 
estimates for the effect of decreases in military personnel have the opposite signs. 
Specifically, the point estimate for decreasing military personnel, though not statistically 
significant, points to slight decreases in median wages for men while increasing median 
wages for women. We find strong support for heterogeneous effects of decreasing 
military personnel on the wages of men and women at the 1% significance level. 
Result 2. (1) Increases of military personnel reduce the median earnings for both men 
and women but more so for men. (2) The point estimate for decreases of military 
personnel, while not statistically significant, provides suggestive evidence of median 
wages for women increasing while decreasing for men. 
When we consider the results associated with cumulative shocks, we find the 
point estimate for decreasing military personnel points to persistent gains in median 
wages for women. However, statistical tests no longer support heterogeneous effects 
between men and women for decreases in military presence. This suggests there is a 
more immediate impact of removing tied migrants associated with military personnel, 
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while the cumulative effect of removing military personnel may represent a reduction in 
lower paid service related jobs and replacing the lower paid tied migrants lost by 
reducing military personnel at higher wages.  
Finally, we see sizable differences in the effect of increasing DOD civilian 
personnel when compared with increasing military personnel. One possible explanation 
for this centers on benefits extended to military personnel which are not currently 
available to civilian personnel. On nearly every military installation, military personnel 
and their dependents can shop tax free for common goods and services at stores 
provided by the Army and Air Force Exchange Service or Navy Exchange. Groceries 
are also provided tax free through the Defense Commissary Agency. Military personnel 
can choose to shop on the military installation while DOD civilians cannot. From this, 
increasing DOD civilian personnel may increase the proportion of lower-paying service 
related occupations in the local economy at a higher rate than increasing military 
personnel, explaining the larger relative effect.  
To gain further insight into the heterogeneity of the 2005 BRAC shocks on wages 
for men and women, we turn our attention to the effect of these shocks on the wage 
gap. In Table 3.6, present regressions that use the variable Wage Gap, defined as the 
difference between log median wages for men and for women. We find negative 
instantaneous shocks decrease the wage gap by roughly 0.91%, an effect that is 
statistically different from zero at the 5% significance level. Neither a positive 
instantaneous shock nor lagged cumulative shocks (in either direction) have significant 
impacts on the wage gap between men and women. However, as has been shown in 
 132 
 
Table 3.5, the employee type may have large heterogeneous impacts on wages by 
gender, particularly shocks associated with military personnel. 
Table 3.6 – BRAC Shocks in Levels with Lagged Shock History on Wage Gap 
Dependent Variable: Wage Gap 
Regressor  
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘+  -0.0021 (0.0025) 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘− -0.0091 (0.0045)** 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘. 𝐻𝑡−1
+   -0.0025 (0.0028) 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘. 𝐻𝑡−1
−   -0.0039 (0.0024) 
 N 8,496 
County Fixed Effects Yes 
Time Fixed Effects  Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is measured by subtracting the log of median wages for women from the log of median wages from 
men in each county in each year. The regressor variables are expressed as percentages of total county employment in 2005. 
Standard errors are listed in parentheses and they are clustered at the county level. *,**, and *** represent statistical significance at the 
10, 5, and 1% levels respectively. 
In Table 3.7, we present our regression results for the effect of instantaneous 
shocks by employee type and lagged cumulative shocks by employee type on the wage 
gap. We see that the coefficient associated with instantaneous military personnel 
shocks (in either direction) both decrease the wage gap in a statistically significant way. 
Increasing military personnel by 1 percent relative to the 2005 total workforce leads to a 
decrease in the wage gap of roughly 0.41%. This estimate is weakly significant. 
Similarly, decreasing the level of military personnel by 1 percentage point decreases the 
wage gap by a more precise 1.77% which is significant beyond the 1% level. It may 
seem unusual that both increasing and decreasing military personnel decreases the 
wage gap. However, these decreases may result from different mechanisms. From 
Table 3.5, we found increases in military personnel leads to decreases in wages for 
both men and women but more so for men. Potentially as a result of increased demand 
for lower wage service and retail jobs which may lead to a closing of the wage gap as 
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seen in Table 3.6. However, increasing in magnitude the size of decreases in military 
personnel leads to increases in wages for women both when we consider the 
instantaneous shock and lagged cumulative shock. Men’s wages are statistically 
unchanged. This may point to a decreased supply of tied migrants associated with the 
military workforce as well as less demand for lower paying service and retail 
occupations. An increase in women’s wages while holding men’s wages relatively 
constant again leads to a closing of the wage gap. We view these results as further 
evidence for heterogeneous impacts on wages for men and women from the 2005 
BRAC.   
Result 3. Both increases and decreases in military personnel decrease the wage gap, 
which we speculate occurs through different mechanisms. 
Table 3.7 – BRAC Shocks in Levels by Employee Type with Lagged Shock History on Wage Gap 
Dependent Variable: Wage Gap 
Regressor  
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦+ -0.0041 (0.0021)* 
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦− -0.0177 (0.0050)*** 
𝐶𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛+  0.0132 (0.0114) 
𝐶𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛− -0.0015 (0.0286) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟+  0.0186 (0.0173) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟−  0.0660 (0.1018) 
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦. 𝐻𝑡−1
+  -0.0041 (0.0039) 
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦. 𝐻𝑡−1
−  -0.0045 (0.0044) 
𝐶𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛. 𝐻𝑡−1
+  -0.0057 (0.0158) 
𝐶𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛. 𝐻𝑡−1
−   0.0049 (0.0182) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟. 𝐻𝑡−1
+   0.0322 (0.0194)*  
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟. 𝐻𝑡−1
−  -0.0185 (0.0513) 
 N 8,496 
County Fixed Effects Yes 
Time Fixed Effects          Yes 
 Notes: The dependent variable is measured by subtracting the log of median wages for women from the log of median wages from 
men in each county in each year. The regressor variables are expressed as percentages of total county employment in 2005. 
Standard errors are listed in parentheses and they are clustered at the county level. *,**, and *** represent statistical significance at 
the 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively. 
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In nearly every specification provided above, we find at a minimum suggestive 
evidence of heterogeneous impacts of BRAC shocks on wages by gender. In particular, 
decreasing military personnel leads to increases in median wages but these increases 
are almost completely driven by gains in wages by women. Similarly, in our preferred 
specification estimating the impact of BRAC actions by employee type on the wage gap 
(reported in Table 3.7), we find strong statistical evidence that decreasing military 
presence leads to a large decrease in the wage gap. This decrease is more than twice 
the decrease in the wage gap associated with increasing the presence of military 
personnel. 
3.3.2 2005 BRAC Impact on Occupational Crowding 
The next issue we address is whether shocks related to the 2005 BRAC had any 
impact on occupational crowding, which can also place downward pressure on wages 
for women. As previously discussed, we use the Duncan Index of Occupational 
Dissimilarity, which measures the proportion of women (or men) that would have to 
change occupations to find a state of equality. We have scaled these such that a value 
of 100 indicates a completely gender segregated county while a value of 0 indicates 
complete gender balance. Table 3.4, summarized data concerning occupational 
crowding. Due to missing employment information, we have 129 fewer county-year 
observations than our wage analysis data. In our dataset, a typical county has a Duncan 
Index of 30.65.  
 135 
 
Table 3.8 reports results from our regression on the effects of BRAC shocks by 
employee type on occupational crowding.27 We see the 2005 BRAC had little to no 
effect on occupational crowding. Only increases in DOD Contractor presence has any 
statistical significance. However, as previously discussed, we observe only a handful of 
positive DOD Contractor shocks. Additionally, this change represents roughly one-fourth 
of one standard deviation a relatively small change. A lack of statistical significance for 
shocks by employee type may point to further support for the role of reducing tied 
migrants associated with military personnel. Given BRAC shocks have minimal impact 
on occupational crowding, large changes in wages for women may result more directly 
from substituting lower paid tied migrants with higher waged women. 
Result 4. The 2005 BRAC generated no economic or statistically meaningful impacts 
on occupational crowding. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this paper, we present evidence which suggest DOD presence does not 
induce inequality between men and women in the workforce per se. Instead, we find a 
more nuanced structural issue inherent to military presence, the tied migrant problem. 
These tied migrants suffer from earnings penalties and human capital accumulation 
limitations (Burke & Miller, 2017). Reducing military presence then reduces these tied  
  
                                            
 
 
 
27 We estimated but do not report the effect of changes in general DOD presence. We find neither 
instantaneous shocks (in either direction) nor lagged cumulative shocks (in either direction) have 
significant impacts on occupational crowding.  
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Table 3.8 – BRAC Shocks in Levels by Employee Type with Lagged Shock History on Duncan 
Index 
Dependent Variable: Duncan Index 
Regressor  
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦+ -0.12256 
(0.21395) 
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦− -0.18939 
(0.24502) 
𝐶𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛+ 0.13935 
(0.53281) 
𝐶𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛− -0.85105 
(0.74528) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟+ 1.89601*** 
(0.62349) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟− 2.48151 
(1.86613) 
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦. 𝐻𝑡−1
+  0.03599 
(0.07582) 
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦. 𝐻𝑡−1
−  0.20228 
(0.20297) 
𝐶𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛. 𝐻𝑡−1
+  -0.37201 
(0.46624) 
𝐶𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛. 𝐻𝑡−1
−  -0.46600 
(0.44657) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟. 𝐻𝑡−1
+  0.94470 
(0.67750) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟. 𝐻𝑡−1
−  1.00913 
(1.30313) 
N 8,428 
County Fixed Effects   Yes 
Time Fixed Effects              Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is measured by calculating the Duncan Index for Occupational Dissimilarity in each county in each 
year. The regressor variables are expressed as percentages of total county employment in 2005. We include controls for county and 
year fixed effects. Standard errors are listed in parentheses and they are clustered at the county level. *,**, and *** represent 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively. 
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migrants throughout the local workforce and results in a statistically significant closing of 
the wage gap between men and women.  
We also find statistically significant heterogeneous impacts on wages when both 
increasing and decreasing military presence. For example, the point estimate for the 
effect of decreasing military personnel on wages for women is eight times in magnitude 
that of the effect on men. We find little support for the claim that changes in DOD 
presence effect occupational crowding. 
Recent programs established by the DOD to increase the participation of military 
spouses in highly mobile private sector careers may have positive externalities (Military 
Spouse Employment Partnership, 2014). For example, if these programs lead to 
spouses filling a wider variety of occupations or taking remote working opportunities in 
large numbers, this may potentially mitigate the wage penalty and human capital 
limitations highlighted by Burk & Miller (2017). Widespread participation in the Military 
Spouse Employment Partnership may attenuate effects of future changes in military 
personnel presence.  
Under continued budgetary pressure and force restructuring the DOD has and 
will continue to request BRAC authorizations from Congress to right-size their 
infrastructure and minimize costs. The DOD has worked closely with affected 
communities to minimize adverse effects of closing military installations by providing 
both financial and technical support as communities look to repurpose these assets. 
While this paper focused on the heterogeneous impacts of changes in DOD presence 
on wages and occupational crowding, there are still opportunities to extend this 
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research. For example, recent attention has been placed on the role the military has on 
closing racial homeownership gaps in local communities (see DePillis, 2018). 
Advancing our knowledge about the role of DOD presence in local economies is critical 
as the DOD continues to face future budget pressure and force restructuring.  
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Appendix (A). Decision tasks and Observed Group Outcomes 
  
E&S Series 1 –This setting is characterized by a “middle income” individual 
choosing payoffs for a “high income” individual and a “low income” individual.  The 
“middle income” individual is provided with the same payoff across the three allocations 
to remove selfish motives.  
We have arranged the allocations so that Player 3, in our design, is the “middle 
income” individual. In decision task F and Fx, efficiency coincides with maximin 
preferences. While in treatments in E and Ex, efficiency and maximin are separated into 
two different choices. We present the predicted decisions using self-interest, efficiency, 
and maximin. Additionally, we present the allocations for decision tasks F, E, Fx, and Ex 
below (all payoffs are denominated in US dollars). We also present the totals, averages 
of Player 1 and Player 2’s payoffs, Player 3’s payoff relative to the total for each of the 
respective choices, and the group decisions made using the procedures outlined in our 
experimental design section. 
 
A B C A B C A B C A B C
Player 3 2.8 2.8 2.8 3.2 3.2 3.2 5 5 5 6 6 6
Player 2 4.1 4.4 4.7 4.7 4.2 3.7 8.5 9 9.5 10.5 8.5 6.5
Player 1 2.3 1.8 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.9 4.5 2.5 0.5 1.5 2 2.5
Total 9.2 9 8.8 9.2 9 8.8 18 16.5 15 18 16.5 15
Average 1, 2 3.2 3.1 3 3 2.9 2.8 6.5 5.75 5 6 5.25 4.5
Relative 3 to total 0.304 0.311 0.318 0.348 0.356 0.364 0.278 0.303 0.333 0.333 0.364 0.400
Predictions
Selfish A B C A B C A B C A B C
Efficiency A A A A
Maximin A C A C
Choices (Count)
T1 - Engineering Model 10 1 2 2 3 8 11 2 0 4 2 7
T2 - Flat Bureaucracy 12 1 0 1 4 8 13 0 0 2 2 9
T3 - Tall Bureaucracy 13 1 0 1 6 7 14 0 0 2 5 7
T4 - Autocracy 13 1 0 3 3 8 14 0 0 4 3 7
Total 48 4 2 7 16 31 52 2 0 12 12 30
E&S (Count) 57 7 4 27 16 25 26 2 2 12 5 13
Choices (Percentage)
T1 76.9 7.7 15.4 15.4 23.1 61.5 84.6 15.4 0.0 30.8 15.4 53.8
T2 92.3 7.7 0.0 7.7 30.8 61.5 100.0 0.0 0.0 15.4 15.4 69.2
T3 92.9 7.1 0.0 7.1 42.9 50.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 14.3 35.7 50.0
T4 92.9 7.1 0.0 21.4 21.4 57.1 100.0 0.0 0.0 28.6 21.4 50.0
Total 88.9 7.4 3.7 13.0 29.6 57.4 96.3 3.7 0.0 22.2 22.2 55.6
E&S (Percentage) 83.8 10.3 5.9 39.7 23.5 36.8 86.7 6.7 6.7 40.0 16.7 43.3
Taxation Games (E&S Series 1)
F (E&S1.1) E (E&S1.2) Fx (E&S1.3) Ex (E&S1.4)
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E&S Series 2 – The envy games are characterized by the ability of the “middle 
income” individual to reduce the payoff available to the “high income” individuals by 
simultaneously reducing the payoff available to “low income” individuals. In decision 
task N, the payoff to the “middle income” individual, Player 3, is kept constant across 
the three available options. However, in decision tasks Nx, Ny, and Nyi, E&S introduce 
a selfish motive by providing different payoffs to Player 3 across the three available 
options. This variation provides insight to the tradeoff individuals are willing to make 
between selfish concerns or efficiency concerns and maximin preferences. 
 
 E&S Series 3– In contrast to the prior decision tasks, the rich and poor games 
are characterized by Player 3 receiving the highest payoff or the lowest payoff 
respectively. Player 3’s payoff is constant across the three choices for each of the 
decision tasks. The final decision task provided by E&S, decision task Ey, reintroduces 
the taxation game structure but separates efficiency from all other fairness motives 
A B C A B C A B C A B C
Player 3 4 4 4 4.5 4 3.5 3.5 4 4.5 3.75 4 4.25
Player 2 8 6.5 5 8 6.5 5 8 6.5 5 8 6.5 5
Player 1 2.5 1.5 0.5 2.5 1.5 0.5 2.5 1.5 0.5 2.5 1.5 0.5
Total 14.5 12 9.5 15 12 9 14 12 10 14.25 12 9.75
Average 1, 2 5.25 4 2.75 5.25 4 2.75 5.25 4 2.75 5.25 4 2.75
Relative 3 to total 0.276 0.333 0.421 0.300 0.333 0.389 0.250 0.333 0.450 0.263 0.333 0.436
Predictions
Selfish A B C A C C
Efficiency A A A A
Maximin A A A A
Choices
T1 - Engineering Model 10 1 2 11 2 0 9 2 2 10 3 0
T2 - Flat Bureaucracy 13 0 0 13 0 0 6 6 1 8 5 0
T3 - Tall Bureaucracy 13 1 0 14 0 0 3 5 6 1 8 5
T4 - Autocracy 12 0 2 14 0 0 4 3 7 6 2 6
Total 48 2 4 52 2 0 22 16 16 25 18 11
E&S (Count) 21 8 1 25 5 1 23 4 3 18 5 7
Choices (Percentage)
T1 76.9 7.7 15.4 84.6 15.4 0.0 69.2 15.4 15.4 76.9 23.1 0.0
T2 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 46.2 46.2 7.7 61.5 38.5 0.0
T3 92.9 7.1 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 21.4 35.7 42.9 7.1 57.1 35.7
T4 85.7 0.0 14.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 28.6 21.4 50.0 42.9 14.3 42.9
Total 88.9 3.7 7.4 96.3 3.7 0.0 40.7 29.6 29.6 46.3 33.3 20.4
E&S (Percentage) 70.0 26.7 3.3 80.6 16.1 3.2 76.7 13.3 10.0 60.0 16.7 23.3
Envy Games (E&S Series 2)
Nyi (E&S2.4)N (E&S2.1) Nx (E&S2.2) Ny (E&S2.3)
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considered by E&S. These structures were chosen by E&S to analyze efficiency, 
maximin preferences, and inequality aversion. Again, we focus our analysis on 
efficiency and maximin preferences. 
 
Hierarchy Consistent Payoff Task Series1 – The prior 11 decision tasks focused 
primarily on cases where Player 3 maintains a fixed payoff across the three allocations 
for each decision task. Only decision tasks Nx, Ny, and Nyi provide an opportunity for 
self-interest. In the following 12 decision tasks we expand on this and provide variation 
across player 3’s payoff in the three allocations for each decision task introducing larger 
incentives for selfish behavior. 
 In the HCP1 series of decision tasks we disentangle self-interest from efficiency 
and maximin preferences. To choose the efficient allocation in T2, T3, and T4, Player 3 
must give up some amount of their own payoff. To select the maximin allocation, Player 
A B C A B C A B C
Player 3 6 6 6 2 2 2 4.5 4.5 4.5
Player 2 5.5 4 2.5 7 5.5 4 10.5 8.5 6.5
Player 1 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 1.5 2 2.5
Total 12.5 11.5 10.5 11.5 10.5 9.5 16.5 15 13.5
Average 1, 2 3.25 2.75 2.25 4.75 4.25 3.75 6 5.25 4.5
Relative 3 to total 0.480 0.522 0.571 0.174 0.190 0.211 0.273 0.300 0.333
Predictions
Selfish A B C A B C A B C
Efficiency A A A
Maximin C A B C C
Choices
T1 - Engineering Model 4 3 6 6 5 2 7 1 5
T2 - Flat Bureaucracy 4 3 6 4 4 5 2 6 5
T3 - Tall Bureaucracy 5 4 5 2 4 8 2 7 5
T4 - Autocracy 4 1 9 5 0 9 4 2 8
Total 17 11 26 17 13 24 15 16 23
E&S (Count) 21 8 1 25 5 1 23 4 3
Choices (Percentage)
T1 30.8 23.1 46.2 46.2 38.5 15.4 53.8 7.7 38.5
T2 30.8 23.1 46.2 30.8 30.8 38.5 15.4 46.2 38.5
T3 35.7 28.6 35.7 14.3 28.6 57.1 14.3 50.0 35.7
T4 28.6 7.1 64.3 35.7 0.0 64.3 28.6 14.3 57.1
Total 31.5 20.4 48.1 31.5 24.1 44.4 27.8 29.6 42.6
E&S (Percentage) 70.0 26.7 3.3 80.6 16.1 3.2 76.7 13.3 10.0
Rich and Poor Games (E&S Series 3)
R (E&S3.1) P (E&S3.2) Ey (E&S3.3)
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3 must give up double the amount relative to the amount required to choose the efficient 
allocation. The cost to achieve an efficient or maximin allocation increases from HCP1.1 
to HCP1.2 and again from HCP1.2 to HCP1.3. 
 
HCP2 Series – The HCP1 series decision tasks focused on isolating self-interest, 
efficiency concerns, and maximin preferences. Here we instead focus on self-interest 
while allowing the efficient and maximin allocation to coincide. This design provides a 
clear contrast for self-interest against efficiency and maximin preferences. 
A B C A B C A B C
Player 3 9 9.25 8.75 9.5 11 8 11 13.5 8.5
Player 2 7.5 5 6.25 8 5 6.5 8.5 6.5 7.5
Player 1 4.5 4 5 4.75 4.25 5.25 6 4.5 7.5
Total 21 18.25 20 22.25 20.25 19.75 25.5 24.5 23.5
Average 1, 2 6 4.5 5.625 6.375 4.625 5.875 7.25 5.5 7.5
Relative 3 (to total) 0.429 0.507 0.438 0.427 0.543 0.405 0.431 0.551 0.362
Predictions
Selfish B B B
Efficiency A A A
Maximin C C C
P3 loses (if selected) -0.25 0 -0.5 -1.5 0 -3 -2.5 0 -5
Gains in efficiency 2.75 0 1.75 2 0 -0.5 1 0 -1
Gain to min 0.5 0 1 0.5 0 1 1.5 0 3
Choices
T1 - Engineering Model 3 3 7 7 2 4 4 2 7
T2 - Flat Bureaucracy 10 2 1 5 7 1 5 7 1
T3 - Tall Bureaucracy 7 5 2 2 11 1 4 9 1
T4 - Autocracy 3 8 3 3 9 2 5 7 2
Total 23 18 13 17 29 8 18 25 11
Choices (Percentage)
T1 23.1 23.1 53.8 53.8 15.4 30.8 30.8 15.4 53.8
T2 76.9 15.4 7.7 38.5 53.8 7.7 38.5 53.8 7.7
T3 50.0 35.7 14.3 14.3 78.6 7.1 28.6 64.3 7.1
T4 21.4 57.1 21.4 21.4 64.3 14.3 35.7 50.0 14.3
Total 42.6 33.3 24.1 31.5 53.7 14.8 33.3 46.3 20.4
Hierarchy Consistent Payoff Task Series 1
HCP1.1 HCP1.2 HCP1.3
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HCP3 Series – We carry forward elements from the HCP2 series of decision 
tasks but now hold constant the payoff for Player 2. This adjustment makes Player 2 
indifferent between the three allocations in each of the decision tasks with respect to 
their own payoff. Having Player 2 indifferent between allocations concerning their own 
payoff reduces the cognitive energy required to self-deceive oneself into choosing the 
selfish choice. In the HCP2 series of decision tasks, if Player 3 chooses selfishly it is at 
the expense of both Player 1 and Player 2. This dynamic is no longer present in the 
HCP3 series since the payoff to Player 2 is constant across allocations. We maintain 
the alignment of efficiency and maximin predictions to isolate self-interest motives. 
A B C A B C A B C
Player 3 6.5 7 6 8.5 10 7 10 12.5 7.5
Player 2 6 5 5.5 7 6 6.5 8 6 7
Player 1 3 1 5 3.5 0.5 6 2.5 0.5 6.5
Total 15.5 13 16.5 19 16.5 19.5 20.5 19 21
Average 1, 2 4.5 3 5.25 5.25 3.25 6.25 5.25 3.25 6.75
Relative 3 (to total) 0.419 0.538 0.364 0.447 0.606 0.359 0.488 0.658 0.357
Predictions
Selfish B B B
Efficiency C C C
Maximin C C C
P3 loses (if selected) -0.5 0 -1 -1.5 0 -3 -2.5 0 -5
Gains in efficiency 2.5 0 3.5 2.5 0 3 1.5 0 2
Gain to min 2 0 4 3 0 5.5 2 0 6
Choices
T1 4 4 5 3 2 8 1 1 11
T2 5 2 6 3 3 7 3 4 6
T3 5 3 6 4 7 3 4 7 3
T4 2 6 6 2 6 6 2 8 4
Total 16 15 23 12 18 24 10 20 24
Choices (Percentage)
T1 30.8 30.8 38.5 23.1 15.4 61.5 7.7 7.7 84.6
T2 38.5 15.4 46.2 23.1 23.1 53.8 23.1 30.8 46.2
T3 35.7 21.4 42.9 28.6 50.0 21.4 28.6 50.0 21.4
T4 14.3 42.9 42.9 14.3 42.9 42.9 14.3 57.1 28.6
Total 29.6 27.8 42.6 22.2 33.3 44.4 18.5 37.0 44.4
HCP2.1 HCP2.2 HCP2.3
HCP Task Series 2
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HCP4 Series – Finally, we present the HCP4 series of decision task. In the HCP3 
series of decision tasks, we focused on the alignment of the maximin preferences and 
efficiency concerns while isolating selfish motives. In the HCP4 series of decision tasks, 
we relax the constant payoff across allocations for Player 2 and now align selfish 
motives with maximin. By doing so, we isolate efficiency concerns and show the 
influence the efficiency motive when a decision maker is faced with clearly aligned 
selfish and maximin allocations. 
A B C A B C A B C
Player 3 6.5 7 6 8.5 10 7 10 12.5 7.5
Player 2 5.5 5.5 5.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 7 7 7
Player 1 2 1 3 4 2 6 3.5 0.5 6.5
Total 14 13.5 14.5 19 18.5 19.5 20.5 20 21
Average 1, 2 3.75 3.25 4.25 5.25 4.25 6.25 5.25 3.75 6.75
Relative 3 (to total) 0.464 0.519 0.414 0.447 0.541 0.359 0.488 0.625 0.357
Predictions
Selfish B B B
Efficiency C C C
Maximin C C C
P3 loses (if selected) -0.5 0 -1 -1.5 0 -3 -2.5 0 -5
Gains in efficiency 0.5 0 1 0.5 0 1 0.5 0 1
Gain to min 1 0 2 2 0 4 3 0 6
Choices
T1 2 1 10 3 3 7 3 2 8
T2 3 5 5 0 8 5 4 6 3
T3 1 8 5 2 10 2 3 10 1
T4 1 7 6 2 8 4 1 8 5
Total 7 21 26 7 29 18 11 26 17
Choices (Percentage)
T1 15.4 7.7 76.9 23.1 23.1 53.8 23.1 15.4 61.5
T2 23.1 38.5 38.5 0.0 61.5 38.5 30.8 46.2 23.1
T3 7.1 57.1 35.7 14.3 71.4 14.3 21.4 71.4 7.1
T4 7.1 50.0 42.9 14.3 57.1 28.6 7.1 57.1 35.7
Total 13.0 38.9 48.1 13.0 53.7 33.3 20.4 48.1 31.5
HCP3.1 HCP3.2 HCP3.3
HCP Task Series 3
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A B C A B C A B C
Player 3 10 9.5 9 11.5 10 8.5 12.5 10 7.5
Player 2 4 6.5 9 5 8 12 3 7.5 12
Player 1 4 3 2 5 4 4.5 3 2 1
Total 18 19 20 21.5 22 25 18.5 19.5 20.5
Average 1, 2 4 4.75 5.5 5 6 8.25 3 4.75 6.5
Relative 3 (to total) 0.556 0.500 0.450 0.535 0.455 0.340 0.676 0.513 0.366
Predictions
Selfish A A A
Efficiency C C C
Maximin A A A
P3 delta (if selected) 0 -0.5 -1 0 -1.5 -3 0 -2.5 -5
Gains in efficiency 0 1 2 0 0.5 3.5 0 1 2
Gain to min 2 1 0 1 0 0.5 2 1 0
Choices
T1 4 4 5 9 2 2 8 3 2
T2 10 1 2 10 2 1 11 2 0
T3 11 2 1 13 1 0 12 2 0
T4 11 0 3 9 2 3 13 1 0
Total 36 7 11 41 7 6 44 8 2
Choices (Percentage)
T1 30.8 30.8 38.5 69.2 15.4 15.4 61.5 23.1 15.4
T2 76.9 7.7 15.4 76.9 15.4 7.7 84.6 15.4 0.0
T3 78.6 14.3 7.1 92.9 7.1 0.0 85.7 14.3 0.0
T4 78.6 0.0 21.4 64.3 14.3 21.4 92.9 7.1 0.0
Total 66.7 13.0 20.4 75.9 13.0 11.1 81.5 14.8 3.7
HCP Task Series 4
HCP4.1 HCP4.2 HCP4.3
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Appendix (B). Experimental Instructions  
  
 This appendix provides the instructions read aloud verbatim to subjects prior to 
beginning each session in z-tree. 
 
B.1 Engineering Model Setting (T1) Instructions 
 
Experiment Instructions 
Introduction 
This is an experiment in economic decision-making. Please follow the instructions 
carefully.  Please do not communicate with other participants during the experiment 
unless instructed.  Importantly, please refrain from verbally reacting to events that 
occur. You are welcome to ask questions as we read the instructions. If you ask a 
question, please refrain from suggesting what choices you or others should make as 
this may compromise the scientific value of the experiment.  
 
You will never be asked to reveal your identity to anyone during the course of the 
experiment. Your name will never be associated with any of your decisions. In order to 
keep your decisions private, please do not reveal your choices to any other participant. 
 
You will earn money based on decisions made in the experiment. We will also pay you 
$5.25 for completing the entire experiment, along with a post-experiment questionnaire. 
At the end of the session, you will be paid your earnings in private and in cash. 
 
The Decision Setting 
In this experiment, you will be randomly matched into a group with two other players 
that are sitting in the room. The identity of your group members will never be revealed to 
you. You will remain in the same group for the entire experiment.  
 
The three players in your group will be assigned the role of Player 1, Player 2, and 
Player 3. You will be in the same role for the entire experiment. 
 
In a decision round, all members in your group will consider three options. Each option 
defines a payment amount for each of the three players. An example is provided on the 
next page. 
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In this example, if Option A is selected, Player 1 will receive 2.00, Player 2 will receive 
1.00 and Player 3 will receive 3.00. If instead Option B is chosen, Player 1 will receive 
3.00, Player 2 will receive 2.00 and Player 3 will receive 1.00. And so on.  
 
How is the option selected? In each round, all players will cast a vote for which option 
the group should select. If a majority in your group (2 out of 3) vote for the same option, 
the option with the majority vote will be chosen. If there is no majority, the computer will 
randomly select one of the options. In either case, the selected option will be in effect 
for all group members. 
 
Experiment Organization 
The experiment consists of several decision rounds, and all involve the same decision 
setting described before. You will not know the number of decision rounds until the 
experiment is finished. Please know that after a decision round is completed, you will 
not be provided with any feedback before the next round begins, including the option 
selected for the group. The specific payment amounts for the three options will change 
from one round to the next, so please look at all the options carefully before making 
choices.  
 
To determine your earnings, after the last decision round TWO of the decision rounds 
will be selected at random and played out for real. That is, the option selected in this 
round – using the procedure described before – will be in effect for your group. You will 
simply earn the payment amount indicated in this option for your Player role. 
   
Each round is equally likely to be selected as the paid round. You should thus treat 
each round as if it will be the randomly selected, paid round. 
 
We have now completed the instructions. Before we proceed to the decision rounds, are 
there any questions? 
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B.2 Flat Bureaucracy Setting (T2) Instructions 
 
Experiment Instructions 
Introduction 
This is an experiment in economic decision-making. Please follow the instructions 
carefully.  Please do not communicate with other participants during the experiment 
unless instructed.  Importantly, please refrain from verbally reacting to events that 
occur. You are welcome to ask questions as we read the instructions. If you ask a 
question, please refrain from suggesting what choices you or others should make as 
this may compromise the scientific value of the experiment.  
 
You will never be asked to reveal your identity to anyone during the course of the 
experiment. Your name will never be associated with any of your decisions. In order to 
keep your decisions private, please do not reveal your choices to any other participant. 
 
You will earn money based on decisions made in the experiment. We will also pay you 
$5.25 for completing the entire experiment, along with a post-experiment questionnaire. 
At the end of the session, you will be paid your earnings in private and in cash. 
 
The Decision Setting 
In this experiment, you will be randomly matched into a group with two other players 
that are sitting in the room. The identity of your group members will never be revealed to 
you. You will remain in the same group for the entire experiment.  
 
The three players in your group will be assigned the role of Player 1, Player 2, and 
Player 3. You will be in the same role for the entire experiment. 
 
In a decision round, all members in your group will consider three options. Each option 
defines a payment amount for each of the three players. An example is provided on the 
next page. 
 
 
 
In this example, if Option A is selected, Player 1 will receive 2.00, Player 2 will receive 
1.00 and Player 3 will receive 3.00. If instead Option B is chosen, Player 1 will receive 
3.00, Player 2 will receive 2.00 and Player 3 will receive 1.00. And so on.  
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How is the option selected? In each round, Player 3 will choose an option on behalf of 
the group. This option will be in effect for all group members. Player 1 and Player 2 will 
be able to make recommendations. In particular, Player 1 and Player 2 will first make a 
recommendation to Player 3 of what option to choose. These recommendations will be 
made separately. Player 1 will not know of Player 2’s recommendation, and vice versa. 
 
Player 3 will receive the recommendations from Player 1 and Player 2 before entering 
his or her decision. Player 3 is free to select any option, whether it is one recommended 
by Player 1 and/or Player 2 or something different.  
 
Experiment Organization 
The experiment consists of several decision rounds, and all involve the same decision 
setting described before. You will not know the number of decision rounds until the 
experiment is finished. Please know that after a decision round is completed, you will 
not be provided with any feedback before the next round begins, including the option 
selected for the group. The specific payment amounts for the three options will change 
from one round to the next, so please look at all the options carefully before making 
choices.  
 
To determine your earnings, after the last decision round, TWO of the decision rounds 
will be selected at random and played out for real. That is, the option selected in this 
round – using the procedure described before – will be in effect for your group. You will 
simply earn the payment amount indicated in this option for your Player role. 
   
Each round is equally likely to be selected as the paid round. You should thus treat 
each round as if it will be the randomly selected, paid round. 
 
We have now completed the instructions. Before we proceed to the decision rounds, are 
there any questions? 
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B.3 Tall Bureaucracy Setting (T3) Instructions 
 
Experiment Instructions 
 
Introduction 
This is an experiment in economic decision-making. Please follow the instructions 
carefully.  Please do not communicate with other participants during the experiment 
unless instructed.  Importantly, please refrain from verbally reacting to events that 
occur. You are welcome to ask questions as we read the instructions. If you ask a 
question, please refrain from suggesting what choices you or others should make as 
this may compromise the scientific value of the experiment.  
 
You will never be asked to reveal your identity to anyone during the course of the 
experiment. Your name will never be associated with any of your decisions. In order to 
keep your decisions private, please do not reveal your choices to any other participant. 
 
You will earn money based on decisions made in the experiment. We will also pay you 
$5.25 for completing the entire experiment, along with a post-experiment questionnaire. 
At the end of the session, you will be paid your earnings in private and in cash. 
 
The Decision Setting 
In this experiment, you will be randomly matched into a group with two other players 
that are sitting in the room. The identity of your group members will never be revealed to 
you. You will remain in the same group for the entire experiment.  
 
The three players in your group will be assigned the role of Player 1, Player 2, and 
Player 3. You will be in the same role for the entire experiment. 
 
In a decision round, all members in your group will consider three options. Each option 
defines a payment amount for each of the three players. An example is provided on the 
next page. 
 
 
 
 
In this example, if Option A is selected, Player 1 will receive 2.00, Player 2 will receive 
1.00 and Player 3 will receive 3.00. If instead Option B is chosen, Player 1 will receive 
3.00, Player 2 will receive 2.00 and Player 3 will receive 1.00. And so on.  
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How is the option selected? In each round, Player 3 will choose an option on behalf of 
the group. This option will be in effect for all group members. Player 1 and Player 2 will 
be able to make recommendations. In particular, Player 1 will first make a 
recommendation to Player 2 of what option to choose. Player 2 will then make a 
recommendation to Player 3 of what option to choose. Player 2 is free to recommend 
any option to Player 3, whether it is the one also recommended by Player 1 or a 
different option. 
 
Player 3 will receive the recommendation from Player 2 before entering his or her 
decision. Player 3 is free to select any option, whether it is the one recommended by 
Player 2 or a different option. Player 3 will not know the recommendation provided by 
Player 1.  
 
 
Experiment Organization 
The experiment consists of several decision rounds, and all involve the same decision 
setting described before. You will not know the number of decision rounds until the 
experiment is finished. Please know that after a decision round is completed, you will 
not be provided with any feedback before the next round begins, including the option 
selected for the group. The specific payment amounts for the three options will change 
from one round to the next, so please look at all the options carefully before making 
choices.  
 
To determine your earnings, after the last decision round TWO of the decision rounds 
will be selected at random and played out for real. That is, the option selected in this 
round – using the procedure described before – will be in effect for your group. You will 
simply earn the payment amount indicated in this option for your Player role. 
   
Each round is equally likely to be selected as the paid round. You should thus treat 
each round as if it will be the randomly selected, paid round. 
 
We have now completed the instructions. Before we proceed to the decision rounds, are 
there any questions? 
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B.4 Autocracy Setting (T4) Instructions 
Experiment Instructions 
 
Introduction 
This is an experiment in economic decision-making. Please follow the instructions 
carefully.  Please do not communicate with other participants during the experiment 
unless instructed.  Importantly, please refrain from verbally reacting to events that 
occur. You are welcome to ask questions as we read the instructions. If you ask a 
question, please refrain from suggesting what choices you or others should make as 
this may compromise the scientific value of the experiment.  
 
You will never be asked to reveal your identity to anyone during the course of the 
experiment. Your name will never be associated with any of your decisions. In order to 
keep your decisions private, please do not reveal your choices to any other participant. 
 
You will earn money based on decisions made in the experiment. We will also pay you 
$5.25 for completing the entire experiment, along with a post-experiment questionnaire. 
At the end of the session, you will be paid your earnings in private and in cash. 
 
The Decision Setting 
In this experiment, you will be randomly matched into a group with two other players 
that are sitting in the room. The identity of your group members will never be revealed to 
you. You will remain in the same group for the entire experiment.  
 
The three players in your group will be assigned the role of Player 1, Player 2, and 
Player 3. You will be in the same role for the entire experiment. 
 
In a decision round, all members in your group will consider three options. Each option 
defines a payment amount for each of the three players. An example is provided on the 
next page. 
 
 
 
In this example, if Option A is selected, Player 1 will receive 2.00, Player 2 will receive 
1.00 and Player 3 will receive 3.00. If instead Option B is chosen, Player 1 will receive 
3.00, Player 2 will receive 2.00 and Player 3 will receive 1.00. And so on.  
 
How is the option selected? In this task, Player 3 will choose an option on behalf of the 
group. This option will be in effect for all group members. Player 1 and Player 2 are 
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asked to provide the option they would recommend to Player 3 if they could. Player 3 
will not receive this information. 
 
Experiment Organization 
The experiment consists of several decision rounds, and all involve the same decision 
setting described above. You will not know the number of decision rounds until the 
experiment is finished. Please know that after a decision round is completed, you will 
not be provided with any feedback before the next round begins, including the option 
selected for the group. The specific payment amounts for the three options will change 
from one round to the next, so please look at all the options carefully before making 
choices.  
 
To determine your earnings, after the last decision round TWO of the decision rounds 
will be selected at random and played out for real. That is, the option selected in this 
round – using the procedure described before – will be in effect for your group. You will 
simply earn the payment amount indicated in this option for your Player role. 
 
Each round is equally likely to be selected as the paid round. You should thus treat 
each round as if it will be the randomly selected, paid round. 
 
We have now completed the instructions. Before we proceed to the decision rounds, are 
there any questions? 
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Appendix (C). Data Appendix 
This appendix provides a more detailed description of the procedures used to 
develop the data sources and manipulations utilized in our paper. 
DOD BRAC Recommendations. We first collected the DOD proposed 2005 realignment 
and closure list from Appendix K of the BRAC Commission report to the President (2005 
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 2005). Appendix K provided the 
DOD’s recommendation to the BRAC Commission for further consideration. The DOD’s 
recommendation consisted of 190 recommendations broken down by military branch of 
service. For example, the Army made 56 recommendations consisting of roughly 200 
individual actions with the largest single increase in personnel representing an increase 
of 12,466 personnel while the largest single decrease in personnel represented a 
decrease of 14,870 personnel. Similarly, the Navy and the Air Force made 20 and 41 
recommendations respectively. In addition to branch specific recommendations, the 
DOD looked to find synergies among the independent branches by also recommending 
70 recommendations which seek to develop “Joint” or blended capabilities across 
services. The 70 Joint recommendations spanned a diverse set of focus areas such as 
education and training, headquarters and support activities, industrial support (i.e depot 
maintenance and storage of ammunition), medical services, and technical support (i.e. 
consolidating ground vehicle development and acquisition). 
Each of the recommendations from Appendix K provided a recommendation 
number, the name of the installations impacted by the recommendation, the state these 
installations belong to, the number of direct net military, civilian, and contractor 
personnel impacted by the recommendation, and the recommended action (i.e. closure, 
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realignment, or gainer). In many cases, a recommendation to close or realign one 
installation resulted in decreasing personnel in one location and reallocating those 
positions across several locations in the US. For military personnel, these actions 
resulted in moving impacted personnel from one location to another. For DOD civilian 
personnel, it is not always the case that the DOD moved impacted individuals from one 
location to another and we are unaware of data tracking the number of civilians moved 
by the DOD as a result of the 2005 BRAC. To our knowledge, the DOD did not relocate 
DOD contractor personnel.  
The BRAC Commission provided Appendix K as a Portable Document Format 
(PDF). As a result, we manually key-punched the recommendation number, DOD 
recommendation, installation name, State, net military, net civilian, and net contractor 
personnel into an Excel document. 
Final and Approved BRAC Commission Recommendations. The DOD 
recommendations provided in Appendix K of the BRAC Commission report to the 
President formed the starting point for the BRAC Commission’s deliberations. The 
BRAC commission considered the DOD recommendations against two categories of 
criteria. The first of these categories focused on military value such as the current and 
future mission capabilities, cost of operations, or the potential operating environment of 
both the existing and potential receiving locations. The second, more general category, 
focused on other considerations such as time of potential costs and savings, economic 
impact on existing communities, available infrastructure to accommodate new 
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personnel, and environmental impact. As directed by law, military value was to hold 
primacy in the BRAC Commission deliberation process.  
 Appendix Q of the BRAC Commission report to the President provides a 
recommendation by recommendation history of decisions from the BRAC Commission 
concerning the DOD’s recommendations. In many cases, the BRAC Commission simply 
found the recommendations of the DOD consistent with the final selection criteria. 
However, the BRAC Commission also made minor changes to verbiage for clarity or 
made more substantial structural changes to the DOD recommendations. In some 
cases, the BRAC Commission voted to delete recommendations. In total, the BRAC 
Commission voted to delete 30 of the DOD recommendations. Finally, the BRAC 
Commission also added 5 recommendations mostly impacting Navy installations.  
 We carefully reviewed Appendix Q and incorporated updates to the data we key-
punched from the DOD recommendations (Appendix K). Appendix Q provides a text 
narrative for the BRAC Commission decisions and does not provide the same numerical 
level of detail provided in the DOD recommendations. This leads to some ambiguity in 
personnel impacts related to the BRAC Commissions final decision. In cases where the 
partial change recommended by the BRAC Commission led to ambiguity in the 
personnel impacts, we maintained the DOD’s recommendation. Later, we updated the 
final personnel impacts utilizing data from Appendix O of the BRAC Commission report 
to the President.  
Appendix O of the BRAC Commission report to the President provides the final 
net job changes by military, DOD civilian, and DOD contractor employee types. 
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However, Appendix O also summarizes the net job changes at the installation level 
which leads to a loss of mapping individual BRAC recommendations to the installation. 
For example, the DOD makes four recommendations (Recommendations# 5, 130, 140, 
and 141) in Appendix K which directly impact Fort Meade, MD; Appendix O simply lists 
Fort Meade, MD once. We map the DOD recommendations in Appendix K, updated by 
information in Appendix Q, to the final net job changes in Appendix O of the BRAC 
Commission report to the President. Before resolving any differences in the reported net 
job changes, we identify the county each BRAC affected installation resides in and 
identify the year in which the DOD completed each BRAC recommendation. We outline 
these procedures here, followed by our procedure to resolve any disagreements in final 
net job changes in our dataset with those in Appendix O of the BRAC Commission 
report to the President. 
Linking US County to BRAC Recommendations. In order to perform our analysis at the 
county level, we documented the location data for each of the BRAC action 
recommendations. We began by utilizing DOD provided information relating to location 
data for DOD installations. In supporting documents provided to the BRAC Commission, 
we find an Excel document titled “Counties MSA and Stuff.xls” which contains 
information pertaining to the branch of service of installations, the name of the 
installation, city, state, and county (Department of Defense, 2017e). However, this data 
provided incomplete coverage of installations directly impacted by the 2005 BRAC. In 
the absence of DOD provided installation location data, we simply conducted web 
searches using Google.com to access publicly available installation location data. 
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Combining these two sources of information, we developed a complete linkage between 
installation location data at the county level and the DOD recommendations.  
Linking DOD Recommendation to Implementation Schedule. Once we established the 
link between counties of interest and DOD recommendations from Appendix K (updated 
using Appendix Q), we turned our attention to the implementation schedule. To 
accomplish this, we utilize the 2006-2008, 2011, and 2013 Reports on 2005 Defense 
Base Closure and Realignment Implementation, or simply “Section 2907” reports, 
mandated by Congress as amended by Section 2931 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. 
 These reports provide a wide variety of information related to the 2005 BRAC. 
Specific to our study, the Section 2907 reports provide the BRAC Commission’s 
recommendation number, the installation name, the BRAC action undertaken, and the 
estimated completion date for BRAC actions. Due to the complex nature of the BRAC 
actions, we begin with a reasonable assumption that the DOD scheduled completion of 
BRAC actions towards the end of availability of BRAC authority in 2011 to maximize 
planning and orderly transitions in both the losing and gaining installations. This 
assumption seems reasonable due to the complexity of large personnel movements and 
the necessity of major construction in gaining locations to accommodate the influx of 
new personnel and mission requirements.  
 Utilizing the most current Section 2907 report in 2013 and working towards the 
oldest report in 2006, we reviewed each document to find information on the timing of 
completion of each of the BRAC recommendations. We only use the most current 
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information available for each BRAC recommendation and where applicable apply the 
date of completion to both the losing and gaining locations. If we lack specific year of 
completion associated with BRAC recommendations, we assume these actions were 
completed in 2011.  
Reconciling DOD and Final BRAC Commission Recommendations. As previously 
discussed, we began with the DOD recommendations in Appendix K, and updated the 
DOD recommendations with information in Appendix Q of the BRAC Commission report 
to the President. We then utilized the Section 2907 reports to build the approximate 
realized implementation schedule of the 2005 BRAC. Finally, we reconciled our dataset 
with the final net job changes listed in Appendix O of the BRAC Commission report to 
the President. We compared the total net jobs by employee type (military, DOD civilian, 
and DOD contractor) in our dataset with those listed in Appendix O. If a 
recommendation in our dataset did not match those listed in Appendix O, we amended 
our dataset to match those provided in Appendix O. If a disagreement occurred which 
spanned several years in our dataset, we matched the final net job changes by 
employee type listed in Appendix O by proportionally time phasing the data in Appendix 
O.  
For example, the DOD made recommendations 99, 101, 102, 103, 106, 117, and 
118 in Appendix K which directly impacted Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas leading 
to an increase of 2,713 personnel. According to Section 2907 reports, the DOD 
accomplished these recommendations throughout 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2011. The 
final BRAC Commission recommendations documented in Appendix O of the BRAC 
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Commission report to the President states Little Rock Air Force Base will gain 2,752 
positions, a difference of 49 positions. To reconcile this difference, we calculate the 
proportion of each employee type in 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2011 then allocate the final 
net job changes by employee type documented in Appendix O. By following this 
procedure, we maximize the utilization of available information while matching the final 
net job changes approved by the BRAC Commission.  
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